MEMORANDUM *
The facts and procedural posture of this case are known to the parties, and we do not repeat them here. Appellant Richard W. Postma, Jr. appeals the district court’s grant of Appellees Stephen Van Goor’s and Mark Woelber’s motion for summary judgment. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s summary judgment decision based on absolute or qualified immunity. Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 911 (9th Cir.2012) (en banc). We review for abuse of discretion attorney fee awards made pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. McCown v. City of Fontana, 565 F.3d 1097, 1101 (9th Cir.2009). We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment based on Appellees’ prosecutorial immunity, but we reverse its grant of attorney’s fees.
Absolute prosecutorial immunity attaches to prosecutors for acts within the scope of their duties. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 422-29, 431, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976). This immunity also covers bar officials, administrative law judges, and agency prosecutors “so *690long as they perform functions similar to judges and prosecutors in a setting like that of a court.” Hirsh v. Justices of Supreme Court of State of Cal., 67 F.3d 708, 715 (9th Cir.1995) (citing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 511-17, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978)). Postma argues that by filing an Original Application with the Alaska Supreme Court, Appellees “side-stepped the judicial process” and' went beyond the “special authorization” of their official positions, thereby acting merely as “private lawyers.” See Stapley v. Pestalozzi, 733 F.3d 804, 811-12 (9th Cir.2013); Lacey, 693 F.3d at 914. We disagree. Appellees exercised their authority (as articulated in Alaska Bar Rule 30(b)) to seek relief directly from the Alaska Supreme Court before taking any action against Postma. Postma argues that the Bar Rules do not, in fact, grant Appel-lees such authority. But our absolute immunity analysis does not depend on the fine details of local law. What matters is that Appellees were at least arguably empowered to act in service of a prosecutorial function. See McCarthy v. Mayo, 827 F.2d 1310, 1314-15 (9th Cir.1987). Moreover, far from seeking to avoid the judicial process, Appellees were working within the judicial process to “petition” the Alaska Supreme Court to “order [Postma] to submit to a medical and/or psychological examination.” Bar Rule 30(b). Accordingly, Appellees are entitled to absolute immunity.1
The district court abused its discretion in granting attorney’s fees because it did not make sufficient findings that Postma’s claims were “frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation.” Harris v. Maricopa Cnty. Superior Court, 631 F.3d 963, 968 (9th Cir.2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, the district court merely stated without any explanation that the claims were “frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless” in granting Appel-lees’ motion for an attorney’s fees award. Although we hold that Postma’s claims are not meritorious, they were not frivolous, and we reverse the district court’s award of attorney’s fees.
The judgment of the district court granting Appellees’ motion for summary judgment is AFFIRMED, and its judgment granting Appellees attorney’s fees is REVERSED.2 Each party shall bear its own costs.