Tommy Yuen and Don Kwan were both convicted by a jury of seven counts of first-degree robbery. The jury also returned special verdicts on each count that both defendants were armed with deadly weapons, specifically, firearms. Their appeals have been consolidated.
All the robbery counts arose from a single incident at the Bing Kong Ton, a club or fraternal organization in Seattle. The facts of this incident are not relevant to the issues presented on appeal.
The first issue is whether the defendants were denied their speedy trial rights under CrR 3.3. On August 23, 1977, the State moved for a continuance based on the unavailability of its witnesses — Officers Beard and Lorenzo of the Seattle Police Department, and one Moo Min Mar. The continuance was granted over objection, and as a result defendants were not tried within the 60-day period of CrR 3.3. Had the continuance been properly granted, the so-called "60-day rule" would not have been violated.
The granting or denial of a continuance rests within the sound discretion of the trial court and is reviewable on *379appeal only for manifest abuse of discretion. State v. Eller, 84 Wn.2d 90, 524 P.2d 242 (1974); Balandzich v. Demeroto, 10 Wn. App. 718, 519 P.2d 994 (1974). CrR 3.3(e)(2) provides in part:1
Continuances or other delays may be granted as follows:
(2) On motion of the prosecuting attorney if:
(ii) the state's evidence is presently unavailable, the prosecution has exercised due diligence, and there are reasonable grounds to believe that it will be available within a reasonable time; or
(iii) required in the due administration of justice and the defendant will not be substantially prejudiced in the presentation of his defense.
While defense counsel resisted the motion for a continuance, it was not disputed that Officers Beard and Lorenzo were under subpoena, nor that Beard's father had died, nor that Officer Lorenzo could not be located even though the Seattle police had attempted to do so. The defense contended only that these witnesses were not necessary to the State's case and the State had not exercised due diligence in insuring their availability. A review of the record discloses that witness Mar was a victim of the robbery and named in the information, and Officers Beard and Lorenzo possessed material evidence supporting the conviction. As we stated in State v. Lowrie, 14 Wn. App. 408, 542 P.2d 128 (1975), the prosecutor's motion for continuance under CrR 3.3(e) need not state the materiality of the evidence when it is self-evident. As to due diligence, it is undisputed that the officers were under subpoena. While it would have been better had the prosecutor kept in closer contact with the witnesses, the State complied with the basic requirement of due diligence — the issuance of subpoenas to the witnesses.
*380The defendant in State v. Walker, 16 Wn. App. 637, 557 P.2d 1330 (1976), made a similar argument, contending dismissal was proper because of the absence of specific findings of fact regarding the existence or nonexistence of the circumstances required by CrR 3.3(e)(2)(ii). We concluded in that case that where allegations supported by the record and legally sufficient to support the conclusions required by CrR 3.3 are accepted as fact by the trial court, nothing more is required. State v. Walker, supra.
In the case at bench, the prosecutor stated that the State’s evidence was unavailable, that he exercised due diligence, and that reasonable grounds supported the belief that the evidence would be available within a reasonable time. The court accepted this showing and so stated in its order granting the continuance.2
Such a showing by the prosecution in moving for a continuance and the finding by the trial court in its order precludes us from holding that the court's exercise of discretion is "upon a ground, or to an extent, clearly untenable or manifestly unreasonable." Friedlander v. Friedlander, 80 Wn.2d 293, 298, 494 P.2d 208 (1972); State ex rel. Carroll v. Junker, 79 Wn.2d 12, 482 P.2d 775 (1971).
The remaining issues concern the prosecutor's comment during the cross-examination of a victim and a police officer's testimony that he had had previous contact with one of the defendants. We are satisfied that each incident *381was inadvertent. The test is whether such volunteered remarks, when viewed against the background of all the evidence, so tainted the proceedings that the defendants could not receive a fair trial. State v. Music, 79 Wn.2d 699, 715, 489 P.2d 159 (1971); State v. Johnson, 60 Wn.2d 21, 371 P.2d 611 (1962). The law presumes the jury finds the facts from the evidence the court permits it to consider. In both instances the trial court orally admonished the jury to disregard the complained of comments. The decision as to the adequacy of instructions admonishing the jury to disregard testimony or comments is especially pervaded with judicial discretion. As we said in State v. Thrift, 4 Wn. App. 192, 196, 480 P.2d 222 (1971):
The trial judge can impartially observe and appraise the impact of inadmissible testimony upon the jury. His discretionary judgment that a corrective instruction and admonition effectively cures an error should be respected by the appellate court unless the record demonstrates that beyond a reasonable doubt the refusal to grant a new trial denied the defendant a fair trial.
We have reviewed the record and cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in these matters.
We affirm the convictions. However, for the reasons stated in State v. Workman, 90 Wn.2d 443, 584 P.2d 382 (1978), the cause must be remanded for resentencing without regard to RCW 9.41.025, the firearms statute.
Affirmed and remanded.
Ringold, J., concurs.