*461OPINION
Defendant Samuel Rolack pleaded guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm and was sentenced to 57 months’ imprisonment, within the Guidelines range of 57 to 71 months. Rolack appeals his sentence, asserting that the district court committed procedural error in failing to recognize that under recent Supreme Court precedent it had discretion to vary from or reject on policy grounds the two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(4) for possession of a stolen firearm (which is applicable without regard to whether the defendant knew or should have known the gun was stolen). We affirm.
I.
The revised pre-sentence report outlines the offense conduct:
On April 27, 2007, Memphis Police Officers assigned to the Organized Crime Unit (OCU) were investigating a drug complaint at the Longview Apartment Complex. Detectives observed the defendant, Samuel Rolack, engage in a hand-to-hand transaction with another individual, then get into the passenger side of a vehicle and depart the scene. Detectives stationed at the scene advised other detectives, over the radio, of the transaction that took place and a description of the vehicle Rolack occupied. The vehicle was located and Ro-lack was observed sitting in the vehicle with the passenger door open. As detectives approached Rolack and identified themselves, Rolack began reaching for his waistband. Rolack was then detained by the officers. When asked if he was in possession of a weapon, Rolack responded, yes, in my waistband. Officers recovered a loaded .40 caliber Glock handgun from Rolack’s waistband. Officers conducted a pat-down of Rolack and discovered a clear plastic bag in his pocket containing 50.24 grams of marijuana and another clear plastic bag containing 1.80 grams of crack cocaine. Rolack made several verbal threats to the officers as they took him into custody.
Officers ran a criminal history check on Rolack and determined him to be a convicted felon. Officers also ran a check on the firearm and determined it was not manufactured in the state of Tennessee and therefore traveled in interstate commerce. The firearm was reported stolen on July 1, 2006, in a theft from a motor vehicle.
A federal grand jury returned an indictment charging Rolack with being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Pursuant to a plea agreement, Rolack pleaded guilty to the one-count indictment, and the government recommended a sentence at the low end of the Guidelines range. Over Rolack’s objection to the 2-level enhancement for possession of a stolen firearm, U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(4), the court adopted the PSR’s Guidelines range of 57 to 71 months, and sentenced Rolack at the low end, to 57 months’ imprisonment.
II.
After United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), the sentencing guidelines are advisory, rather than mandatory, and “appellate review of sentencing decisions is limited to determining whether they are ‘reasonable.’ ” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). “[Cjourts of appeals must review all sentences ... under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 41, 128 S.Ct. 586; United States v. Grossman, 513 F.3d 592, 595 (6th Cir.2008). The review is two-tiered: the court must review for both procedural and substantive error. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586.
*462Under Gall, procedural errors include “failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence ...” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586. A sentence may be considered substantively unreasonable where the district court “ ‘select[s] the sentence arbitrarily, bas[es] the sentence on impermissible factors, fail[s] to consider pertinent § 3553(a) factors or giv[es] an unreasonable amount of weight to any pertinent factor.’ ” United States v. Collington, 461 F.3d 805, 808 (6th Cir.2006) (<quoting United States v. Webb, 403 F.3d 373, 385 (6th Cir.2005)). In this circuit, a sentence that falls within the Guidelines enjoys “a rebut-table presumption of reasonableness,” and the defendant bears the burden of rebutting this presumption. United States v. Williams, 436 F.3d 706, 708 (6th Cir.2006).
8. Application of Subsection (b)(4).—
(B) Knowledge or Reason to Believe.— Subsection (b)(4) applies regardless of whether the defendant knew or had reason to believe that the firearm was stolen
A
At issue is U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(4), which provides in pertinent part, “If any firearm ... was stolen, increase by 2 levels.” The Commentary to the Guideline renders irrelevant the defendant’s lack of knowledge that the firearm was stolen.1
In United States v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 846, 848-49 (6th Cir.1996)2, this court re*463jected the argument that the lack of a scienter requirement in § 2K2.1(b)(4) is contrary to the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Subsequent to Murphy, this circuit has upheld application of § 2K2.1(b)(4) in the absence of a scienter requirement both before and after Booker was decided in 2005. See United States v. Fouse, 250 Fed.Appx. 704, 708-09 (6th Cir.2007) (unpublished disposition); United States v. Burns, 109 Fed.Appx. 52, 54-56 (6th Cir.2004) (unpublished disposition) (revisiting the enhancement after Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), and upholding it).3
On appeal, Rolack argues that the district court failed to recognize that, despite Murphy, it had discretion to reject and vary from the Guidelines under post-Booker cases, including Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 110, 128 S.Ct. 558, 169 L.Ed.2d 481 (2007) (holding that “it would not be an abuse of discretion for a district court to conclude when sentencing a particular defendant that the crack/powder disparity yields a sentence ‘greater than necessarjf to achieve § 3553(a)’s purposes, even in a mine-run case”), and Spears v. United States, — U.S. -, -, 129 S.Ct. 840, 842-44, 172 L.Ed.2d 596 (2009)4 (clarifying Kimbrough, noting that “district courts are entitled to reject and vary categorically from the crack-cocaine Guidelines based on a policy disagreement with those Guidelines” and not simply based on an individualized determination that they yield an excessive sentence in a particular case).5
At the district court level, the argument that the district court should vary from the Guidelines range based on a policy disagreement with the enhancement was intertwined with the argument that, in light of subsequent case law, Murphy no longer controls regarding Rolack’s objections to the application of U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(4). The latter argument contends that the district court should revisit the issues raised in Murphy — the constitutionality and propriety of applying the enhancement in the absence of a finding of scienter; the former argument contends that although Murphy is controlling on the constitutionality of the Guideline commentary, the district court may nevertheless on its own decline to apply the enhancement when it yields a sentencing range in excess of a *464sentence that is “ ‘sufficient, but not greater than necessary’ to accomplish the sentencing goals advanced in § 3553(a)(2).” See Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 111, 128 S.Ct. 558.
Rolack relies on United States v. Handy, 570 F.Supp.2d 437, 439 (E.D.N.Y. 2008), a 43-page opinion in which Senior United States District Judge Jack Weinstein held invalid the Guidelines Commentary’s elimination of the scienter requirement.6 In the instant case, the district court concluded it was bound by Murphy, and that the enhancement is applicable; the court did not directly address whether it had discretion to reject or vary from the 2-level enhancement based on a disagreement with the Guideline.
B — Procedural Reasonableness7
To the extent Rolack’s sentencing memorandum and argument at sentencing presented a direct challenge to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(4)’s constitutionality and applicability, the district court addressed that argument, correctly, and concluded that Murphy continues to stand for the proposition that application of the enhancement is constitutional and proper, even where knowledge of the firearm’s stolen character is not shown.
Moreover, the district court correctly calculated the applicable Guidelines range, gave both parties opportunity to argue for the sentence they deemed appropriate, and considered the § 3553 factors to determine whether they supported a below-Guidelines range sentence, as Rolack requested.8 The court did not treat the Guidelines as mandatory, and did not select the sentence based on clearly erroneous facts (Rolack did not object to the PSR’s facts, which included that the firearm had been reported stolen in 2006). Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586.
It is a separate question, however, whether the district court adequately explained its chosen sentence in light of Ro-*465lack’s argument that, despite Murphy, the court had discretion to reject the 2-level enhancement for possessing a stolen firearm.9 We conclude that although the district court did not expressly address whether it recognized that it had discretion to reject or vary from the stolen firearm enhancement on policy grounds, its remarks at sentencing10 indicate that it concluded that Rolack had enough reason to believe the firearm was stolen to make application of the enhancement appropriate, and that it found a 57-month sentence adequate, but not excessive.
After the court announced its ruling based on Murphy, it entertained argument regarding the appropriate sentence. At this juncture, defense counsel again argued that the court should opt for a sentence based on the Guidelines range without application of the enhancement.11 The *466court addressed this argument directly, concluding that the advisory range was reasonable “in light of all the circumstances.” 12 Thus, while the court did not explicitly state that it recognized it could reject the enhancement as inconsistent with § 3553(a), but chose not to do so, such a deliberative process is appropriately inferred from the record.
For these reasons, we AFFIRM.