Opinion PER CURIAM.
A federal employee unsuccessfully solicited in the District Court equitable relief against the employing agency and money damages from officials thereof individually. For failure to exhaust administrative remedies and then seek judicial review in the forum statutorily designated, we affirm on the first branch of this appeal. Finding, however, that the court erroneously failed to consider the damage claims, we remand for further proceedings on that score.
I
Appellant, Phyllis A. Daly, a career civil servant, is employed at the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).1 In 1975, she became director of the agency’s Office of Planning and Review, a subdivision of its Office of Research and Development, with a grade classification of GS-15.2 Her career became stormy, however,. in July of 1977, when appellee Stephen Gage became assistant administrator of the Office of Research and Development, and thus appellant’s immediate supervisor.
Shortly after assuming his post, Gage launched a study of the feasibility of internal reorganization.3 Within a week — on July 11, 1977 — Gage relieved appellant of her duties as director of the Office of Planning and Review, and transferred her to a 120-day detail.4 Appellant complained to the EPA’s then-Administrator, appellee Douglas M. Costle, but he declined to disturb Gage’s action.5 Pending completion of the reorganization study, appellant was assigned to a second 120-day detail,6 and shortly afterwards — in April, 1978 — the Office of Planning and Review was abolished.7 Appellant was put on a third 120-day detail, with a view to determination in the mean*49time on where she should be relocated within the agency.8
On July 25, 1978, appellee Donald Sadler, an EPA personnel officer, requested that reduction-in-force procedures be initiated within the Office of Research and Development, and that appellant be placed permanently in another post.9 Accordingly, on August 16, 1978, appellant was informed that her position as director of the Office of Planning and Review would be eliminated.10 She was offered instead a program analyst’s job, classified 'GS-14, and told that while she would continue to receive her GS-15 salary for two years she would, if an alternative situation was not found in the interim, then suffer a cutback in pay.11 On September 21, 1978, following an inquiry from the Civil Service Commission,12 to which appellant had protested the personnel actions affeeting her,13 Sadler offered appellant a position as a GS-15 environmental scientist, in lieu of the one previously tendered as a program analyst.14 She accepted, with the understanding that she would continue her challenge.15
II
Appellant filed two separate complaints with the Civil Service Commission, each adverting to her political affiliation as a Republican. The first charged that the reorganization was politically motivated and improperly conducted;16 the second more generally alleged political harassment at EPA.17 Each, however, was ultimately unsuccessful. On January 26, 1979, the Merit Systems Protection Board, which had succeeded the Civil Service Commission,18 found “that partisan politics was not a factor in the reduction-in-force action by which appellant was affected.”19 Consequently the Board concluded that “there has been no violation of appellant’s rights under the reduction-in-force regulations.”-20 On October 26, 1979, the Board announced that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the harassment claim because “appellant alleges no violation of the basic requirements for employment practices.” 21
Shortly before the Board issued its first decision, however, appellant instituted the instant litigation in the District Court.22 Naming Costle, Gage and Sadler as defendants in their individual as well as their official capacities, appellant asserted that the three had violated her Fifth Amendment due process rights by “ignoring] and misusing] Civil Service regulations and *50procedures”;23 that together with “other unnamed conspirators [they had] conspired [against appellant] in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(1)”;24 and that the named defendants had “conspired together for the purpose of depriving [appellant] and a class of persons who were in policy making positions during the previous (Republican) administration ... of the equal protection of the laws or the privileges and immunities of the laws of the United States.... ”25 Appellant sought both money damages and injunctive relief.26
Again she was unsuccessful. The District Court, in an opinion issuing after the Board’s first decision and practically simultaneously with its determination on the harassment claim,27 deemed conclusive the Board’s findings on the controversial reduction-in-force.28 The Board’s order sustaining the agency’s action was entitled to effect, as a collateral estoppel, the court held, because “[pjlaintiff was represented by counsel [before the Board], and had a fair opportunity to be heard.” 29 And while the only issue considered by the Board in the decision under attack was the propriety of the reduction-in-force, the Board, said the court, had
[a]nalyzed the RIF action and the partisan polities allegations in light of all the interactions between Defendants and Plaintiff. The Board found that there was no evidence that any of the Defendants’ behavior was motivated by partisan politics ....
Since collateral estoppel precludes Plaintiff from asserting the Defendants’ actions were motivated by partisan politics or that the RIF action was illegal, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted.30
The court did not reach what it termed the sole remaining issue in the case — whether “putting Plaintiff on three consecutive details, even if unclouded by partisan politics, was nonetheless a misuse of Civil Service regulations.”31 That aspect of the claim, the court reminded, had never been subjected to agency review, and the failure to utilize that administrative remedy made judicial resolution inappropriate.32
Appellant requested reconsideration, pointing out that the Board had dismissed her political-harassment claim for lack of jurisdiction, and arguing that she was not given an adequate opportunity to litigate the reduction-in-force complaint.33 The District Court was unmoved, however. Appellant, the court declared, had “not provided sufficient evidence to [the] Court reflecting that the [Board’s] procedures were inadequate as a matter of law.”34 And, the court noted, appellant could have pursued administrative remedies within EPA itself.35 Reconsideration was denied,36 whereupon appellant came to this court.
Ill
The District Court undoubtedly was right insofar as it concluded that an injunctive remedy is unavailable to appellant. To now be eligible for equitable relief — which was available administratively — appellant *51must properly have pursued all appropriate administrative remedies,37 and, of course, any avenue statutorily prescribed for ensuing judicial review. While appellant correctly took her reduction-in-foree complaint to the Merit Systems Protection Board,38 she did not seek review by this court of the Board’s adverse ruling, as is statutorily required.39 She cannot now short-circuit the review procedures congressionally mandated by collaterally attacking the Board’s order in the District Court. And appellant’s more general claims of political harassment are foreclosed by her failure to pursue any efficacious administrative remedy at all.40 That appellant has alleged constitutional deprivations does not change the analysis, for so long as effective remediation conceivably could have been achieved through the administrative process, exhaustion was pre- • requisite.41
This conclusion, however, does not dispose of the case. Appellant, charging political bias as well as improper personnel actions, brought suit against the named defendants in their individual as well as official capacities, and sought money damages as well as injunctive relief.42 The exhaustion rule did not extend to the damage claims appellant asserted against her adversaries personally and individually, for obviously they were not redressable administratively.43 Yet the District Court never considered these claims, apparently because it believed that they all were grounded essentially on the allegations of political harassment, and that those allegations had been rejected by the Board for want of supporting evidence.44
If indeed this was the District Court’s rationale, it was plainly mistaken. The Board did not, as the court stated, find “that there was no evidence that any of Defendants’ behavior was motivated by partisan polities.45 On the contrary, the Board explicitly declared itself “without jurisdiction to determine whether any [actions other than the reduction-in-force] taken by [EPA] were motivated by partisan politics.”46 Thus, several harassment charges against the appellees individually were never addressed at either the administrative 47 or the judicial levels. Appellant is entitled to judicial asessment of those claims,48 and the present record leaves us in the dark as to whether they were dealt with, if at all, on a legally sustainable theory-
*52We affirm, then, the District Court’s ruling that appellant cannot now obtain equitable relief through the courts. But it is for the District Court to address, in the first instance, the difficult factual and legal issues posed by appellant’s claims for money damages against the appellees individually.49 If that has already been done, and the claims were denied on a ground other than the one we have rejected,50 the court must at least, articulate its reasons for the edification of the litigants, and of this court in the event of subsequent review. The case is accordingly remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.