The defendant, Lance Huggins, raises a single issue following his conviction of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, second offense:1 whether the judge erred in finding that the charge was supported by probable cause when both the police and the judge relied in part on evidence that, at the scene, the defendant refused to perform field sobriety tests. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
*108Background. The defendant’s pretrial motion to “dismiss/ suppress” sought two different types of relief — the suppression of evidence and the dismissal of the charge. Only the motion to dismiss is before us.2 The judge conducted an evidentiary hearing, and heard testimony from three police officers. We summarize the facts found by the judge, supplemented “with uncontested testimony from the suppression hearing that the judge explicitly or implicitly credited.” Commonwealth v. Bermudez, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 46, 47-48 (2012).
On March 30, 2009, at approximately 12:45 a.m., Officer Baker of the Brockton police department was on routine patrol when he noticed headlights shining into a wooded area near Intervale Street. On investigation, he saw a vehicle approximately fifteen feet off the side of the road. The vehicle had struck a few trees and “was hung up on some rocks.” The roads were dry. The area was well lit. The defendant was in the driver’s seat of the vehicle when Officer Baker approached it. After determining that there was no need for immediate medical assistance, he returned to his cruiser and called for a tow truck. Several additional officers arrived. Officer Kalp approached the defendant, who was still seated in his vehicle, to ask for his license and registration. He noticed “an extremely strong odor of alcoholic beverage coming from [the defendant’s] breath.” When asked for his license and registration, the defendant threw personal papers out of the window of his vehicle as he looked for the items. He produced his license. Although the passenger doors were operable, the police had to force the driver’s side door open to enable the defendant to get out of his vehicle.
Once outside the vehicle, the defendant told the police he had been there for forty-five minutes. The police observed that he was “very erratic,” and his manner was rude and belligerent. *109He said a neighbor had come by who was supposed to telephone the police. There was no record of such a call having been made. The defendant also told the police that another car forced him off the road, but he could not supply the officers with any details about what had occurred or give a description of the other vehicle or the direction in which it was traveling. Officer Kalp opined that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol; he testified that his determination that the defendant was intoxicated was based in part on the defendant’s refusal to perform field sobriety tests. The defendant was handcuffed, arrested, advised of the Miranda warnings, and transported to the police station for booking.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge denied the motion to dismiss. The judge stated that the basis for her decision was the totality of the circumstances as depicted by the three officers who testified, including the defendant’s demeanor, the strong odor of alcohol, the location of the defendant’s vehicle, and his refusal to perform field sobriety tests.
Discussion. 1. Challenging probable cause for arrest after conviction. The defendant claims for the first time on appeal that he is entitled to the dismissal of the charge because the police lacked probable cause for his arrest since they relied on his refusal to perform field sobriety tests to make that judgment. This argument overlooks the fact that “[a]n illegal arrest, without more, has never been viewed as a bar to subsequent prosecution, nor as a defense to a valid conviction.” Commonwealth v. Jacobsen, 419 Mass. 269, 275 (1995), quoting from United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 474 (1980).3 Because the defendant went to trial and was found guilty, there is no basis for a claim of *110prejudice resulting from a pretrial determination of probable cause. See Commonwealth v. Greenwood, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 611, 622, cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 327 (2011).4,5
2. Judge’s role when acting on a motion to dismiss. We take this opportunity to clarify the judge’s role when it is alleged that there was no probable cause for the issuance of a complaint. When, as in this case, a person is arrested without a warrant, the initial assessment of probable cause is made by the arresting police officer. See District Attorney for the Norfolk Dist. v. Quincy Div. of the Dist. Ct. Dept., 444 Mass. 176, 182 (2005). In such cases, when the person is promptly released (whether on bail or personal recognizance),6 a judicial officer must make an independent determination of probable cause before a complaint is issued. See Mass.R.Crim.P. 3(g)(2), as appearing in 442 Mass. 1502 (2004).7 See also District Attorney for the *111Norfolk Dist., supra at 186 & n.16. At this stage, “the facts on which a complaint is based [shall] either be submitted in writing or, in the discretion of the appropriate judicial official, conveyed orally so long as the oral statement is transcribed or otherwise recorded.” Reporters’ Notes to Mass.R.Crim.R 3(g)(1), Mass. Ann. Laws Court Rules, Rules of Criminal Procedure, at 1344 (LexisNexis 2012-2013). See Commonwealth v. Lester L., 445 Mass. 250, 256 & n.5 (2005). If the defendant is not satisfied with this determination, the remedy is a postarraignment motion to dismiss.
A motion to dismiss a complaint, in which the defendant challenges whether the charge is supported by probable cause, is a very limited remedy analogous to a postindictment motion to dismiss under Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 385 Mass. 160, 163 (1982) (“at the very least the grand jury must hear sufficient evidence to establish the identity of the accused and probable cause to arrest him” [citation omitted]). Thus, in Commonwealth v. DiBennadetto, 436 Mass. 310, 313 (2002), the Supreme Judicial Court stated that “[a]fter the issuance of a complaint, a motion to dismiss will lie for a failure to present sufficient evidence to the clerk-magistrate (or judge).” We recently explained that “[ujnless the Commonwealth consents, a motion to dismiss a criminal complaint for lack of probable cause is decided from the four comers of the complaint application, without evidentiary hearing.” Commonwealth v. Bell, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 61, 62 (2013).
In the present case, despite the fact that the prosecutor and defense counsel disagreed whether the observations made by the police at the scene were sufficient to establish probable cause, the judge should have decided the motion to dismiss on the basis of the written or recorded statement in support of the complaint on file with the clerk-magistrate in accordance with Mass.R.Crim.R 3(g). The defendant has no right to cross-examine the Commonwealth’s witnesses in advance of trial. DiBennadetto, 436 Mass, at 315. Here, the Commonwealth did not give its consent to an evidentiary hearing. Accordingly, the *112judge should not have conducted an evidentiary hearing and should not have permitted the defendant to cross-examine the police officers.
Judgment affirmed.