ORDER
This matter is before the court upon Defendant Sonny’s Camp-N-Travel Mart, Inc.’s (“Defendant” or “Sonny’s”) Motion for Summary Judgment. For the reasons set forth herein, the court grants Defendant’s motion.
BACKGROUND
The facts of this case, considered in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, are as follows:
On or about June 19, 2003, Cummins Atlantic, Inc. (“Cummins” or “Plaintiff’) installed a generator on a recreational vehicle (“RV”) that had been converted for use as a mobile dental facility. Plaintiff admits that it did not properly complete its work, and as a result, the generator was not properly ventilated. Plaintiff again had contact with the RV when it serviced the generator on August 27, 2003, but Plaintiff did not notice the exhaust problem. On October 27, 2003, the owner of the RV, Barbara Ferran, took it to Sonny’s 1 for an oil change on the RV’s genera*533tors. (Ferran Dep. 11:4-11:17, Dec. 20, 2006.) At her deposition, Ms. Ferran indicated that Sonny’s never indicated it would be performing a comprehensive check of the generator systems and that she did not expect Sonny’s to do any form of safety inspection on the generators. (Farran Dep. 11:18-12:3.)
On October 27, 2003, after Sonny’s changed the oil in the RV’s generators,2 several individuals were present in the mobile dental unit, including dentist Penelope Cralle, dental hygienist Ivis Cuni, and several others receiving dental treatment. Because the RV’s generator was not properly ventilated, these individuals were exposed to carbon monoxide gas and suffered personal injuries.3 Both Cralle and Cuni filed suit against Cummins in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, and several of the other individuals filed claims against Cummins. From June 2005 through January 2006, Centennial Insurance Company and United States Fire Insurance Company, on behalf of Cummins, paid Cralle, Cuni, and the other individuals in excess of $8,000,000 in full and complete settlement for any and all claims they had resulting from the carbon monoxide poisoning incident.
On February 7, 2006, Cummins filed suit against Sonny’s, seeking contribution pursuant to South Carolina’s Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act. See S.C.Code ANN. §§ 15-38-10 et seq. According to Cummins,
[T]he Defendant Sonny’s, as a joint tort-feasor with Plaintiff Cummins, is legally liable to contribute its pro rata share of liability for the claims which the Plaintiff Cummins has settled, in that the Plaintiff Cummins has paid more than its pro rata share of common liability, pursuant *534to South Carolina Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tort Feasors Act [sic], S.C.Code Annotated §§ 15-38-10, et seq. (1976, as amended), and therefore the Plaintiff Cummins is entitled to recover from Defendant Sonny’s its pro rata share of payments for liability for the claims resulting from the [carbon monoxide poisoning] incident ..., as well as the costs associated with the pursuit of this action.
(Comply 23.) Spencer Jacobs, the employee of Sonny’s believed to have changed the oil in the RV’s generators, had his deposition taken on October 26, 2006, at which he testified that he did not see the exhaust problem. (Jacobs Dep. 32:7-32:23.) Defendant Sonny’s filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on February 5, 2007. Plaintiff has filed a Response, to which Defendant filed a Reply.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
To grant a motion for summary judgment, the court must find that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The judge is not to weigh the evidence but rather must determine if there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). All evidence should be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Perini Corp. v. Penni Constr., Inc., 915 F.2d 121, 123-24 (4th Cir.1990). “[W]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, disposition by summary judgment is appropriate.” Teamsters Joint Council No. 83 v. Centra, Inc., 947 F.2d 115, 119 (4th Cir.1991). “[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The “obligation of the nonmoving party ‘is particularly strong when the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof.’ ” Hughes v. Bedsole, 48 F.3d 1376, 1381 (4th Cir.1995) (quoting Pachaly v. City of Lynchburg, 897 F.2d 723, 725 (4th Cir.1990)). Summary judgment is not “a disfavored procedural shortcut,” but an important mechanism for weeding out “claims and defenses [that] have no factual basis.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548.
ANALYSIS
Defendant Sonny’s moves for summary judgment, arguing (1) Sonny’s did not have a duty to discover the defect created by Cummins and (2) Sonny’s was not a joint tortfeasor. (Def.’s Mem. in Support at 4-5.)4 Plaintiff, on the other hand, argues summary judgment is not appropriate because “a genuine and material factual dispute exists as to what was known and what should have been known to those representatives of Defendant involved in performing the RV generator oil change.” (Pl.’s Mem. in Opp’n at 7.) According to Plaintiff, genuine issues of material fact must be resolved “in order to determine whether Defendant’s having undertaken to perform maintenance on the generator gave rise to a duty to identify and report the obvious exhaust problems to the owner.” (Pl.’s Mem. in Opp’n at 7.)
The parties thus disagree on the question of duty. “ ‘Generally, there is no *535common law duty to act.... Thus, a person usually incurs no liability when he fails to take steps to protect others from harm not created by his own wrongful conduct.’ ” Wogan v. Kunze, 366 S.C. 583, 610, 623 S.E.2d 107, 121 (Ct.App.2005), cert. granted, 2007 S.C. LEXIS 34 (S.C., Jan. 5, 2007) (quoting Dennis by Evans v. Timmons, 313 S.C. 338, 342, 437 S.E.2d 138, 141 (Ct.App.1993)). Although “there is no general duty to control the conduct of another or to warn a third person or potential victim of danger,” there are exceptions to this rule. Madison ex rel. Bryant v. Babcock Ctr., Inc., 371 S.C. 123, 136, 638 S.E.2d 650, 656 (2006).5 “An affirmative legal duty may be created by statute, a contractual relationship, status, property interest, or some other special circumstance.” Id. at 136, 638 S.E.2d at 656-57. “The mere fact that [a plaintiffs] injuries may have been foreseeable does not create a duty to prevent those injuries. For negligent conduct to be actionable, it must violate some specific legal duty owed to [the plaintiff].” Bauer v. United States, 882 F.Supp. 516, 519 (D.S.C.1995) (citations omitted).
The issue of whether a duty arises is a question of law for the court. As the Court of Appeals of South Carolina stated,
The issue of negligence is a mixed question of law and fact. The court must first determine whether a duty arises in one party to exercise reasonable care for the benefit of another under the facts of a given case. The existence and scope of the duty are questions of law. Thereafter, the jury determines whether a breach of the duty has occurred, and the resulting damages.
Staples v. Duell, 329 S.C. 503, 506-07, 494 S.E.2d 639, 641 (Ct.App.1997) (quoting Miller v. City of Camden, 317 S.C. 28, 31, 451 S.E.2d 401, 403 (Ct.App.1994)); see also Steinke v. S.C. Dep’t of Labor, Licensing & Regulation, 336 S.C. 373, 387, 520 S.E.2d 142, 149 (1999) (“The court must determine, as a matter of law, whether the law recognizes a particular duty.”); Washington v. Lexington County Jail, 337 S.C. 400, 405, 523 S.E.2d 204, 206 (Ct.App.1999) (“The existence of a duty owed is a question of law for the courts.”) If the court determines “there is no duty, then the defendant in a negligence action is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Madison, 371 S.C. at 135-36, 638 S.E.2d at 656.
As previously noted, Plaintiff argues summary judgment is not appropriate because “genuine issues of material fact exist that must be resolved in order to determine whether Defendant’s having undertaken to perform maintenance on the generator gave rise to a duty to identify and report the obvious exhaust problems to the owner.” (Pl.’s Mem. in Opp’n at 7.)6 However, even Plaintiff recognizes the *536existence of a duty and its scope are questions of law for the court. Plaintiff states,
Though some of the issues in this case may ultimately be legal rather than factual in nature, those legal issues (e.g., the existence of a duty and the scope of the duty) cannot be determined in this case prior to full hearing and understanding of the facts concerning expectations in the industry in connection with what is standard and expected of those performing services such as generator oil changes.
(Pl.’s Mem. in Opp’n at 4 n. 2.) Plaintiff argues, in essence, that because it has produced expert testimony that Sonny’s should have noticed the exhaust problem, the court should not grant Sonny’s Motion for Summary Judgment.7
*537The court does not agree with Plaintiff. Barbara Ferran, the RV owner, contracted with Sonny’s to have Sonny’s change the oil in the RVs generators. Sonny’s did just that, and there is no allegation that injuries occurred because Sonny’s used the wrong type of oil or failed to replace the drain plug after changing the oil. Rather, Plaintiff argues that because Sonny’s changed the oil in the generators, Sonny’s had a duty to inspect and warn of problems with the generator’s exhaust.
Plaintiff has the burden of establishing a duty, see Shain, 328 S.C. at 577, 493 S.E.2d at 113, and the court finds Plaintiff has not met his burden to show that Sonny’s had a duty to inspect the generator’s exhaust system. “When a mechanic undertakes to repair a vehicle, the mechanic impliedly assumes a duty to make the repairs in a skillful, careful, diligent, and workmanlike manner.” Reiland v. Southland Equip. Serv., Inc., 330 S.C. 617, 635, 500 S.E.2d 145, 154 (Ct.App.1998), abrogated on other grounds by Webb v. CSX Transp., Inc., 364 S.C. 639, 615 S.E.2d 440 (2005) (citing Hutson v. Cummins Carolinas, Inc., 280 S.C. 552, 314 S.E.2d 19 (Ct.App.1984)). However, the fact that Sonny’s undertook to change the oil in the RV’s generators does not mean that Sonny’s had a duty to inspect the generator for exhaust problems.
Both parties cite Byerly v. Connor, 307 S.C. 441, 415 S.E.2d 796 (1992) for support. In Byerly, the issue was whether the respondent, “by and through its wholly owned state utility, Santee Cooper ..., owed a duty to warn of a latent hazardous condition which it did not create and about which it had no knowledge.” Byerly, 307 S.C. at 442-13, 415 S.E.2d at 797. Karl Byerly was electrocuted when he dove into Lake Marion from a houseboat which was moored to a dock constructed and maintained by one of Santee Cooper’s lessees. Id. at 443, 415 S.E.2d at 798. The lower court granted summary judgment in favor of Santee Cooper “on the ground that ... Santee Cooper had no duty to warn the decedent that a latent hazardous condition” existed at the marina. Id. at 443, 415 S.E.2d at 798.
On appeal, the plaintiff argued, inter alia, that Santee Cooper had a “special duty to discover and to warn of the latent hazardous condition” stemming from the fact that Santee Cooper undertook to inspect the dock at the marina. Id. at 444, 415 S.E.2d 796, 415 S.E.2d at 798. Santee Cooper’s agent conducted yearly inspections of the docks and piers on the lake “solely for the purpose of ensuring that the docks and piers conform[ed] to structural requirements of permits issued by Santee Cooper.” Id. at 445, 415 S.E.2d at 799. This inspection, however, did not *538give rise to the duty to discover and warn of the latent defect. The Supreme Court of South Carolina stated,
Santee Cooper has undertaken a limited duty to use due care to discover structural nonconformity with permits. We find that the trial judge did not err in holding that Santee Cooper’s undertaking to inspect for structural conformity did not include a duty to inspect for a latent hazardous condition at [the marina].
Id. at 445, 415 S.E.2d at 799.
Plaintiff argues the holding in Byerly supports its position, stating, “Had Defendant performed service on some part of the RV other than the generators, an argument might exist that no duty existed to identify and report obvious defects with the generators ...” (Pl.’s Mem. in Opp’n at 10.) The court does not agree with Plaintiffs interpretation of Byerly. In Byerly, Santee Cooper inspected the dock, and it was the dock that had the electrical problem. However, the fact that Santee Cooper inspected the dock for structural nonconformity did not mean Santee Cooper undertook a duty to inspect the dock for a latent hazardous electrical condition. Byerly, 307 S.C. at 445, 415 S.E.2d at 799. Byerly thus supports Defendant’s assertion that in undertaking to change the oil in the RV’s generators, it did not undertake to inspect the generators’ exhaust systems. The court accordingly finds that Sonny’s did not have a duty to inspect the generators’ exhaust systems and therefore grants Sonny’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
CONCLUSION
It is therefore ORDERED, for the foregoing reasons, that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.