— In February 1992, Applied Industrial Materials Corporation (AIMCOR) filed an action against Melton, Smith and Pacific Rim Olivine, Inc. (Pacific Rim), to quiet title in 34 mining claims. AIMCOR and its predecessors originally "located”1 all of these claims. In early 1989, Pacific Rim attempted to "relocate”2 the claims.
The trial court originally granted AIMCOR’s motion for summary judgment, but on reconsideration it ruled as a matter of law that RCW 78.08.0903 does not require anything more to relocate a mining claim than compliance with RCW 78.08.060,4 the statute relating to location of a claim. The trial *75court also found that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding the sufficiency of Pacific Rim’s "monumentation”.5 Based on these two findings, the trial court denied AIMCOR’s motion for summary judgment.6 We granted discretionary review, and now reverse and remand for entry of judgment in favor of AIMCOR.
Facts
AIMCOR held 34 mining claims on federal land within the Mt. Baker/Snoqualmie National Forest. In the assessment year ending September 1,1988, AIMCOR did not perform its annual assessment work, making it possible for others to relocate these claims.7
In early 1989, Melton8 and Smith, acting on behalf of Pacific Rim, attempted to relocate all 34 of AIMCOR’s mining claims. Pacific Rim recorded location notices with the Skagit County Auditor’s office. Pacific Rim alleges that it staked a single relocation notice on each of the 34 claims. However, Pacific Rim conceded that it had not posted monu*76merits at each corner, sunk a new discovery shaft or conducted any development work on any of the claims.9
Discussion
As an initial matter, we reject Pacific Rim’s contention that under the federal mining law of 1872 states may not enact statutes that create different requirements for location and relocation of mining claims. The federal mining law of 1872, as amended, includes no such prohibition.
On the contrary, the federal statutes and mining regulations require that relocators comply with both state and federal law. See Clason v. Matko, 223 U.S. 646, 654-55, 56 L. Ed. 588, 32 S. Ct. 392 (1912) (upholding state statute requiring additional notice provisions for relocation of mining claim; noting that the federal requirements may not be dispensed with, but they may be supplemented by state law if it is not repugnant to the letter or the spirit of the federal law).
Pacific Rim has failed to establish that RCW 78.08.090 is so contrary to federal law as to be in conflict with or repugnant to 30 U.S.C. § 28. Like the statute at issue in Clason, RCW 78.08.090 merely sets forth the procedures that a relo*77cator must follow to take advantage of the federal right set out in 30 U.S.C. § 28, and does not, by its operation, divest the relocator of this right. See also Knutson v. Fredlund, 56 Wash. 634, 638-39, 106 P. 200 (1910) (defects in relocation notices render relocation invalid).
As a second preliminary matter, we agree with Pacific Rim that its motion for reconsideration by the trial court was timely. AIMCOR challenged the trial court’s use of the Supplemental Declaration of Tony Smith, submitted by Pacific Rim after the trial court ruled initially in favor of AIM-COR on its motion for summary judgment.
In the context of a summary judgment, unlike a trial, there is no prejudice to any findings if additional facts are considered. Meridian Minerals Co. v. King Cy., 61 Wn. App. 195, 203, 810 P.2d 31, review denied, 117 Wn.2d 1017 (1991). "Although not encouraged, a party may submit additional evidence after a decision on summary judgment has been rendered, but before a formal order has been entered.” Meridian Minerals, 61 Wn. App. at 202-03.
Here, it was permissible for the trial court to entertain the motion for reconsideration. The only problem is that, upon doing so, the trial court reached the wrong legal conclusion as to the construction of RCW 78.08.090.
RCW 78.08.090, on its face, is unambiguous. By its terms, this statute requires a relocator to: sink a new discovery shaft and fix claim boundaries in the same manner described in RCW 78.08.060; or engage in an equal amount of development work and fix the claim boundaries in the same manner as described in section .060; or sink a preexisting discovery shaft 10 feet deeper and erect new location monuments.
It is undisputed that Pacific Rim failed to fully comply with any of the three alternative requirements under the relocation statute. Instead, Pacific Rim contends that the intention of the Legislature is not reflected in the plain words of the statute. Specifically, Pacific Rim contends that the Legislature’s failure to amend RCW 78.08.090 when it amended RCW 78.08.060 in 1963 was merely an oversight.
*78Looking at the legislative history of RCW 78.08, we are unable to find any indication that the Legislature’s failure to amend section .090 so as to comply with the amended section .060 was by way of oversight, rather than design. Therefore, we reject Pacific Rim’s contention to the contrary.10
Even if this court were persuaded by Pacific Rim’s argument that the Legislature "overlooked” the significance of section .090 when it last amended section .060, there are limits on a court’s authority to add or subtract provisions, thus effectively "rewriting” a statute in the name of statutory construction.11
If a statute’s language is clear, its plain meaning must be given effect without resort to rules of statutory construction, and when the language of a statute is clear, the courts must apply its obvious meaning. Pasco v. Ross, 39 Wn. App. 480, 484, 694 P.2d 37 (1985) (citing State v. Theilken, 102 Wn.2d *79271, 275, 684 P.2d 709 (1984)). A legislative body is presumed not to have used superfluous words. Courts are bound to accord meaning, if possible, to every word in a statute. State v. Lundquist, 60 Wn.2d 397, 403, 374 P.2d 246 (1962) (citing Group Health Coop. v. King Cy. Med. Soc’y, 39 Wn.2d 586, 637, 237 P.2d 737 (1951)).
In construing a statute, it is always safer not to add to, or subtract from, the language of the statute unless imperatively required to make it a rational statute. McKay v. Department of Labor & Indus., 180 Wash. 191, 194, 39 P.2d 997, 98 A.L.R. 990 (1934); State v. Taylor, 97 Wn.2d 724, 728, 649 P.2d 633 (1982); State v. Edwards, 104 Wn.2d 63, 67-68, 701 P.2d 508 (1985). The general rule is that
[c]ourts must . . . construe statutes as they are written. They may not rewrite them to suit their views of what they think the statutes ought to say or to avoid difficulties in construing and applying them.
Arkansas Oak Flooring Co. v. Louisiana & Ark. Ry., 166 F.2d 98, 101 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 828 (1948).
Notwithstanding these well-settled rules of statutory construction, Pacific Rim contends that the interpretation of RCW 78.08.060 is controlled by the holding of National Milling & Mining Co. v. Piccolo, 57 Wash. 572, 107 P. 353 (1910), and, therefore, that we should affirm the trial court. In National Milling the Supreme Court held that a then existing and since repealed statutory exception relating to the sinking of a discovery shaft for the location of a claim west of the summit of the Cascade Mountains also applied to relocation of claims west of the summit of the Cascade Mountains. 57 Wash, at 575-76. The reasoning of the National Milling court was that a relocation of a forfeited or abandoned claim was as much a "location” as an original discoverer’s location and it would be erroneous to restrict a generally applicable statute to only one type of "location”. National Milling, 57 Wash, at 576. Therefore, according to Pacific Rim, this court is bound to consider an abandoned or forfeited claim as no different from an original locator’s claim for purposes of *80satisfying the "location” requirements of RCW 78.08.060 and .090.
AIMCOR responds that the 1963 amendment to RCW 78.08.060, making location of a claim easier by eliminating the discovery shaft requirement, was intended to overrule National Milling.
Although we think AIMCOR goes too far in saying that the Legislature, by its 1963 amendment to section .060, "overruled” National Milling (the statutory provision the National court was interpreting was repealed in 1955), the Legislature’s adherence to the 1949 version of section .090 when it amended the location statute in 1963 can indeed be logically justified as the dissent suggested in National.12 Thus, we may reasonably infer that the Legislature’s adherence to section .090 was a conscious departure from the reasoning of the National majority.
For all of the reasons noted above, we hold that the trial court erred when it ruled as a matter of law that RCW 78.08.090 is to be read as if it had been amended to reflect the 1963 version of section .060. We reverse the trial court’s denial of AIMCOR’s motion for summary judgment and remand for entry of judgment in favor of AIMCOR.
Pekelis, A.C.J., and Coleman, J., concur.