G. Alexander Ramsey v. The United States.
On the Proofs.
In August, 1866, the Secretary of the Treasury issues a circular prescribing the proportion of penalties and forfeitm-es which will be awarded to informéis. The claimant gives information vihereby a large amount is recovered. After the information is given, Congress repeal the laws authorizing informers’ shares. The Secretary refuses to pay anything to the claimant. He brings suit to recover the share assured to informers by the circular.
I. Tlie cases reviewed in which it is held that the court has or has not jurisdiction of cases directly or indirectly arising under the revenue laws.
XI. Where a statute provides that, if a share of money paid into the Treasury in lieu of a fine or penalty claimed hy an informer, the Secretary of the Treasury “shall determine whether any claimant is entitled to such share” “and to whom the same shall be paid,” his jurisdiction of the matter is exclusive, and no action can he maintained in this court.
*368
The Reporters’ statement of tbe case:
Tbe following are tbe facts as found by tbe court:
I. On tbe 14th of August, I860, tbe Secretary of tbe Treasury issued tbe following circular:
“Treasury Department, August 14,1866.
“Tbe act amendatory of tbe internal-revenue law, which went into effect on August 1, contains the following provisions:
“ ‘And where not otherwise provided for, such share as tbe Secretary of tbe Treasury shall by general regulation provide, not exceeding one moiety nor more than five thousand dollars in any one case, shall be to tbe use of tbe person, to be ascertained by tbe court which shall have imposed or decreed any such fine, penalty, or forfeiture, who shall first inform of tbe cause, matter, or thing whereby such fine, penalty, or forfeiture shall have been incurred; and when any sum is paid without suit or before judgment, in lieu of fine, penalty, or forfeiture, and a share of the same is claimed by any person as informer, the Secretary of the Treasury, under general regulations to be by him prescribed, shall determine whether any claimant is entitled to such share as above limited, and to whom the same shall be paid, and shall make payment accordingly.
“ It is hereby declared to be the true intent and meaning of the present and all previous provisions of internal-revenue acts granting shares to informers, that no right accrues to or is vested in any informer in any case until the fine, penalty, or forfeiture in such case is fixed by judgment or compromise and the amount or proceeds shall have been paid, when the informer shall become entitled to his legal share of the sum adjudged or agreed upon and received: Provided, That nothing herein contained shall be construed to limit or affect the power of remitting the whole or any portion of a fine, penalty, or forfeiture conferred on the Secretary of the Treasury by existing laws.’
“ Under the authority here conferred, the following schedule of informers’ shares is hereby prescribed :
On the first five hundred dollars of any penalty the informer shall receive. 50 per cent.
Of tbe next fifteen hundred dollars. 40 per cent.
Of the next two thousand dollars .30 per cent.
Of the next two thousand dollars. 25 per cent.
Of the next two thousand dollars. 20 per cent.
Of the next two thousand dollars. 10 per cent.
Of all above twelve thousand dollars and not exceeding fifty-five thousand dollars . 5 per cent.
Thus, if the penalty is five hundred dollars, the informer will receive.. $250 00
If one thousand dollars. 450 00
*369If two thousand dollars'. $850 00
If three thousand dollars. 1,150 00
If four thousand dollars. 1,450 00
If five thousand dollars. 1, 700 00
If sis thousand dollars. 1,950 00
If seven thousand dollars. 2,150 00
If eight thousand dollars.. 2,350 00
If nine thousand dollars. 2, 500 00
If ten thousand dollars. 2, 650 00
If eleven thousand dollars. 2,750 00
If twelve thousand dollars. 2,850 00
Of every additional one thousand dollars up to fifty-five thousand..... 50 00
“HUGH McCULLOOH,
, “ Secretary of the Treasury.”
II. Upon information first given by the claimant to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, after said circular was issued and communicated by him through a supervisor of internal-revenue to a United States district attorney, and at the request of said supervisor, the district attorney brought suits against the Houston and Texas Central Railway Company in the United States court for the eastern district of Texas for forty penalties of $1,000 each, alleged to be due because the company had made fraudulent returns of receipts, which said suits were compromised in June, 1874, before judgment, by the payment to the defendants of $5,000 as or in lieu of penalties, $5,521.87 for tax unpaid, $1,834.95 for interest thereon, and $3,337.21 for costs of court; in all, $15,694.03.
III. In March, 1875, the claimant made application for a share of said sum. so received in compromise, and received the following reply thereto:
“ Treasury Department, “Oeeice oe Internal Revenue,
“ Washington, March 15th, 1875.
u Sir : You letter of the 24th ultimo to the Hon. Solicitor of the Treasury, in relation to the case of the Houston & Texas Central Railway Company, in which you claim the informers’ share, has been referred to this office. You state that your information was furnished in March, 1871; but the case was not disposed of until June, 1874, when it was compromised, upon payment of five thousand dollars and all taxes due and costs after the date when the act of June 6th, 1872, repealing in*370formers’ shares went into force; hence 'you are not entitled to the share for -which you make application.
* * * * -* * *
“ Respectfully,
“J. W. DOXJGLASS,
“ Commissioner.
“G. Alexander. Ram:sey, Esq.”
Again he made like application to the Secretary of the Treasury, and the same was referred to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, who made the following reply thereto, and the Secretary thereupon rejected the claim for the reason stated by the Commissioner:
“Treasury Department,
“Office-or Internal Revenue,
“ Washington, June 12th, 1876.
“ Sir : I have the honor to return the letter of G. Alexander Ramsey, of the 2d instant, addressed to you, in relation to his claim for compensation as informer in the case of the Houston and Texas Central Railroad Company, and to state that Mr. Ramsey does not appear to be entitled to any compensation; for this reason: His information was furnished in March, 1871. The case was compromised in June, 1874, upon payment of five thousand dollars ($6,000) penalty and all costs and taxes due, amounting in the aggregate to fifteen thousand six hundred and ninety-six dollars and three cents ($15,696.03), after the act of June 6,1872, repealing the law allowing shares to informers, went into effect. .
“Mr. Ramsey was informed to this effect March 15,1875.
“ I have the honor to be, respectfully, etc.,
“D. D. PRATT,
“ Commissioner.
“Secretary of the Treasury.”
Mr. S. Clcvy Bliss for the claimant.
Mr. A. D. Robinson (with whom was the Assistant Attorney-General) for the defendants:
There having been no judgment, the Secretary had the sole power of deciding as to the informer. The act says, where there is no judgment “ the Secretary shall determine whether any claimant is entitled,” &c.; and however clear the evidence was in favor of any informer, it being an exercise of judgment and discretion, all that a mandamus could do would be to compel the Secretary to act. Having acted, it could do no more, and *371if decided against tbe informer, as in this case, his remedy is with Congress and not in this court. (See Kendall’s Case, 12 Pet., 524.)
RichardsoN, J.,
delivered the opinion of the court:
The claimant was the first informer of the matter whereby certain penalties were alleged to have been incurred under the internal-revenue laws by a railway company for fraud in making returns. Suits were thereupon brought in a Dnited States court against the company to recover forty penalties of $1,000 each. In June, 1874, before judgment in said suits, a compromise was effected by which the railway company paid $5,000 in lieu of penalties, in addition to the tax, interest, and cost, amounting in all to $15,694,03.
The claimant made application to the Secretary of the Treasury for payment to him of the informer’s share under the provisions of the Aet July 13,1866, ch. 184, § 9 (14 Stat. L., 145) and the Secretary’s circular of August 14,1866, set forth in the findings. This application was refused, on the ground that an informer’s right to share in penalties under that statute did not accrue and become vested until the penalty was fixed by judgment or compromise and the amount paid, and that in this case the law authorizing the payment of shares to informers was repealed by thp Aet June 6, 1872, ch. 315, § 39 (17 Stat. L., 256) before the compromise was made.
Whether or not the Secretary of the Treasury made his decision in conformity with the true construction of the law or whether the conclusion which he reached was the same as that which we should arrive at if the case were within our jurisdiction, we are of opinion that his determination is conclusive except against Congress, and cannot be reviewed in this court.
The question has frequently arisen and has been much discussed as to how far this court has jurisdiction of cases arising under the revenue laws; and some language found in one of the opinions of the Supreme Court, not necessary to the decision of the points of law involved therein, seems to have conveyed the impression that we had no jurisdiction in such cases under any circumstances. (Nicol v. United States, 7 Wall., 122, and 7 C. Cls. R., 36.)
A suit was brought in this court to recover the amount of an *372allowance made in writing by tlie Commissioner of Internal Revenue as a refund on account of special-tax stamps returned unused, wbicb allowance, having been certified to the Comptroller of the Treasury, that officer refused to pass. We held that this court had jurisdiction, and on appeal our judgment was affirmed. (Kaufman’s Case, 11 C. Cls. R., 659, affirmed on appeal 96 U. S., 567, and 13 C. Cls. R., 562; see also Boughton’s Case, 12 C. Cls. R., 330, and Campbell’s Case, 12 C. Cls. R., 470.)
In Boughton’s Case (12 C. Cls. R., 334), after commenting upon . the Nichol and Kaufman Oases, and pointing out the circumstances under which this court has jurisdiction under revenue laws, we said : “It would seem logically to follow that in all cases, whether under the revenue laws or. any other laws, in which Congress has provided a specific system adequate, in the opinion of the law-making power, to the investigation and recovery of legal claims of any particular class due from the government, intrusting the determination of the rights of the parties to the judgment and, discretion of special executive or other officers, and a final enforcement to other tribunals than this court under special limitations and restrictions, such jurisdiction is exclusive, and furnishes the only remedy to claimants of that class.”
Again, in Campbell v. United States (12 C. Cls. R., 470), where the whole subject is carefully reviewed and all the cases on the one side and the other are referred to, the Chief Justice, in giving the opinion of the court, says: “Where the right of 3, claimant was by law required to be determined by some executive officer, and it had either been determined against him or was still undetermined, we have held that we have no jurisdiction to overrule the decision already made or to determine the matter here, and, upon the basis of our determination, render a judgment against the government.” (Portland Co. Case, 5 C. Cls. R., 441; Dougherty’s Case, 5 id., 90; Turner’s Case, 9 id., 367.)
The act of 1866, upon which the present claim is founded, provides:
“And where not otherwise provided for, such share as the Secretary of the Treasury shall by general regulation provide, not exceeding one moiety nor more than five thousand dollars in any one case, shall be to the use of the person, to be ascertained by the court which shall have imposed or decreed any such fine, penalty, or forfeiture, who shall first inform of the cause, *373matter, or tiling whereby snob, ñne, penalty, or forfeiture shall have been incurred; and when any sum is paid without suit, or before judgment, in lieu of fine, penalty, or forfeiture, and a share of the same is claimed by any person as informer, the Secretary of the Treasury, under general regulations to be by him prescribed, shall determine whether any claimant is entitled, to such share as above limited, and to whom the same shall be paid, and shall make payment accordingly.”
It is clear that the statute makes the Secretary of the Treasury the sole judge as to whether there is an informer who is entitled to a share of any sum received in lieu of penalty before judgment, in like manner as it confers upon the court alone which imposes a fine, penalty, or forfeiture the same authority after judgment. In each case special and exclusive jurisdiction of the matter is given to a tribunal or officer other than this court.
If the Secretary had decided in the claimant’s favor and certified his decision to the accounting officers, and they had rejected the claim, the case would have been like that of Kaufman’s, and this court would have had jurisdiction to enforce payment; but without such a decision in his favor by the officer designated by law to determine the matter, he has no standing in court.
The findings show that the government received more than $12,000, besides costs, through information first given by the claimant, of which the sum of $5,000 was in lieu of penalties, and of this sum the claimant would seem to be entitled to $1,700 had not the statute been repealed before the compromise was effected. This repeal, although it was after the service had been performed, the Secretary determined deprived him of the reward offered by statute and the circular issued thereunder. The only remedy left to the claimant is , through an appeal to Congress, which alone has- authority to grant him any relief.
The claimant’s petition must be dismissed.