Petitioners-appellants1 in these consolidated cases challenge the validity of a *1122group of final orders2 of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) which deny refunds of fees paid under the Commission’s 1970 fee schedule.3 We agree that the fees in question were illegally assessed, and thus that refunds of those fees were improperly denied; we therefore remand these actions to the FCC to determine proper fees and refund the portion illegally collected.
As we explain in greater detail in a companion case decided this same date,4 the 1970 fee schedule was promulgated by the FCC under the authority of Title V of the Independent Offices Appropriations Act of 1952 (IOAA),5 which decreed that federal agencies should thereafter assess fees for any “work, service, publication, report, document, benefit, privilege, authority, use franchise, license, permit, certificate, registration, or similar thing of value or utility” conferred by the agency on any person, so that those transactions would be “self-sustaining to the full extent possible.” The fee schedule was challenged in the Fifth Circuit by, among others, some of the parties who are now before us, and was upheld *1123by that court in all respects in Clay Broadcasting Corp. of Texas v. United States.6 Only one party (the National Cable Television Association) sought review of that decision in the Supreme Court, limited to the issue of the validity of the cable television annual fee.7 In National Cable Television Association v. United States (NCTA), 415 U.S. 336, 344, 94 S.Ct. 1146, 1150, 39 L.Ed.2d 370 (1974), the Court reversed “so that the case can be remanded to the Federal Communications Commission for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”
After remand, the Commission suspended future collection of the annual fee for both broadcast systems and cable television systems pending revision of the 1970 fee schedule,8 and refunded all cable television annual fees which had been collected under that fee schedule.9 The remaining fees assessed by the 1970 fee schedule against other regulated industries in the other areas of the Commission’s operation,10 however, were neither refunded nor suspended.
After receiving a number of protests and refund requests on individual fees (other than the cable television annual fee) paid under the 1970 schedule, the FCC issued a series of opinions and orders denying refund requests generally.11 Those orders form the basis for the instant petitions for review.
I.
The threshold question in these cases is whether petitioners have any basis for seeking recovery since they never appealed the decision in Clay Broadcasting,12 which upheld the fees now challenged here. The only appeal from that decision was by cable television operators who questioned the validity of their annual fee, which is not at issue here. Thus we must decide whether, by failing to appeal that decision, petitioners waived their rights to challenge the 1970 fee schedule further, and what effect the decision of the Supreme Court in NCTA has upon this question.
Petitioners’ first argument is that the Supreme Court, by deciding that the cable television annual fee was improperly measured and by reversing and remanding for further proceedings,13 effectively struck down the entire 1970 fee schedule. We cannot agree that the Supreme Court’s action in NCTA is to be so broadly viewed. As we have already observed, the issue before the Court in that case was specifically limited to the validity of the cable television annual fee;14 and the language of the Court’s opinion, although vague in places, *1124cannot be said clearly to go beyond that defined issue.15
It is the generally accepted rule in civil cases that where less than all of the several co-parties appeal from an adverse judgment, a reversal as to the parties appealing does not necessitate or justify a reversal as to the parties not appealing.16 Moreover, even assuming arguendo that NCTA could be read as passing directly on the validity of the entire 1970 fee schedule, it would not be appropriate for this court to so hold: the proper method for raising that issue would have been by a petition for rehearing in the Fifth Circuit following remand by the Supreme Court. Therefore, we believe that the Court’s reversal of Clay Broadcasting was only a reversal as to the issue which was presented to it by the cable operators, and cannot be interpreted as invalidating the entire fee schedule.17
*1125This is not to say, however, that, the principles laid down by the Court in NCTA do not call into question the validity of the entire 1970 fee schedule: although the NCTA opinion cannot be read as having acted upon anything other than the validity of the cable television annual fee, that decision is strong precedent on the validity of other fees adopted at the same time. We are not unmindful that the fees imposed on broadcasters are worlds apart from the annual cable television fee. The basis for the two fees is radically different both in the nature of the services rendered and in the variety of services. Nonetheless, the general rules of stare decisis apply. Certainly, by remanding “for further proceedings consistent with this opinion,”18 the Supreme Court intended (but did not require) that the Commission should review the future application of its entire fee schedule to the extent that the application of such schedule in the future might violate its decision. In fact, that is what took place,19 and a new fee schedule was adopted on January 15, 1975.20 The distinct question now before us is whether petitioners are entitled to a refund of fees assessed before that time under the now-doubtful 1970 fee schedule in light of the principles announced in NCTA.
In the present case, petitioners are seeking refund of the specific charges which they paid between 1970 and 1975. Some of the petitioners here participated in the earlier Fifth Circuit challenge to the order establishing the 1970 schedule, but none were parties to the ultimately successful *1126petition of the cable companies to the Supreme Court.21 They have had no previous opportunity to question the validity, under the principles laid down in NCTA, of the fees assessed against them under the 1970 fee schedule. There seems to be no good reason now to deny them that opportunity.
The Government argues against our jurisdiction here by observing that all of the petitioners have already had an opportunity to challenge the specific fees assessed against them at the time when payment was required.22 Apparently, such a challenge would have required the withholding of payment while judicial review was being pursued. This simplistic argument overlooks several important facts. First, the fees in question here are those assessed for filings, for the grant of certain necessary authorization, and for the basic operating authority of broadcasters. The Commission has indicated in no uncertain terms that these fees must be paid when the service is furnished, with serious consequences for the party assessed if they are not.23
Second, any judicial challenge under sections 402(a) and (b) of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 402(a), 402(b) (1970), presupposes an appealable decision or order by the Commission; but no such “order” accompanies each individual assessment. Payment followed by a refund request is for practical purposes required in order to precipitate such a reviewable order. Finally, and most importantly, the Commission staff has indicated that payment followed by refund is the preferred procedure:
The grant fee is . payable on closing. If Cowles wishes, it can file a request for refund after payment, which is the procedure followed in other cases, and which is set forth in Section 1.1102(d) of the Commission’s Rules. The only exception to the principle of paying the grant fee assessed by the Commission on closing has occurred on occasions when the Commission has had difficulty in deciding the size of the grant fee and did not wish to delay grant of the application in question pending a decision on the grant fee.
*112731 F.C.C.2d 525, 526 (1971). Although 47 C.F.R. § 1.1002(d) (1971), referred to in the quotation above, makes no mention of refunds, section 1.1103 does contemplate refunds of “payments in excess of an applicable [legal] fee.” Because the Commission has made it both preferable and necessary to protest a fee assessment only after payment and publicly declared that policy, it is now estopped from requiring the petitioners to follow another procedure.
A greater obstacle to review in this court, in our eyes, is the fact that all of the petitioners now before us could have appeared before the Fifth Circuit upon remand of the NCTA case from the Supreme Court to request that the court of appeals consider its decision in Clay Broadcasting regarding the entire 1970 fee schedule, but did not do so. Absent extenuating circumstances, we would normally be inclined to hold that they had thereby waived any further challenge to the fees they were contesting in that action. But here petitioners justifiably relied on statements by the FCC to the effect that action on refunds would be taken by the Commission on its own initiative.24 Since the FCC led petitioners to believe that more timely action on their part was unnecessary, the prior possibility of an application to the Fifth Circuit on remand cannot bar the present suit.
We conclude that we have jurisdiction to consider petitioners’ request that we review the agency’s action at this time. In *1128so holding, we have considered and rejected two additional bars to review argued by the parties here: “the voluntary payment” doctrine and laches.25 As to the former, the short answer is that these payments were not in any sense “voluntary.” See note 23 supra; Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 329, 29 S.Ct. 671, 53 L.Ed. 1013 (1909); Swift Co. v. United States, 111 U.S. 22, 4 S.Ct. 244, 28 L.Ed. 341 (1884). As regards the latter, we note that neither unreasonable delay26 nor prejudice to the defendant,27 both necessary elements of laches, Powell v. Zuckert, 125 U.S.App.D.C. 55, 57, 366 F.2d 634, 636 (1966), has been shown here. Therefore, these two defenses cannot be raised to bar our review in this action.
II.
The difficult questions presented by this case are all procedural: whether petitioners have any basis for suit in this court (discussed in the previous section), and what remedy is to be applied (discussed in the next section). Having resolved the former question in favor of petitioners, the substantive issue of the validity of the claims for refunds is easily decided: clearly, the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in NCTA require us to strike down the entire 1970 fee schedule, and having done this, to declare that the FCC erred in denying petitioners’ refund requests. While it is true that the broadcast businesses of many of the petitioners here are tremendously different, both in the extent and character of their operations, from the relatively small cable operations that were before the Court in NCTA, the Court in that decision did enunciate principles which require us to find that the entire fee schedule here questioned by the broadcasters, and applicable to them, included improper elements, and therefore that the fees imposed exceeded permissible amounts. However, because the evidence in this record is insufficient, it is impossible for us therefrom to determine the dollar or precise percentage range for a proper fee.
In NCTA, the Court invalidated the cable television annual fee because it charged cable operators a fee based in part upon “public policy or interest served.” 415 U.S. at 341, 94 S.Ct. 1146. The Court held that, although some language of the IOAA of 1952 appears to allow a fee with such elements, charging in part for an independent public interest served (rather than solely for value conferred upon the recipient) makes the assessment a tax rather than a fee. It concluded that the IOAA must be narrowly read to prohibit this since there was no indication in the statute of an intent on the part of Congress to delegate the power to tax to the FCC. 415 U.S. at 342, 94 S.Ct. 1146.
However, the incorporation of compensation for public interest elements into the 1970 fee schedule was not limited to the cable television annual fee: the agency’s comments in proposing and adopting the 1970 fee schedule make it clear that “the public interest served” was considered in setting all the fees:
[ T]he rationale for the formulation of the new fee schedule gives explicit recognition, in appropriately varying degrees, to the “value to the recipient” of the privi*1129leges granted, as well as the public interest served and the direct and indirect cost to the Government.
21 F.C.C.2d 502, 504 (1970). See also 23 F.C.C.2d 880, 882, 883 (1970). This statement explicitly admits that the Commission did not base the fee schedule solely on “value to the recipient,” as NCTA thereafter held it was required to do. 23 F.C.C.2d 880, 885 (1970); 21 F.C.C.2d 502, 505-06 (1970). Thus, to the extent that this standard is exceeded, all of the assessments made by the 1970 fee schedule are to some extent in the nature of taxes rather than fees, and the entire schedule is invalid.28 It directly follows from this that the FCC *1130improperly denied the refund orders at issue here, for it would be improper to allow the Commission to retain money illegally exacted and paid involuntarily and under protest (in many cases made contemporaneously with payment), especially in light of its action in refunding cable annual fees29 and its implied pledges to do so in other appropriate cases.30
III.
With the issue of the validity of the refund denials resolved in favor of the petitioners, the remaining question is the remedy to be granted them by this court. Since it would be impossible on the record before us to order refunds ourselves,31 we will remand this case to the agency for such action. In doing so, however, we feel compelled, to the extent that the present record permits us to do so, to specify, the exact nature of the refunds to be granted, so as to finally terminate this lengthy litigation. In particular, we address two questions raised by the parties: (1) can NCTA be applied retroactively by this court so as to allow refund of fees paid before the date of that decision (March 4, 1974); and (2) what portion of the money paid is to be refunded?
The first question arises because, as we have above held, our decision in these cases is controlled by principles established by the Supreme Court in NCTA. The effect of the NCTA decision at minimum was to declare that, in the future (i. e., after March 4, 1974), fees collected under the 10 A A must conform to those principles; thus, some portion of the fees collected by the FCC under its nonconforming 1970 fee schedule after March 4, 1974, must clearly be refunded. The more difficult question involves the possible retroactive application of the NCTA decision to the period before March 4, 1974 — that is, before the principles on which we rely today had been announced.
The general rule of long standing is that judicial precedents normally have retroactive as well as prospective, effect. See, e. g., Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 622-23 & n.6, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965), citing Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 372, 30 S.Ct. 140, 54 L.Ed. 228 (1910) (Holmes, J., dissenting); IB J. Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 0.402[.3-2-l] (1974); Note, Prospective Overruling and Retroactive Application in the Federal Courts, 71 Yale L.J. 907 (1962). Nonetheless, many state courts have occasionally accorded their decisions only prospective effect under various theories,32 and their pow*1131er to do so has been affirmed by the United States Supreme Court in Great Northern Railway v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358, 53 S.Ct. 145, 77 L.Ed. 360 (1932). The Supreme Court has also approved the use of this technique in the federal courts in Linkletter v. Walker, supra, 381 U.S. at 627-29, 85 S.Ct. 1731,33 and the approach has been used, albeit infrequently, both by the Supreme Court and by our own court.34
In the case now before us, the Government argues that the effect given to the NCTA decision should be limited to that of a prospective change in the law. Govt. Brief at 39-42. The effect of this would be to deny petitioners refunds of any money paid before March 4,1974; refunds could be ordered only as to fees paid after that date and before March 1,1975, the effective date of the 1975 fee schedule.35 To get around the fact that the Commission has already refunded annual fees paid by cable operators prior to March 4,1974, the Government requests us to employ the “reward theory” of prospective overruling, see note 31 supra, whereby NCTA would be held to have changed the law only prospectively as to all persons except cable operators, who would receive the benefit of a retroactive application of the new rule as compensation for the time and effort they spent in challenging the 1970 fee schedule. Petitioners, of course, favor a full retroactive application of NCTA.
Perhaps the best resolution of the problem has been suggested by Professor Moore, who states:
[ S]ome judicial decisions elaborate or augment previously articulated doctrine; and some alter or reverse it. Whether decisions in [these] ought to be given retroactive operation as precedent is a problem that ought not to be resolved by a philosophical absolute so abstract as the Blacksonian declaratory theory. The impact of retroactive application of the new rule, both on litigants and on the administration of justice as a whole, ought to be the basic considerations.
IB J. Moore, supra at 10.402[3.-2-2] (emphasis added). Shortly thereafter, he expands upon this idea:
[ W]e have . . . indicated that consistency in the administration of justice is a desirable goal, to be pursued in the absence of compelling circumstances justifying another result. Thus, unless a decision is quite unsound, it ought not normally to be overruled. If it is overruled, the overruling decision ought not to be prospectively limited except for compelling reasons, such as justifiable reliance upon the old rule. And if the overruling decision is prospectively limited, an exception ought not to be made to reward the winning litigant, as was done by the Supreme Court of Illinois in the Molitor decision. [See note 31 supra]. These three steps represent progressive inroads on evenness and consistency in the administration of justice, and none should be taken lightly; unevenness and inconsistency in administering the law undermine public confidence in, and re*1132spect for, the judicial process and the rule of law itself.
Id. at 10.402[3. — 2 — 4] (footnotes eliminated, emphasis added).
From the commentators, we can distill four relevant criteria for deciding whether to limit a decision to a prospective effect: (1) the extent of justifiable reliance upon the rejected precedent or rule; (2) the purpose of the newly announced rule; (3) the degree of finality of plaintiff’s transaction; and (4) the element of surprise. See IB J. Moore, supra at H 0.402[3.-2-4]; Note, Limitation of Judicial Decision to Prospective Operation, 46 Ia.L.Rev. 600, 601 (1961); Note, Prospective Operation of Decisions Holding Statutes Unconstitutional or Overruling Prior Decisions, 60 Harv.L.Rev. 437, 440 (1947); Note, The Effect of Overruled and Overruling Decisions on Intervening Transactions, 47 Harv.L.Rev. 1403, 1404-05 (1934); Note, Prospective Overruling and Retroactive Application in the Federal Courts, 71 Yale L.J. 907, 940-51 (1962). Careful consideration of these four criteria leads inexorably to the conclusion that NCTA should be accorded retroactive effect.
By far the most important consideration of the four is the extent of justifiable reliance on the old rule. See, e. g., IB J. Moore, supra at 10.402[3.-2-4]. Since NCTA was a case of first impression,36 and since the FCC had notice almost from the time it adopted the schedule that it would be subject to a challenge in court, there could be no justifiable reliance here; and indeed, the record demonstrates that there was none.37 For the same reason, and because of the immediate protests and refund requests made by many of the petitioners,38 we reject any idea that the Commission would be unfairly surprised by our action today as well as the notion that petitioners’ “transactions” had become final and should not be disturbed.39 As for the purpose of the rule announced in NCTA, it was to prevent the Commission from collecting money for activities for which it had no statutory right to charge. The same idea would prevent the agency from retaining money illegally exacted.
Therefore, we answer the first question in the affirmative: NCTA can and will be applied retroactively by this court to require refund of fees collected from petitioners under the 1970 fee schedule to the extent that they exceeded legally permissible amounts. The question which remains is what portion of the fees was improperly collected.
Petitioners argue that the 1970 fee schedule should be voided and fees refunded to the extent that they exceed the amount payable under the 1966 fee schedule. They contend that “[s]ince the 1970 order was in both form and substance an amendment of *1133the pre-existing schedule, its invalidity would leave standing the prior rules containing the 1966 Schedule,” NAB Brief at 57 (footnote eliminated), citing Williams v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission, 134 U.S.App.D.C. 342, 363 n.100, 415 F.2d 922, 943 n.100 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1081, 89 S.Ct. 860, 21 L.Ed.2d 773 (1969). In the Williams case, this court did order refund of transit fares collected under an invalid fare structure to the extent that they exceeded the fare payable under the previous fare structure. The present situation, however, is distinguishable because of the existence of a congressional mandate, expressed in the IOAA, that government agencies should become, through the assessment of appropriate fees, “self-sustaining to the full extent possible.” 31 U.S.C. § 483a (1970) (emphasis added). It is our interpretation of this mandate that the Commission should retain the maximum portion of the fees collected that would be permissible under the principles announced in NCTA, New England Power, and the statute.
What proportion this is, we do not know; so we remand this case to the agency with instructions that it initiate proceedings to recalculate the 1970 fee schedule in accordance with the “value to the recipient” standard laid down in NCTA, as interpreted in this case and the other fee cases decided by this court today.40 Briefly, we have interpreted the “value to the recipient” standard to include a number of specific requirements. First, the Commission must justify the assessment of a fee by a clear statement of the particular service or benefit which it is expected to reimburse. Second, it must calculate the cost basis for each fee assessed. This involves (a) an allocation of the specific expenses which form the cost basis for the fee to the smallest practical unit; (b) exclusion of any expenses incurred to serve an independent public interest; and (c) a public explanation of the specific expenses included in the cost basis for a particular fee, and an explanation of the criteria used to include or exclude particular items. Finally, the Commission must set a fee calculated to return this cost basis at a rate which reasonably reflects the cost of the services performed or value conferred upon the payor. The fees may be imposed only on beneficiaries of agency services who satisfy the criteria of NCTA and New England Power.41
Having calculated a proper fee under these guidelines, the Commission should refund that portion of the money which was collected in excess thereof. We contemplate that this will be a general undertaking by the Commission, involving all fees collected from the broadcasters under the 1970 fee schedule and not limited to those sums paid by parties to this lawsuit.42
Judgment accordingly.