Defendant, Gladys Jordan, prosecutes this appeal from a conviction under a bill of information which charged her with *651an unlawful violation of R.S. 40:1033(4) 1 “in that she constructively possessed and controlled a Barbaturate (sic), to-wit: phenobarbital,” and her sentence2 thereunder, relying for a reversal thereof on two bills of exception which were reserved after verdict and before sentence when the trial judge refused her motions (1) for a new trial and (2) in arrest of judgment.
The first bill of exception, based primarily on defendant’s contention that the state failed to offer any evidence showing the venue of the court was East Baton Rouge Parish, is clearly without merit. While it is the settled jurisprudence of this state 3 that on the trial of all criminal cases the district attorney has the burden of proving the offense was committed within the parish where the prosecution is initiated, the record in the instant case reveals that the deputy sheriff who had secured a warrant for the search of the premises occupied by the defendant Gladys Jordan “located at 2220 Ellissalde Street, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, in the Parish of East Baton Rouge, * * * ” where he had good reason to believe there was a certain quantity of drugs, illegally possessed under the Uniform Narcotic Drug Law, testified that he executed the warrant and made the return thereon after seizing the subject pills on the premises, in which he was fully corroborated by the warrant and his return filed in evidence.
The claim in the motion for a new trial that the evidence failed to establish the seized pills were obtained without a prescription, an exception from the provision of prohibited acts, is also without merit for when her own physician was placed on the stand for the specific purpose of clarifying this point, he stated he could not testify those were the same pills he had prescribed for her several months previously. Moreover, what comes by way of an exception in a statute must be urged by way of defense, R.S. 15:228,4 and the burden of proving such a proviso or exemption rests upon the defendant, R.S. 40:1044.5
The motion in arrest of judgment is based on several allegations, which are equally without merit, but for the purpose of the disposition thereof, will be grouped as follows:
The bill of information is fatally defective (1) in that it does not state every *652fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the offense as required by R.S. 15:2276 (Par. a), (2) the act under which she was charged does not make it a crime to possess phenobarbital (Par. d), (3) the bill was too vague to permit the defendant to properly prepare a defense (Par. e), and (4) the bill of information fails to allege that the drugs had not been obtained for bona fide medical uses nor that she was excepted under R.S. 40:1035 7 (Par. b).
Defendant also contends Revised Statutes 40:1031 through 1046 are unconstitutional for the reason that 40:1032 8 “in defining the words ‘barbiturate’ or ‘barbiturates’ does not define what is a hypnotic or somni-facient drug” in violation of Article 1, Section 10 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921, and because of the “various and sundry exceptions” in the administration of said law, these statutes are in contravention of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States (Par. c).
A mere reading of the bill of information clearly shows that it tracks the language of the statute, specifically designating the defendant “unlawfully violated R.S. 40:1033(4) in that she constructively possessed and controlled a Bar-baturate (sic), to wit: phenobarbital,” which is all that is required by R.S. 15 :227 (see footnote six). Whether phenobarbital is a barbiturate is a question of fact over which we have no jurisdiction. If the defendant thought the bill of information was too vague to properly prepare her defense, she should have urged this before arraignment in a motion for a bill of particulars, R.S. 15 :284,9 and having failed to do so, such defect, if any, is cured by *653verdict, R.S. 15 :41810; and the state charging a person with an offense is not required to negative any exemption or proviso in a statute creating the offense, R.S. 15:228, R.S. 40:1044 (see footnotes four and five).
The allegation that the statutes are unconstitutional because of the failure on the part of the legislature to define “hypnotic or somnifacient drugs” has no substance as the words “hypnotic” or “somnifacient” drugs mean nothing more than drugs that produce sleep, and such meaning is well known. Equally lacking in merit is the defendant’s contention that the exemptions contained in the act are denial of equal protection guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. A review of the statutes indicates the legislature has set forth reasonable classifications of persons associated with the use of barbiturates in its effort to control the use thereof, delineating in detail for each category or class the acts which are to be considered offensive, the procedure to be applied in the prosecution thereof, and the punishment to be inflicted. Such legislation is a valid exercise of the state’s inherent police power and becomes otherwise only if arbitrary distinctions are made between different classes of persons or persons within the same class, which is obviously not the case herein.
For the reasons assigned, the conviction and sentence appealed from are affirmed.
Rehearing denied.
McCALEB, J., believes that a rehearing should be granted to consider whether the uncontroverted evidence of defendant’s expert — that Bellergal is not a hypnotic or somnifacient drug or a central nervous system stimulant because it contains, in addition to phenobarbital, sufficient quantities of other potent drugs (ergotamine and belladonna alkaloids) which make it impossible for it to be thus used — brings the case within R.S. 40:1034, exempting all such compounds, mixtures or preparations from the provisions of the Louisiana Barbiturate and Central Nervous System Stimulant Law.