The defendant’s automobile rear-ended tbe automobile of plaintiff George W. O’Dell while the latter was stopped for a red traffic signal. The jury returned a verdict of $450 in plaintiff’s favor and of $50 for loss of consortium in favor of his wife, the other plaintiff. Plaintiffs appeal asserting, among other things, that the trial judge erred in injecting by his charge the issue of sudden emergency although the issue had not been earlier raised by the defendant either in his pleadings, pretrial statement or oral argument and was not supported by evidence.
Defendant-appellee makes a three-fold response: (1) there was evidence of sudden emergency, (2) if there was not, the trial judge’s supplemental charge corrected the matter, and (3) since the jury returned a verdict in plaintiffs’ favor, the error, if any, was not prejudicial to the plaintiffs.
We are satisfied the evidence did not justify the injection of the sudden emergency issue by jury instruction. The portion of the record relied on by the defendant shows only that the defendant testified “all of a sudden I saw the car in front of me.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The trial judge’s supplemental charge did not cure the error. On the contrary, the supplemental charge compounded the error by telling the jury that de*576•spite the fact there was “no direct claim of sudden stopping, as such; that in cross-examination the defendant did not characterize the stop to- have been sudden”, the jury could nevertheless find, if it chose to do so, that plaintiff-driver had suddenly stopped and consider that in its determination.*
Our examination of the record leads us to conclude that the trial judge’s erroneous instructions may well have deprived plaintiffs of a fair trial despite the fact that a verdict was rendered in their favor. Compare Bishop v. Plumb (1961), 363 Mich 87.
Reversed and remanded for a new trial. Costs to appellant.
T. Gr. Kavanagh, P. J., and Levin and Newblatt, JJ., concurred.