The decisions of the Tax Court having sustained the commissioner’s determination of deficiencies for the calendar years 1933 and 1934, these consolidated petitions were brought to review them. Attacking, as clearly erroneous, the findings on which the decisions rest, they present two questions for our decision.
One of these is whether the Tax Court erred in holding that a partnership claimed to be existing between petitioners’ married daughter, Mary Hart, and her uncle, Robert Alexander, was not bona fide, real, and valid, but a pretense, a cloak, and a sham, under whose cover family income was divided for the purpose and with the result of lessening family tax burdens.
The other is whether the Tax Court erred in holding that income attributed to their minor daughter, Frances, during the taxable years involved, was properly attributable to petitioners under Sec. 22(a) 1 of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C.A. § 22(a).
For the reason hereafter briefly stated, and upon the authority of our cases, Scherf v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 5 Cir., 161 F.2d 495, and Batman v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 5 Cir., 189 F.2d 107, we answer the first question in the negative.
This reason is that this is not a case, as some of the cases erroneously decided by the Tax Court have been, where the existence of a family partnership has been denied merely because its effect was to reduce income. It is one, on the contrary, where the Tax Court meets head on the fact issue of sham or reality, and where the claimed partnership is not so specifically and definitely proven by a written instrument or by an oral agreement, whose content and meaning is undisputable, that we 'are able to say that the Tax Court’s finding, that there was no real agreement, was clearly erroneous.
There is unquestionably some evidence from which a fact finder could draw the inference that Robert Alexander and Mary Hart were, for the years in question, genuinely and really members of a partnership. There is other evidence, though, if not of a completely contradictory, at least of an equivocal, character from which a contrary inference could be drawn. It cannot, be said, therefore, that the evidence as a whole is unequivocal or compelling, so that we can with confidence declare clearly erroneous the carefully set out findings, made by the judge of the Tax Court who heard and saw the witnesses, that not Mary but Harley Alexander was Robert’s partner.
*923If there is any one thing which emerges clearly from the confusion caused by the body of utterances and decisions, administrative and judicial, dealing with claimed family partnerships, leading up to and culminating in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280, 66 S.Ct. 532, 90 L.Ed. 670, and Lusthaus v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 327 U.S. 293, 66 S.Ct. 539, 90 L.Ed. 679, it is that instead of their being examined with an eye single to determining whether in law and in fact they were a reality or a sham, many of them were examined and dealt with with a gaze, focused too much upon the consequences, to the surtax, of recognizing them.2
Under the impetus of this point of view, it has sometimes seemed to be forgotten that it is one thing for the commissioner to properly alert himself to prevent imposition by taxpayers upon the revenue, it is quite another thing for him, the Tax Court, and the other courts, to usurp the legislative function of congress by interpreting the clear and simple statutes involved so as to strike down' family partnerships because, and only because, they are such.3
*924If there is anything which emerges with clarity from the decision in the Culbertson case, supra, and from the reports of the committees of Senate and House, quoted in notes 2 and 3 supra, it is that the artificial and so-called objective tests of the existence of a partnership, set up in the Tower and Lusthaus cases as conclusive, are not such. The question in each case is one of fact to be determined like any other fact question upon the evidence as a whole, and, as, stated in the Committee Reports, “The same standards apply in determining the bona fides of alleged family partnerships as in determining the bona fides of other transactions between family members”.
It, therefore is, and remains, true that the acid test for determining the question of the reality and validity vel no*n of a family partnership is to be found in the answer to the question: Was the arrangement real, honest and bona fide, so that all the ordinary incidents and effects of an agreement of partnership flow, each partner bound for the losses, each sharing in the profits, in accordance with his agreement? If the answer is yes, whatever may be found to be the intent or result taxwise, there was a partnership. By the same token, if the answer is that the agreement was not real, with the intent and result that a partnership be created, but a sham, a fraud or a pretense, so that the reality behind the partnership form when unmasked shows itself to be. the contrary of what was pretended, there is no partnership, whatever may have been the intent or result taxwise.
Upon a careful examination of the record as a whole, in the light of these views, we are not able to say that the findings of the Tax Court, within the applicable authorities, Sanders v. Leech, 5 Cir., 158 F. 2d 486, and U. S. v. U. S. Gypsum Co., 333 U. S. 364, 68 S.Ct. 525, 92 L.Ed. 746, were clearly erroneous.
We answer the second question in the affirmative, upon the authority of Alexander v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 190 F.2d 753; Phillips v. U. S., 5 Cir., 193 F.2d 132, and because the commissioner, in his determination, and the Tax Court, in affirming it, have misappre- . hended the effect in law and in fact of the undisputed facts. They have done this *925by refusing to give effect to the fact that, while her father did assist her in obtaining the income in question, it was the fruit of Frances’ property, and the assistance was rendered by the father not to himself but to her.
In the reports of the Senate and House Committees on H. R. 4473 (see notes 2 and 3 supra), the fruitful source of error in the application of the Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. Ill, 50 S.Ct. 241, 74 L.Ed. 731 and Clifford cases is so carefully pointed out that a wayfarer, if he be but uninformed and not a deliberate strayer, may not continue to err in the way.
This source has been and is the failure, and sometimes the refusal, of commissioner and Tax Court to recognize and’ give effect to the difference, on the one hand, between tax evasion, the use of pretenses and forbidden devices to lessen or defeat taxes, and, on the other, tax avoidance, the making of lawful, that is of bona fide and valid, dispositions and arrangements in respect to property and services, with the purpose and result of effecting legally permissible tax savings. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 55 S.Ct. 266, 79 L.Ed. 596.
Here, nothing occurred which was either more or less than occurred in the Phillips and Alexander cases supra. In each a farmer and ranchman tried to contribute to the training and development of his daughter who had shown interest in farming and had worked on a farm, by giving her cattle and arranging for her to have a farm, and, instead of hiring someone to perform for her what services were required, performed them himself as a matter of paternal interest and affection.
To say that the profits derived from Frances’ land and cattle here and in Alexander’s case, and the losses sustained in Phillips’ case, were, merely because in each instance the father helped his child by attending to necessary business details, attributable to the parents and not to the children is completely specious reasoning. It is to deny the fundamental verities of the traditional parent and child, father and daughter relationship existing in America, and especially in the farming and ranching areas, where individuality, early independence, competence and self reliance is the rule, and where effective participation in 4-H, F & A Clubs, Fat Stock Shows and County Fairs is the entirely laudable ambition of farmbred boys and girls.
The decision and judgment of the Tax Court, finding the partnership invalid is affirmed. Its decision and judgment taxing to her parents the proceeds of cattle and farming operations having to do with cattle given to, and with farm land leased for, their daughter Frances, is reversed with directions to disallow the deficiencies.