OPINION
Nathaniel Montgomery appeals the denial of the motion he filed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. We will affirm.
Because we write primarily for the parties, we will but briefly recite the facts of this case. Montgomery was indicted on a drug-conspiracy charge stemming from his role in the notorious Carter Organization; specifically, he was charged with conspiracy to distribute more than five kilograms of powder cocaine and more than fifty *174grams of crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. Following a jury trial, Montgomery was convicted of the offense. The pre-sentence report (PSR) prepared by the probation office determined that Montgomery was “accountable for greater than 1.5 kilograms of cocaine base (“crack”); and greater than 150 kilograms of powder cocaine (which combine to equate to a minimum of 60,000 kilograms of marijuana) in furtherance of the criminal activity.” PSR ¶ 63. Applying the November 2003 Sentencing Guidelines, the PSR set Montgomery’s base offense level at 38. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(1) (2003). Following a Booker1 remand, Montgomery was resentenced in 2006 to a term of 280 months of incarceration. We affirmed his sentence on direct appeal. See generally United States v. Montgomery, — Fed.Appx. -, 2007 WL 3122255 (3d Cir. 2007).
Since that time, both the statutory terms and Guidelines ranges attached to crack offenses have been lowered, and Montgomery has endeavored to avail himself of the changes. In the appeal from one of Montgomery’s previous, unsuccessful attempts to seek relief via § 3582(c)(2), we explained to him why he might encounter difficulty premising his motion on the changed crack sentencing ranges: “[t]he more than 150 kilograms of powder cocaine for which he was responsible supports his base offense level, wholly apart from any changes to the Crack Cocaine Guidelines range.” United States v. Montgomery, 398 Fed.Appx. 843, 845 (3d Cir. 2010).
Montgomery filed this § 3582(c)(2) motion pursuant to Guidelines Amendment 750,2 arguing that he was eligible for a reduction in his sentence due to the further lowering of the crack Guidelines. The District Court denied relief, reemphasizing that Montgomery’s powder cocaine range had not changed. Montgomery appealed.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. While the ultimate decision to reduce a sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) is committed to the discretion of the District Court, we exercise plenary review over the Court’s legal analysis. United States v. Styer, 573 F.3d 151, 153 (3d Cir.2009); United States v. Doe, 564 F.3d 305, 307 n. 2 (3d Cir.2009).
The District Court rightly concluded that Montgomery was not entitled to relief under § 3582(c)(2), which allows for a sentence reduction based on “a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission.” The sentencing range for powder cocaine was left unaltered by the modifications to the crack Guidelines. Compare U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(1) (2011), with U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(1) (2003). Thus, our observation from Montgomery’s prior appeal retains its full force: the cocaine exposure alone would suffice to place Montgomery at a base offense level of 38. Recognizing this impediment, Montgomery argues that *175the amount of crack and powder cocaine with which he was associated in the PSR represented “extrapolated drug amounts”; and, thus, he maintains that the lowering of the Guidelines range attached to 1.5 kilograms of crack (compare U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(3) (2011), with U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(1) (2003)) could conceivably lead to an independent reevaluation of his sentence. But § 3582 authorizes “only a limited adjustment to an otherwise final sentence and not a plenary resentencing proceeding.” Dillon v. United States, — U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 2683, 2691, 177 L.Ed.2d 271 (2010) (emphasis added). The District Court is not authorized, via § 3582(c)(2), to conduct the inquiry Montgomery seeks in the absence of a lowered Guidelines range, and here there is no question that the applicable range was not lowered.3 Therefore, relief was properly denied. Because we find the language of § 3582(c)(2) sufficient to so conclude, we need not address Montgomery’s claim that portions of the Guidelines are unconstitutional.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court.