delivered the opinion of the Court.
The questions presented here are whether the federal drug forfeiture statute authorizes a district court to enter a pretrial order freezing assets in a defendant’s possession, even where the defendant seeks to use those assets to pay an attorney; if so, we must decide whether such an order is permissible under the Constitution. We answer both of these questions in the affirmative.
I — I
In July 1987, an indictment was entered, alleging that respondent had directed a large-scale heroin distribution enterprise. The multicount indictment alleged violations of racketeering laws, creation of a continuing criminal enterprise (CCE), and tax and firearm offenses. The indictment also alleged that three specific assets — a home, an apartment, and $35,000 in cash — had been accumulated by respondent as a result of his narcotics trafficking. These assets, the indict*603ment alleged, were subject to forfeiture under the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984 (CFA), 98 Stat. 2044, as amended, 21 U. S. C. § 853(a) (1982 ed., Supp. V), because they were “property constituting, or derived from . . . proceeds . . . obtained” from drug-law violations.1
On the same day that the indictment was unsealed, the District Court granted the Government’s ex parte motion, pursuant to § 853(e)(1)(A),2 for a restraining order freezing *604the above-mentioned assets pending trial. Shortly thereafter, respondent moved to vacate this restraining order, to permit him to use the frozen assets to retain an attorney. Respondent’s motion further sought a declaration that if these assets were used to pay an attorney’s fees, §853(c)’s third-party transfers provision would not subsequently be used to reclaim such payments if respondent was convicted and his assets forfeited.3 Respondent raised various statutory challenges to the restraining order, and claimed that it interfered with his Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice. The District Court denied the motion to vacate.
*605On appeal, the Second Circuit concluded that respondent’s statutory and Sixth Amendment challenges were lacking, but remanded the case to the District Court for an adversarial hearing “at which the government ha[d] the burden to demonstrate the likelihood that the assets are forfeitable”; if the Government failed its burden at such a hearing, the Court of Appeals held, any fees paid to an attorney would be exempt from forfeiture irrespective of the final outcome at respondent’s trial. 836 F. 2d 74, 84 (1987). Pursuant to this mandate, on remand, the District Court held a 4-day hearing on whether continuing the restraining order was proper. At the end of the hearing, the District Court ruled that it would continue the restraining order because the Government had “overwhelmingly established a likelihood” that the property in question would be forfeited at the end of trial. App. to Pet. for Cert. 86a. Ultimately, respondent’s criminal case proceeded to trial, where he was represented by a Criminal Justice Act-appointed attorney.4
In the meantime, the Second Circuit vacated its earlier opinion and heard respondent’s appeal en banc.5 The en *606banc court, by an 8-to-4 vote, ordered that the District Court’s restraining order be modified to permit the restrained assets to be used to pay attorney’s fees. 852 F. 2d 1400 (1988). The Court was sharply divided as to its rationale. Three of the judges found that the order violated the Sixth Amendment, while three others questioned it on statutory grounds; two judges found § 853 suspect under the Due Process Clause for its failure to include a statutory provision requiring the sort of hearing that the panel had ordered in the first place. The four dissenting judges would have upheld the restraining order.
We granted certiorari, 488 U. S. 941 (1988), because the Second Circuit’s decision created a conflict among the Courts of Appeals over the statutory and constitutional questions presented.6 We now reverse.
II
We first must address the question whether § 853 requires, upon conviction, forfeiture of assets that an accused intends to use to pay his attorneys.
A
“In determining the scope of a statute, we look first to its language.” United States v. Turkette, 452 U. S. 576, 580 (1981). In the case before us, the language of §853 is plain and unambiguous: all assets falling within its scope are to be forfeited upon conviction, with no exception existing for the assets used to pay attorney’s fees—or anything else, for that matter.
*607As observed above, § 853(a) provides that a person convicted of the offenses charged in respondent’s indictment “shall forfeit . . . any property” that was derived from the commission of these offenses. After setting out this rule, § 853(a) repeats later in its text that upon conviction a sentencing court “shall order” forfeiture of all property described in § 853(a). Congress could not have chosen stronger words to express its intent that forfeiture be mandatory in cases where the statute applied, or broader words to define the scope of what was to be forfeited. Likewise, the statute provides a broad definition of “property” when describing what types of assets are within the section’s scope: “real property . . . tangible and intangible personal property, including rights, privileges, interests, claims, and securities.” 21 U. S. C. § 853(b) (1982 ed., Supp. V). Nothing in this all-inclusive listing even hints at the idea that assets to be used to pay an attorney are not “property” within the statute’s meaning.
Nor are we alone in concluding that the statute is unambiguous in failing to exclude assets that could be used to pay an attorney from its definition of forfeitable property. This argument, advanced by respondent here, see Brief for Respondent 12-19, has been unanimously rejected by every Court of Appeals that has finally passed on it,7 as it was by the Second Circuit panel below, see 836 F. 2d, at 78-80; id., at 85-86 (Oakes, J., dissenting); even the judges who concurred on statutory grounds in the en banc decision did not accept this position, see 852 F. 2d, at 1405-1410 (Winter, J., concurring). We note also that the Brief for American Bar *608Association as Amicus Curiae 6 frankly admits that the statute “on [its] face, broadly cover[s] all property derived from alleged criminal activity and contain[s] no specific exemption for property used to pay bona fide attorneys’ fees.”
Respondent urges us, nonetheless, to interpret the statute to exclude such property for several reasons. Principally, respondent contends that we should create such an exemption because the statute does not expressly include property to be used for attorneys’ fees, and/or because Congress simply did not consider the prospect that forfeiture would reach assets that could be used to pay for an attorney. In support, respondent observes that the legislative history is “silent” on this question, and that the House and Senate debates fail to discuss this prospect.8 But this proves nothing: the legisla*609tive history and congressional debates are similarly silent on the use of forfeitable assets to pay stockbroker’s fees, laundry bills, or country club memberships; no one could credibly argue that, as a result, assets to be used for these purposes are similarly exempt from the statute’s definition of forfeit-able property. The fact that the forfeiture provision reaches assets that could be used to pay attorney’s fees, even though it contains no express provisions to this effect, “‘does not demonstrate ambiguity’” in the statute: ‘“It demonstrates breadth.’” Sedima, S. P. R. L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U. S. 479, 499 (1985) (quoting Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 747 F. 2d 384, 398 (CA7 1984)). The statutory provision at issue here is broad and unambiguous, and Congress’ failure to supplement § 853(a)’s comprehensive phrase — “any property” — with an exclamatory “and we even mean assets to be used to pay an attorney” does not lessen the force of the statute’s plain language.
*610We also find unavailing respondent’s reliance on the comments of several legislators — made following enactment — to the effect that Congress did not anticipate the use of the forfeiture law to seize assets that would be used to pay attorneys. See Brief for Respondent 15-16, and n. 9 (citing comments of Sen. Leahy and Reps. Hughes and Shaw). As we have noted before, such postenactment views “form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent” behind a statute, United States v. Price, 361 U. S. 304, 313 (1960); instead, Congress’ intent is “best determined by [looking to] the statutory language that it chooses,” Sedima, S. P. R. L., swpra, at 495, n. 13. Moreover, we observe that these comments are further subject to question because Congress has refused to act on repeated suggestions by the defense bar for the sort of exemption respondent urges here,9 even though it has amended § 853 in other respects since these entreaties were first heard. See Pub. L. 99-570, §§ 1153(b), 1864, 100 Stat. 3207-13, 3207-54.
In addition, we observe that in the very same law by which Congress adopted the CFA — Pub. L. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837-Congress also adopted a provision for the special forfeiture of collateral profits (e. g., profits from books, movies, etc.) that a convicted defendant derives from his crimes. See Victims of Crime Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 2175-2176 (now codified at 18 U. S. C. §§3681-3682 (1982 ed., Supp. V)). That forfeiture provision expressly exempts “pay[ments] for legal representation of the defendant in matters arising from the offense for which such defendant has been convicted, but no more than 20 percent of the total [forfeited collateral profits] may be so used.” §3681(c)(l)(B)(ii). Thus, Congress adopted express ly — in a statute enacted simidtaneously with the one under review in this case — the precise exemption from for*611feiture which respondent asks us to imply into §853. The express exemption from forfeiture of assets that could be used to pay attorney’s fees in Chapter XIV of Pub. L. 98-473 indicates to us that Congress understood what it was doing in omitting such an exemption from Chapter III of that enactment.
Finally, respondent urges us, see Brief for Respondent 20-29, to invoke a variety of general canons of statutory construction, as well as several prudential doctrines of this Court, to create the statutory exemption he advances; among these doctrines is our admonition that courts should construe statutes to avoid decision as to their constitutionality. See, e. g., Edward, J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U. S. 568, 575 (1988); NLRB. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U. S. 490, 500 (1979). We respect these canons, and they are quite often useful in close cases, or when statutory language is ambiguous. But we have observed before that such “interpretative canon[s are] not a license for the judiciary to rewrite language enacted by the legislature.” United States v. Albertini, 472 U. S. 675, 680 (1985). Here, the language is clear and the statute comprehensive: §853 does not exempt assets to be used for attorney’s fees from its forfeiture provisions.
In sum, whatever force there might be to respondent’s claim for an exemption from forfeiture under § 853(a) of assets necessary to pay attorney’s fees — based on his theories about the statute’s purpose, or the implications of interpretative canons, or the understandings of individual Members of Congress about the statute’s scope — “[t]he short answer is that Congress did not write the statute that way.” United States v. Naftalin, 441 U. S. 768, 773 (1979).
B
Although § 853(a) recognizes no general exception for assets used to pay an attorney, we are urged that the provision *612in § 853(e)(1)(A) for pretrial restraining orders on assets in a defendant’s possession should be interpreted to include such an exemption. It was on this ground that Judge Winter concurred below. 852 F. 2d, at 1405-1411.
The restraining order subsection provides that, on the Government’s application, a district court “may enter a restraining order or injunction ... or take any other action to preserve the availability of property ... for forfeiture under this section.” 21 U. S. C. §853(e)(1) (1982 ed., Supp. V). Judge Winter read the permissive quality of the subsection (i. e., “may enter”) to authorize a district court to employ “traditional principles of equity” before restraining a defendant’s use of forfeitable assets; a balancing of hardships, he concluded, generally weighed against restraining a defendant’s use of forfeitable assets to pay for an attorney. 852 F. 2d, at 1406. Judge Winter further concluded that assets not subjected to pretrial restraint under § 853(e), if used to pay an attorney, may not be subsequently seized for forfeiture to the Government, notwithstanding the authorization found in § 853(c) for recoupment of forfeitable assets transferred to third parties.
This reading seriously misapprehends the nature of the provisions in question. As we have said, § 853(a) is categorical: it contains no reference at all to § 853(e) or § 853(c), let alone any reference indicating that its reach is limited by those sections. Perhaps some limit could be implied if these provisions were necessarily inconsistent with § 853(a). But that is not the case. Under § 853(e)(1), the trial court “may” enter a restraining order if the United States requests it, but not otherwise, and it is not required to enter such an order if a bond or some other means to “preserve the availability of property described in subsection (a) of this section for forfeiture” is employed. Thus, § 853(e)(1)(A) is plainly aimed at implementing the commands of § 853(a) and cannot sensibly be construed to give the district court discretion to permit *613the dissipation of the very property that § 853(a) requires be forfeited upon conviction.
We note that the “equitable discretion” that is given to the judge under § 853(e)(1)(A) turns out to be no discretion at all as far as the issue before us here is concerned: Judge Winter concludes that assets necessary to pay attorney’s fees must be excluded from any restraining order. See 852 F. 2d, at 1407-1409. For that purpose, the word “may” becomes “may not.” The discretion found in §853(e) becomes a command to use that subsection (and § 853(c)) to frustrate the attainment of §853(a)’s ends. This construction is improvident. Whatever discretion Congress gave the district courts in §§ 853(e) and 853(c), that discretion must be cabined by the purposes for which Congress created it: “to preserve the availability of property ... for forfeiture.” We cannot believe that Congress intended to permit the effectiveness of the powerful “relation-back” provision of § 853(c), and the comprehensive “any property . . . any proceeds” language of § 853(a), to be nullified by any other construction of the statute.
This result may seem harsh, but we have little doubt that it is the one that the statute mandátes. Section 853(c) states that “[a]ll right, title, and interest in [forfeitable] property . . . vests in the United States upon the commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture.” Permitting a defendant to use assets for his private purposes that, under this provision, will become the property of the United States if a conviction occurs cannot be sanctioned. Moreover, this view is supported by the relevant legislative history, which states that “[t]he sole purpose of [§ 853’s] restraining order provision ... is to preserve the status quo, i. e., to assure the availability of the property pending disposition of the criminal case.” S. Rep. No. 98-225, p. 204 (1983). If, instead, the statutory interpretation adopted by Judge Winter’s concurrence were applied, this purpose would not be achieved.
*614We conclude that there is no exemption from § 853’s forfeiture or pretrial restraining order provisions for assets which a defendant wishes to use to retain an attorney. In enacting §853, Congress decided to give force to the old adage that “crime does not pay.” We find no evidence that Congress intended to modify that nostrum to read, “crime does not pay, except for attorney’s fees.” If, as respondent and supporting amici so vigorously assert, we are mistaken as to Congress’ intent, that body can amend this statute to otherwise provide. But the statute, as presently written, cannot be read any other way.
Ill
Having concluded that the statute authorized the restraining order entered by the District Court, we reach the question whether the order violated respondent’s right to counsel of choice as protected by the Sixth Amendment or the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
A
Respondent’s most sweeping constitutional claims are that, as a general matter, operation of the forfeiture statute interferes with a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice, and the guarantee afforded by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause of a “balance of forces” between the accused and the Government. In this regard, respondent contends, the mere prospect of post-trial forfeiture is enough to deter a defendant’s counsel of choice from representing him.
In another decision we announce today, Caplin & Drys-dale, Chartered v. United States, post, p. 617, we hold that neither the Fifth nor the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution requires Congress to permit a defendant to use assets adjudged to be forfeitable to pay that defendant’s legal fees. We rely on our conclusion in that case to dispose of the similar constitutional claims raised by respondent here.
*615B
In addition to the constitutional issues raised in Caplin & Drysdale, respondent contends that freezing the assets in question before he is convicted — and before they are finally adjudged to be forfeitable — raises distinct constitutional concerns. We conclude, however, that assets in a defendant’s possession may be restrained in the way they were here based on a finding of probable cause to believe that the assets are forfeitable.10
We have previously permitted the Government to seize property based on a finding of probable cause to believe that the property will ultimately be proved forfeitable. See, e. g., United States v. $8,850, 461 U. S. 555 (1983); Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U. S. 663 (1974). Here, where respondent was not ousted from his property, but merely restrained from disposing of it, the governmental intrusion was even less severe than those permitted by our prior decisions.
Indeed, it would be odd to conclude that the Government may not restrain property, such as the home and apartment in respondent’s possession, based on a finding of probable cause, when we have held that (under appropriate circumstances), the Government may restrain persons where there *616is a finding of probable cause to believe that the accused has committed a serious offense. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U. S. 739 (1987). Given the gravity of the offenses charged in the indictment, respondent himself could have been subjected to pretrial restraint if deemed necessary to “reasonably assure [his] appearance [at trial] and the safety of. . . the community,” 18 U. S. C. § 3142(e) (1982 ed., Supp. V); we find no constitutional infirmity in § 853(e)’s authorization of a similar restraint on respondent’s property to protect its “appearance” at trial and protect the community’s interest in full recovery of any ill-gotten gains.
Respondent contends that both the nature of the Government’s property right in forfeitable assets, and the nature of the use to which he would have put these assets (i. e., retaining an attorney), require some departure from our established rule of permitting pretrial restraint of assets based on probable cause. We disagree. In Caplin & Drysdale, we conclude that a weighing of these very interests suggests that the Government may — without offending the Fifth or Sixth Amendment — obtain forfeiture of property that a defendant might have wished to use to pay his attorney. Post, p. 617. Given this holding, we find that a pretrial restraining order does not “arbitrarily” interfere with a defendant’s “fair opportunity” to retain counsel. Cf. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 69, 53 (1932). Put another way: if the Government may, post-trial, forbid the use of forfeited assets to pay an attorney, then surely no constitutional violation occurs when, after probable cause is adequately established, the Government obtains an order barring a defendant from frustrating that end by dissipating his assets prior to trial.
IV
For the reasons given above, the judgment of the Second Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.