HISTORY
On April 13, 1982, John Johnson was renting an apartment in Idaho Falls, Idaho. The record before us contains Johnson’s affidavit, which states, among other things, that he was current in his rent and in all other ways in compliance with his rental agreement. Police officer Earl Sorensen, the officer who searched Johnson’s apartment and seized the evidence that is the subject of Johnson’s motion to suppress, signed an affidavit which stated that he was told by Joe Clevenger, Johnson’s landlord, that Johnson was behind in his rent.
Sorensen stated in his affidavit that Cle-venger entered Johnson’s apartment on April 12, 1982, to see if Johnson had moved out. Clevenger observed what he thought were “suspicious plants,” and called the police. Sorensen’s affidavit states that he received an order to respond to a “suspicious call.” When Sorensen arrived, Cle-venger told him that he had observed “suspicious plants” and invited Sorensen inside to observe them. At Clevenger’s invitation, Sorensen entered the apartment and, looking around, discovered the “suspicious plants.” Sorensen testified at the motion to suppress hearing that, as he entered the apartment, he immediately noted several personal effects which clearly indicated to him that someone was residing therein. Nevertheless, Sorensen continued to enter the apartment and, when looking behind the front door, observed the “suspicious plants.” Believing the plants to be marijuana, Sorensen left the apartment to obtain a warrant in order to seize the suspected contraband.
The affidavit Sorensen filed in support of the warrant he procured states the following:
1. Your Affiant received an Order to Respond to a suspicious call from Joe *519Clevenger, landlord of the above address.
2. Mr. Clevenger indicated that the individual renting apartment # 7 had been told to move due to non-payment of rent. He further indicated that last night, April 12th, 1982, he had entered the apartment to see if the renter had moved and observed suspicious plants growing in five gallon buckets.
3. On this day, April 13, 1982, your affiant was requested by Mr. Cleven-ger to enter the apartment and observe these plants and was let into, the apartment by Mr. Clevenger and observed said plants.
4. Based upon your affiant’s experience, he believes the plants to be marijuana and further believes that due to the large number of plants, additional useable material, paraphernalia and records will be located in said apartment.
Items 3 and 4 of the affidavit were based on the officer’s personal observations while inside Johnson’s home. Johnson argues that these two items should be excluded from the affidavit because they are "fruit” of the officer’s unconstitutional entry into his home. Johnson’s argument is predicated on the fact that he was unaware of and did not consent to the officer’s entry into his home, and that his landlord was without such authority, for Fourth Amendment purposes, to consent to the officer’s entry. Johnson concludes, therefore, that because the officer entered Johnson’s home without a warrant, his entry and search were illegal. Thus, all evidence discovered and obtained as a result of that illegal search should have been suppressed.
The district court denied Johnson’s motion to suppress. The district court thought it important to discover how the officer entered Johnson’s home — whether it was in response to the landlord’s invitation or whether in response to the officer’s request. Said the court: “The question I want to know the answer to is who instigated the entry?” R., Vol. 1., p. 10. The uncontradicted testimony revealed that the landlord invited the officer enter.
Without giving any reason at all, the district court denied Johnson’s motion to suppress. Nevertheless, because the district court thought it important how the officer entered, the court must have reached its conclusion based upon the belief that Johnson’s landlord could consent to the officer’s search of Johnson’s home. Johnson appealed, and his case was assigned to the Court of Appeals. A special panel of that court, comprised of Justice Robert C. Huntley, retired Justice Joseph McFadden, and retired District Judge James G. Towles, unanimously reversed the district court in an exhaustive opinion— which was in turn added to by an additional opinion on denial of the state’s petition for rehearing. State v. Johnson, 108 Idaho 619, 701 P.2d 239 (Ct.App.1985). The state has now petitioned this Court for review.
I. THE SEARCHES
As the Court of Appeals noted, there were three searches of Johnson’s home: the first search by the landlord, the second search by the officer at the landlord’s invitation but prior to the obtaining of a valid search warrant, and the third search by the officer after obtaining a warrant.
The first search by the landlord, although not consented to by Johnson, implicates no interests of the Fourth Amendment or art. 1, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution because those provisions only prohibit illegal governmental searches and seizures. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1984); State v. Pontier, 103 Idaho 91, 94, 645 P.2d 325, 328 (1982). It is the latter two searches to which we turn our attention. The second search raises issues involving whether the conduct of the police officer constituted a search for Fourth Amendment and art. 1, § 17 purposes, whether Johnson’s landlord could adequately consent to a search of Johnson’s home, and whether Johnson had a legitimate expectation of privacy that was violated in this case. The third search’s validity depends to a large degree upon the validity of the *520second search. It also independently raises issues involving the validity of the search warrant, what constitutes probable cause, and what constitutes tainted evidence that must be suppressed.
A. The Second Search in This Case Implicates Rights Protected by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Art. 1, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution.
The state begins by arguing that there is no issue of consent in this case because “the police viewing of the results of the private search was not a search within the confines of the Fourth Amend-ment____” Respondent’s Brief in Support of Petition for Rehearing, p. 9-10.1 In the state’s view, the officer’s conduct was a “police viewing” of what Johnson’s landlord had uncovered, and not a search. Respondent’s Brief, supra, pp. 9-10. We reject the state’s characterization, finding it to be factually and legally without merit.
The cases the state relies upon2 do not support the state. Each of these cases involved a private individual turning over the results of his or her private search to the government. They do not, with the possible exception of Lucas, supra, and Eisentrager, supra,3 involve a- police offi*521cer following a private citizen into a home and conducting an independent search of that home. As the Court of Appeals noted:
In the instant case ... the suspected contraband was not turned over to the authorities; instead the landlord invited the officer to enter a private dwelling to observe the contraband first-hand. In this case, the suspected contraband was not in plain view; and the landlord had neither personally seized nor delivered it to the police. The officer had to enter the private dwelling in order to see it. The fact that the Fourth Amendment does not reach the landlord does not mean that the officer, a government official, is also immune from its sanctions simply because he accompanied the landlord. Johnson, supra, 108 Idaho at 622, 701 P.2d at 242, n. 2 (emphasis to “officer” in original; remainder of emphasis added).
There simply is no evidence in this case from which Johnson’s landlord could have concluded that Johnson had abandoned his apartment. On the contrary, the record reveals that numerous personal effects were found in Johnson’s home, suggesting, that, far from abandoning his home, he was still living there.
The illogic of the state’s argument that the officer’s entry and search did not constitute a search for Fourth Amendment purposes is best observed by noting the results that would flow from application of its argument. If the state were to have its way on this point, it would apparently argue that the following scenario is outside constitutional protection: A private citizen ransacks a home, claiming to be in search of contraband. Upon discovering the alleged contraband, the citizen calls in the police who conduct a second ransacking of the home, looking and searching everywhere and inspecting everything as did the citizen. According to the state, because the officer is only “viewing” the citizen’s efforts — “merely” retracing the citizen’s footsteps — such government activity is outside the purview of federal and state constitutional protections. Such an abbera-tional view is not harmonious with what the framers of our federal and state constitutions intended when they put these protections into our constitutions, and we so hold.
It is of no avail for the state to claim that the police officer “unwittingly” entered the apartment or that his discovery was a “plain view” discovery of the evidence. His affidavit clearly states that Johnson’s landlord informed him that there were “suspicious plants,” which he (the police officer) should see. Thus, the officer knew before entering Johnson’s home that he was entering in to ascertain if some allegedly ‘’suspicious plants” were, in fact, contraband.
The officer also testified at the motion to suppress hearing, and at the preliminary hearing, that: “As I went into the apartment I observed several personal items that indicated someone still lived there.” Nevertheless, the officer testified that he continued to enter Johnson’s home — approximately five or six feet — to search for the “suspicious plants.” Only after looking behind a door did the officer discover the alleged “suspicious plants.” Thus, it is clear that the evidence was not “exposed to the plain view” of the officer, and that he did not have “not only a right, but also a duty” to be where he was. State v. Ellis, 99 Idaho 606, 608, 586 P.2d 1050, 1052 (1978) (emphasis added). See also Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 1540, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983) (“The question whether property in plain view of the police may be seized therefore must turn on the legality of the intrusion that enables them to perceive and physically seize the property in question.”). Accordingly, any “plain view” argument must also fail.
The officer knew that the landlord requesting the search was just that, a landlord, and nothing more — certainly not a spouse or a co-tenant. The police officer is imputed with knowledge of the law, which, as we detail below, see part I.B.2. infra, *522includes among other things, the fact that (1) warrantless searches are per se unconstitutional, unless a specific exception to the rule exists, and (2) that a landlord’s consent is insufficient to permit a government official to search the home of a renter/lessee. Thus, we have a prima facie case, even as seen from the point of view of the officer, where rights under the Fourth Amendment and art. 1, § 17 have been implicated. We turn now to the question of whether those rights were violated.
B. Johnson’s Landlord Did Not Have Proper Authority to Consent to the Police Officer’s Search of Johnson’s Home.
1. Introduction.
It is axiomatic that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, and therefore unconstitutional, unless a specifically enumerated exception to this rule applies. State v. Bottelson, 102 Idaho 90, 92, 625 P.2d 1093, 1095 (1981); State v. Ellis, 99 Idaho 606, 608, 586 P.2d 1050, 1052 (1978); State v. Harwood, 94 Idaho 615, 617, 495 P.2d 160, 162 (1972). Basically, there are three common exceptions to the warrant rule: (1) a search incident to a lawful arrest, Harwood, supra, at 618, 495 P.2d at 163; (2) a search in response to exigent circumstances,4 Id., and (3) a search conducted pursuant to properly given consent. Id.
There is no argument that any of these exceptions apply except the consent exception. Specifically, the state can only excuse the warrantless search in this case if it can persuade us that the landlord had proper authority to consent to the police officer’s search. We hold that the landlord did not have such authority.
2. The Landlord Did Not Have Authority to Consent to the Search of Johnson’s Home.
The burden of proving that consent has been given, and that the person giving the consent had authority to do so, is on the state. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171, 94 S.Ct. 988, 993, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974); State v. Post, 98 Idaho 834, 837, 573 P.2d 153, 156 (1978), overruled on other grounds, State v. Bottelson, 102 Idaho 90, 625 P.2d 1093 (1981). It is conceded that Johnson’s landlord consented to the search of Johnson’s apartment. The issue, however, is whether he had authority to do so. The United States Supreme Court has supplied the test by which to determine whether a third party had authority to consent to a search by a government official:
[W]hen the prosecution seeks to justify a warrantless search by proof of voluntary consent, it is not limited to proof that consent was given by the defendant, but may show that permission to search was obtained from a third party who possessed common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected.7
*523Thus, our inquiry is, in the words of the United States Supreme Court, whether the state has proven that Johnson’s landlord had “mutual use of the property,” and whether Johnson “assumed the risk that [Johnson’s landlord] might permit the common area to be searched.”5
A person’s home “is accorded the full range of Fourth Amendment protections.” Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211, 87 S.Ct. 424, 427, 17 L.Ed.2d 312 (1966). Moreover, the “physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed____” United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 2134, 32 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972) (emphasis added). See also State v. Louis, 296 Or. 57, 672 P.2d 708, 710 (1983) (The defendant’s “living quarters ... are the quintessential domain protected by the constitutional guarantee against warrantless searches.”); accord, State v. Martin, 139 Ariz. 466, 679 P.2d 489, 496 (1984). Our constitutions make no distinction between owned and rented living quarters. So long as a tenant has not abandoned the premises, protection of the Fourth Amendment and art. 1, § 17 is not lost. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 241, 80 S.Ct. 683, 698, 4 L.Ed.2d 668 (1960).
Applying the test announced in Matlock, supra, 415 U.S. at 171 n. 7, 94 S.Ct. at 993 n. 7, to the facts of this case, and for the reasons set forth below, we hold that Johnson’s landlord was without authority for purposes of either the Fourth Amendment or art. 1, § 17 to give effective consent to a search of Johnson’s home.
The reason for our holding in this case is that the state was unable to present any evidence that Johnson’s landlord had “mutual use of the property” or that Johnson “assumed the risk that [Johnson’s landlord] might permit the common area to be searched.” Matlock, supra, 415 U.S. at 171, n. 7, 94 S.Ct. at 993, n. 7. Furthermore, the evidence in this case reveals that Johnson had a legitimate and reasonable expectation of privacy in his home. There is no evidence that he had abandoned his residence. There is evidence that he still was residing there. This was given in the form of the testimony of the police officer who performed the offending search.6
Whether the rental period had expired is a factual issue that has not yet been decided. That issue need not be decided in the context of this case, however, because we hold that Johnson was entirely justified in expecting his landlord to resort to the eviction procedures required by law rather than resorting to self-help in seeking rent payment if he was in fact behind in his rent. United States v. Botelho, 360 F.Supp. 620, 624-25 (D.Hawaii 1973); United States v. Olsen, 245 F.Supp. 641, 644-45 (D.Mont.1965); State v. Taggart, 7 Or.App. 479, 491 P.2d 1187, 1189 (1971).7
Our holding is consistent with what other courts have held in similar situations. For *524example, as the Court of Appeals noted, a lessor/landlord cannot give effective consent to a search of a rental house, Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 81 S.Ct. 776, 5 L.Ed.2d 828 (1961), an apartment, People v. Boorem, 184 Colo. 233, 519 P.2d 939 (1974), a room in a rooming house, State v. Warfield, 184 Wis. 56, 198 N.W. 854 (1924), a hotel, Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 84 S.Ct. 889, 11 L.Ed.2d 856 (1964), or even a locker, Murdock v. State, 664 P.2d 589 (Alaska App.1983).
3. Conclusion.
We therefore hold the following: (1) that the second search by the police officer at the invitation of Johnson’s landlord was a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment; (2) that Johnson had a legitimate and reasonable expectation of privacy in his home; (3) that applying the United States Supreme Court test found in Matlock, supra, 415 U.S. at 171 n. 7, 94 S.Ct. at 993 n. 7, the landlord did not have authority to consent to the search of Johnson’s home; and (4) that the police officer, not having consent to conduct the search, and there being no other exception applicable to our constitutions’ warrant requirements, conducted an unreasonable and, therefore, unconstitutional search. Thus, we turn to the issue of what remedy is necessary to correct the unconstitutional search conducted here.
II. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE APPLIED TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE
A. Introduction.
1. Federal Law.
The exclusionary rule states that evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search or seizure is inadmissible in the criminal trial of a defendant. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 394-98, 34 S.Ct. 341, 345-46, 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 306-07, 41 S.Ct. 261, 264, 65 L.Ed. 647 (1921).8 The rule is a “judicially created means of effectuating the rights secured by the Fourth Amendment.” Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 3047, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976).
The rule was first established by the United States Supreme Court in Weeks, supra, and Gouled, supra. In Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28, 69 S.Ct. 1359, 1361-62, 93 L.Ed. 1782 (1949), the Supreme Court held that the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment are enforceable against the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court explicitly held, however, that the Weeks-Gouled exclusionary rule would not be imposed upon the states. Wolf supra, 338 U.S. at 29, 69 S.Ct. at 1362. Twelve years later, the Court changed its mind, holding that the exclusionary rule is applicable to the states. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-56, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 1691-92, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961).
The Mapp majority justified the application of the rule to the states on several grounds. First, the rule would prevent the use of evidence which was “tantamount” to a coerced confession. Id. at 656, 81 S.Ct. at 1692. Second, the rule would serve as a deterrent to Fourth Amendment violations. Id. at 658, 81 S.Ct. at 1693. Third, the rule would protect judicial integrity. Id. at 659, 81 S.Ct. at 1693-94. Subsequent decisions of the Court have clarified the reason for the rule, stating that its primary purpose is that of deterrence. Stone, supra, 428 U.S. at 486, 96 S.Ct. at 3048-49.9
*525Since Mapp, supra, the efficacy of the exclusionary rule has come under attack. See Stone, supra, 428 U.S. at 487-92, 96 S.Ct at 3049-51 and sources cited therein. In fact, in Stone, although holding that the rule was still applicable at trial and on direct appeal in criminal actions, the United States Supreme Court held that the rule is not applicable in federal habeas corpus proceedings where the state has provided the criminal defendant an opportunity for full and fair litigation of his or her Fourth Amendment claim. Id. at 494,10 96 S.Ct. at 3052.
2. State Law.
Because of the holding in Mapp, supra, the exclusionary rule as defined by the United States Supreme Court is applicable to Idaho. As stated in Newman, supra, however, that does not mean that this Court will not afford appropriate protections under the Constitution of Idaho. Newman, supra, 108 Idaho at 10, n. 6, 696 P.2d at 861, n. 6. Indeed, this Court recognized the validity of and necessity for the exclusionary rule long before the United States Supreme Court required states to apply it in state court proceedings. State v. Arrequi, 44 Idaho 43, 49-57, 254 P. 788, 789-92 (1927). In State v. Conner, 59 Idaho 695, 703, 89 P.2d 197, 201 (1939), this Court could already state:
The rule is well settled in this state that evidence, procured in violation of defendant’s constitutional immunity from search and seizure, is inadmissible and will be excluded if request for its suppression be timely made. ... (State v. Arrequi, 44 Ida. 43, 254 Pac. 788; 52 A.L.R. 463; State v. Wansgaard, 46 Ida. 20, 265 Pac. 671; State v. Severns, 57 Ida. 246, 273 Pac. 940 (emphasis added).11
Thus, from as early as 1927, this Court has held that a violation of an individual’s constitutional rights against unreasonable searches will result in the exclusion of illegally seized evidence.
Cases subsequent to Arrequi have not treated the exclusionary rule in a niggardly way. For example, in State v. Rauch, 99 Idaho 586, 592-93, 586 P.2d 671, 677-78 (1978), Justice Donaldson authored this *526Court’s opinion, applying the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence taken by police officers in violation of Idaho’s “knock and announce” statute, which is contained at I.C. §§ 19-611 and 19-4409.
In State v. LePage, 102 Idaho 387, 391-92, 630 P.2d 674, 678-79 (1981) cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1057, 102 S.Ct. 606, 70 L.Ed.2d 595, this Court declared that although the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct, additional reasons for its use exist. Said the Court:
Finally, we are cognizant of the need to insure that the judiciary does function, and is perceived as functioning, in a manner consistent with the individual constitutional rights, both state and federal, of all who appear before the bar of justice. While the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is undoubtedly to deter police misconduct, it is also true that at some point the courts must simply refuse to countenance certain behavior on the part of law enforcement agencies. “Courts ... cannot and will not be made party to lawless invasions of the constitutional rights of citizens by permitting unhindered use of the fruits of such invasions.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1875, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). While “the imperative of judicial integrity,” Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222, 80 S.Ct. 1437, 1446, 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960), may not be the primary reason for refusing to allow the use of unconstitutionally seized evidence at trial, it certainly requires us to exercise our discretion to review alleged errors that affect substantial rights and are ‘‘plain” in the sense that it is evident that a mistake has occurred. (Emphasis added.)
B. Application of the Exclusionary Rule Requires Suppression of the Evidence Obtained in This Case.
Because we have held that the search by Officer Sorensen at the invitation of Johnson’s landlord was unreasonable, and therefore unconstitutional, we also hold that the evidence gained as a result of the search must be excluded. In this case, the items of evidence obtained were personal observations by Officer Sorensen, who used that evidence to file an affidavit and obtain a search warrant in which to return to Johnson’s apartment and confiscate the contraband. The observations by Officer Sorensen are listed as items 3 and 4 on his affidavit in support of the warrant he sought, which for convenience are restated:
3. On this day, April 13, 1982, your affiant was requested by Mr. Cleven-ger to enter the apartment and observe these plants and was let into the apartment by Mr. Clevenger and observed said plants.
4. Based upon your affiant’s experience, he believes the plants to be marijuana and further believes that due to the large number of plants, additional useable material, paraphernalia and records will be located in said apartment.
Because this evidence was the result of Officer Sorensen’s unlawful search, they must be deleted form the affidavit. Segura, supra, 104 S.Ct. at 3386; Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484, 83 S.Ct. 407, 415-16, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963); Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341, 60 S.Ct. 266, 267-68, 84 L.Ed. 307 (1939). We therefore turn to the rest of the affidavit filed by Officer Sorensen to determine if it contains adequate facts by which the magistrate could have concluded that probable cause exists for issuance of the search warrant.12
The rest of the excised affidavit reads as follows:
1. Your Affiant received an Order to Respond to a suspicious call from Joe Clevenger, landlord of the above address.
*5272. Mr. Clevenger indicated that the individual renting apartment # 7 had been told to move due to non-payment of rent. He further indicated that last night, April 12th, 1982, he had entered the apartment to see if the renter had moved and observed suspicious plants growing in five gallon buckets.
In determining the validity of a search warrant, as pertaining to the factual assertions contained therein, the United States Supreme Court recently reformulated its rules and standard of review. In Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), the Court rejected the “rigidity” of the “two-pronged test” established by Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 1514, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 416, 89 S.Ct. 584, 589, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969), for a “totality of the circumstances” test. The Gates test amounts to the following:
The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, commonsense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the “veracity” and “basis of knowledge” of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. Gates, supra, 103 S.Ct. at 2332.
The Court went on further to articulate the standard of review for appellate courts in reviewing such magistrate decisions: “[T]he duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a ‘substantial basis for ... concluding]’ that probable cause existed. Id., quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271, 80 S.Ct. 725, 736, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960).13
In State v. Lang, 105 Idaho 683, 684, 672 P.2d 561, 562 (1983), this Court adopted the Gates “totality of the circumstances” test. Applying that test to the instant facts, we hold that the magistrate would not have found probable cause to issue the warrant based on the information which was properly before him.
The information contained in the remaining two items of the supporting affidavit were conclusory, and provide no information as to the “ ‘veracity,’ [or] ‘reliability,’ ” Gates, supra, 104 S.Ct. at 2327, of Johnson’s landlord. We also do not know in what way the plants were “suspicious.” If by “suspicious” Johnson’s landlord meant “suspected of being marijuana,” there is nothing in the affidavit which indicates that Johnson’s landlord could identify a marijuana plant if he saw one in the first place. To the contrary, the plain inference is that he could not, and did not. Thus, there is no evidence by which the magistrate could determine if Johnson’s landlord had a proper “basis of knowledge,” id., to conclude as he did. As the Court of Appeals noted, the landlord did not describe in any way whatsoever the allegedly suspicious plants; nowhere is there a description of the plants’ sizes, shapes, number of leaves, or color in terms that would have permitted the magistrate to determine if the plants were in fact contraband. Johnson, supra, 108 Idaho at 624, 701 P.2d at 244.
To rule that the affidavit does support a probable cause determination would constitute the “mere ratification of the bare conclusions of others.” Gates, supra, 104 S.Ct. at 2332. This is something we refuse to do, and are prohibited from doing, under our Constitutions. Thus, we hold, based *528upon items 1 and 2 of Officer Sorensen’s affidavit, that there was not a substantial basis upon which the magistrate could have found that there was a fair probability that contraband would be found inside Johnson’s home. “[G]iven all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him,” id., we hold that there was insufficient evidence by which the magistrate could have found probable cause.
Because the warrant was improperly granted, the search conducted pursuant to it was unlawful. Therefore, all evidence seized as a result of that search must be suppressed, and we so hold.
C. The Exception to Application of the Exclusionary Rule Announced in United States v. Leon, supra, Is Inapplicable to the Facts of This Case.
As mentioned above, see n. 9, supra, the United States Supreme Court in Leon, supra, 104 S.Ct. at 3419-20, provided yet a new exception to the exclusionary rule. The Court held that even where a search warrant does not issue upon probable cause, so long as the officer relied upon the warrant in objective good faith the exclusionary rule need not apply.
The Leon Court went on to discuss four instances in which the exclusionary rule is still applicable:
Suppression therefore remains an appropriate remedy if the magistrate or judge in issuing a warrant was misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for his reckless disregard of the truth. ... The exception we recognize today will also not apply in cases where the issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his judicial role ...; in such circumstances, no reasonably well-trained officer should rely on the warrant. Nor would an officer manifest objective good faith in relying on a warrant based on an affidavit “so lacking in indi-cia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.” ... Finally, depending on the circumstances of the particular case, a warrant may be so facially deficient-i.e., in failing to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized — that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid. Leon, supra, 104 S.Ct. at 3421-22 (citations omitted).14
Segura, supra, decided the same day as Leon, amplified upon the various factual scenarios discussed in Leon. In Segura the Court stated that suppression would be justified when “ ‘the challenged evidence is in some sense the product of illegal government activity.’ ” Segura, supra, 104 S.Ct. at 3391-92, quoting United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 471, 100 S.Ct. 1244, 1250, 63 L.Ed.2d 537 (1980). The Segura Court went on to say that evidence would be suppressed if it would not have been discovered “but for” the illegal search. Id. at 3391. Thus, the thrust of Leon and Segura, to be sure, is that the exclusionary rule should only be employed when it will serve the deterrent effect for which it was created. Leon, supra, 104 S.Ct. at 3412-16, 3419; Segura, supra, 104 S.Ct. at 3385-86.
Leon and Segura have generated much debate.15 We need not enter that debate and decide whether Leon’s “good faith” *529exception should be adopted as part of Idaho constitutional law, because we find it to be inapplicable to the facts of this case.
Segura clearly controls. “But for” Officer Sorensen’s initial illegal search, he could not have executed the affidavit upon which the magistrate relied when he issued the search warrant. Contrary to Segura, where all the information included in the challenged warrant was derived from legal sources, and in no way connected to the prior police officer’s admittedly illegal entry, here the information needed to support Officer Sorensen’s affidavit — items 3 and 4 — are not “wholly unrelated,” Segura, supra, 104 S.Ct. at 3391, to the prior illegal search. Rather, they are the fruit of that search, and should thus be suppressed. Id. at 3386.
Another reason why Leon’s good-faith holding is inapplicable is that application of the exclusionary rule in this case will serve a deterrent effect, which is Leon’s requirement for determining when a court should apply the rule. Leon, supra, 104 S.Ct. at 3420; Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 104 S.Ct. 3424, 3428, 82 L.Ed.2d 737 (1984) (decided the same day as Leon). Ruling as we do today re-emphasizes to government officials the importance of obtaining a search warrant from a magistrate before conducting a search unless one of the several narrow, enumerated exceptions apply. Such a re-emphasis, we believe, will deter future unlawful police searches and seizures.
A final reason why Leon’s good-faith exception is inapplicable is because the reason for the exception is not applicable here. The primary reason for the good-faith exception, as the Leon Court stated it, is that application of the exclusionary rule would have no deterrent effect where it was the judge who committed the error that invalidated the warrant and not the police officer. Leon, supra, 104 S.Ct. at 3418. Here, however, the error was not committed by the judge. Rather, the error was committed by law enforcement personnel— the precise group of government officials to whom the exclusionary rule has been directed. Accordingly, Leon’s good-faith exception is inapplicable. Thus, for the reasons stated above, we hold that the evidence obtained in this case should be suppressed.
III. CONCLUSIONS
We must never forget the reasons for which the Framers of our constitutions adopted the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 1, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution. Time has perhaps dimmed our memory of the outrageous invasions of privacy and dignity the colonists suffered at the hand of British rule.16
We must also never forget that a violation of one person’s Fourth Amendment and art. 1, § 17 rights is a violation of every person’s rights. Only by suppressing the illegally obtained evidence, and deterring future illegal conduct, can a court effectively protect innocent people from impermissible invasions of their constitutional rights. As Justice Jackson eloquently stated:
Courts can protect the innocent against [illegal] invasions only indirectly and through the medium of excluding evidence obtained against those who frequently are guilty____ So a search against Brinegar’s car must be regarded as a search of the car of Everyman. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 181, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1313-14, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949) (emphasis added).
*530Our holding today protects not just Johnson’s rights but the rights of every person. Though the price to be paid is, occasionally, the suppression of incriminating evidence,17 the benefit to be gained is the continued guarantee for every individual of decent privacy for his or her home, papers, and effects — a privacy “which is indispensible to individual dignity and self respect.” Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 198, 67 S.Ct. 1098, 1120, 91 L.Ed. 1399 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting). In writing our constitutions, the Framers decidedly declared that an individual’s privacy be the valued right — a right inviolate and only breachable upon strict compliance to constitutional requirements.
For the foregoing reasons, in agreement with the result expressed by the Court of Appeals, the judgment of the district court is reversed. The cause is remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent herewith.
WALTERS, J. pro tem, concurs.