*475OPINION
By the Court,
This is an adoption proceeding. Deborah, age ten at the time of the filing of the petition, was born to Gerald and Shelvie Casper. Shortly after her birth Gerald left Deborah and her mother who was compelled to seek welfare assistance for support. Thereafter for a few months he paid $12.00 per week. In 1960 he was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to the North Carolina State Prison for a period of 25 to 30 years. All of the foregoing events took place in North Carolina.
Shelvie placed the child in the care of her aunt and uncle with whom the child lived until they instituted these proceedings to adopt Deborah. Shelvie executed a relinquishment in favor of the adoption. Gerald, in prison, having been given notice as required by statute, objected although he acknowledged that leaving the child with the aunt and uncle was satisfactory with him provided he could correspond with the child and visit her whenever able to do so.
The Washoe County Legal Aid Society was appointed to represent the father at the adoption hearing. Casper, of course, was not present, but the court-appointed counsel did appear for him with his knowledge and permission. The trial court found that the father failed to provide proper parental care, custody, guidance, maintenance or support, that the child had suffered severe environmental deprivation while with her natural parents, that therefore she was “an abandoned and/or neglected child” as defined by NRS 128.010(2) and (3),1 and that the *476father was an unfit parent as defined in NRS 128.010(4)2 concluding with a termination of Gerald’s parental rights and granting the adoption to the aunt and uncle.
This court was requested by Gerald to allow him to file an appeal without payment of a filing fee because he is a pauper and that we appoint an attorney to represent him for an appeal.
There is no statutory authority for either of his requests. Pauper privileges are provided by statute only for the trial level of litigation, not for appeals.3 However, in cases where impecuniosity prevents an appeal this court under its inherent powers will waive the $25.00 filing fee requirement which we did in this case. Appointment of counsel is statutorily allowed only for one who petitions for termination of parental rights or for the minor in proceedings such as these. NRS 128.100. The county bears the cost of such appointment. NRS 128.140. Otherwise, there is no statutory right to appointment of counsel for appellate review in this type of civil case as there is in criminal cases and other types of civil cases. NRS 7.260, 136.200, 150.060, 171.188, 171.196, 177.345, 178.397, 260.060, 433.-270. We do not decide whether appointment of appellate counsel is required by Nevada Constitution Article 1, § 8 or the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution when a state terminates parental rights, because in our opinion the appeal is clearly frivolous and appointed counsel would not be of any use.
In evaluating the merits of an appeal from this record we find ample support for the findings of the trial court. The best *477interests of the child were properly served by the order of termination and granting of the adoption. There was substantial evidence in support of the finding of an abandonment. This court in Carson v. Lowe, 76 Nev. 446, 357 P.2d 591 (1960), recognized the solemn duty of the courts to question closely termination of parental rights. We find here that the trial court met the standards.
There are no arguable meritorious issues presented which would necessitate the appointment of an attorney for the purposes of an appeal.
The appeal is dismissed as frivolous.
Collins, C. J., Batjer, Mowbray, and Thompson, JL, concur.