ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Shirley Saveraid appeals from the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of State Farm on her claims to recover for injuries from a car accident. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we AFFIRM.
BACKGROUND
Saveraid sustained injuries as a passenger in a single-vehicle accident in New Mexico. Her friend Robin Hall was driving Saveraid’s motor home. At the time of the accident, Saveraid, an Iowa resident, had two insurance policies with State Farm: a policy for her Holiday Motor Home (“Motor Home policy”) and a policy for her Ford Edge (“Towed Vehicle policy”). Her policies with State Farm were executed in Iowa and, by their terms, are governed by Iowa law. Each of the policies includes liability coverage limits of up to $500,000 per person1 and underinsured motorist (“UIM”) coverage limits of $100,000 per person.2
Each policy also contains several identical provisions that form the basis of this lawsuit. First, both policies include an “other insurance” clause, which is intended to prevent the stacking of UIM coverage from two separate policies.3 The language states:
If Underinsured Motor Vehicle Coverage provided by this policy and one or more other policies issued to you ... by the State Farm Companies apply to the same bodily injury, then ... the Under-insured Motor Vehicle Coverage limits of such policies will not be added together to determine the most that may be paid....
Appellant’s Br. at 67, 105. Second, both policies contain an “owned vehicle exclusion,” which excludes vehicles from the definition of an underinsured motor vehicle if they are either provided liability coverage under the policy or are owned by the insured. Id. at 65, 108.
Following the accident, Hall’s insurance provider (also State Farm) paid Saveraid $25,000 under his policy’s liability coverage. State Farm also paid Saveraid $500,000 in liability benefits under her own Motor Home policy because it treated Hall as a permissive driver.4 Even so, Saveraid *494sued State Farm in New Mexico state court to recover the UIM benefits under her two policies. State Farm then removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico. However, State Farm continued to evaluate her claims and paid Saveraid an additional $100,000 in UIM benefits under her Towed Vehicle policy.
In her complaint, Saveraid claimed a right to stack her UIM coverages from her two policies despite their explicit anti-stacking provisions. Additionally, she claimed that she was entitled to increase her UIM coverage limits to match her liability limits. According to Saveraid, New Mexico’s laws governing the selection and rejection of UIM coverage should trump Iowa law, and New Mexico law allows such policy reformation. Accordingly, she sought a total of $1,000,000 in UIM benefits under her two policies, acknowledging that State Farm had already paid her $100,000 of that amount. State Farm moved for summary judgment, and Saveraid filed a cross-motion for summary judgment.
The district court granted State Farm’s motion for summary judgment and denied Saveraid’s cross-motion. First, it denied her request to apply New Mexico law to the anti-stacking provisions, explaining that the Iowa provision was fully enforceable in New Mexico under Shope v. State Farm Ins. Co., 122 N.M. 398, 925 P.2d 515 (1996). Second, the court declined to reform her Towed Vehicle policy’s UIM coverage limits because, based on the payments Saveraid had received under her policies, it concluded that applying Iowa law did not conflict with fundamental principles of justice in New Mexico.
On appeal, Saveraid argues that the district court erred in concluding that the “other insurance” clause prohibiting inter-policy stacking did not violate New Mexico’s fundamental principles of justice. She next asserts that the district court’s decision regarding the reformation of her UIM coverage was based on the erroneous conclusion that “other insurance” clauses are enforceable in New Mexico. Finally, she requests that this court reverse the grant of summary judgment for State Farm and certify these matters to the New Mexico Supreme Court for determination.
DISCUSSION
Because we sit in diversity jurisdiction, we apply substantive state law to Saver-aid’s claims, but we apply federal law to “the propriety of the district court’s grant of summary judgment.” Hill v. Allstate Ins. Co., 479 F.3d 735, 739 (10th Cir.2007) (quoting Eck v. Parke, Davis & Co., 256 F.3d 1013, 1016 (10th Cir.2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, we review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment. Eugene S. v. Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of N.J., 663 F.3d 1124, 1130 (10th Cir.2011). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).
At its core, this case presents the question of whether New Mexico or Iowa law applies to the disputed insurance policy provisions. New Mexico follows the choice-of-law doctrine of lex loci contrac- *495 tus — the law of the place of contracting— to issues involving contract interpretation, including insurance policies. Shope, 925 P.2d at 517. However, there is a narrow exception: a New Mexico court will apply its own law when the foreign law would violate a fundamental principle of justice under New Mexico law. Id. “It is said that courts should invoke this public policy exception only in ‘extremely limited’ circumstances.” Reagan v. McGee Drilling Corp., 128 N.M. 68, 933 P.2d 867, 869 (N.M.Ct.App.1997) (quoting Tucker v. R.A. Hanson Co., 956 F.2d 215, 218 (10th Cir.1992)). “Mere differences among state laws should not be enough to invoke the public policy exception.” Id. (citing Shope, 925 P.2d at 518). Otherwise, “the forum law would always apply unless the foreign law were identical, and the exception would swallow the rule.” Id.
A. Anti-Stacking Provisions
New Mexico courts generally interpret stacking provisions favorably for the insured. See Rodriguez v. Windsor Ins. Co., 118 N.M. 127, 879 P.2d 759, 759 (1994) (noting that the New Mexico Supreme Court’s cases have “evolved a strong judicial policy ... favoring stacking”). In contrast, Iowa law does not. See Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Iowa v. Ries, 551 N.W.2d 316, 319 (Iowa 1996) (emphasizing that anti-stacking provisions are valid and enforceable even when the various policies involved are issued by different insurers). Here, the district court applied Iowa law to the “other insurance” clause in Saver-aid’s policies, enforcing the anti-stacking provision based on the New Mexico Supreme Court’s holding in Shope. In Shope, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that “our rationale in establishing this policy [of favoring stacking] did not concern fundamental principles of justice.... ” 925 P.2d at 517.
Saveraid argues that the district court erroneously relied on Shope to conclude that the anti-stacking provisions in her insurance policies do not violate a fundamental principle of justice in New Mexico. But her argument centers on the mistaken idea that there is a distinction between inter- and intra-policy stacking under New Mexico law for the purposes of fundamental justice. As mentioned earlier, inter-policy stacking refers to one claimant being covered under multiple policies for a single loss, and intra-policy stacking refers to one claimant being covered under multiple coverages within the same policy for a single loss. Saveraid attacks this difference in an attempt to distinguish her case from Shope. She fails to do so.
1. Inter-Policy versus Intra-Policy Stacking
Saveraid attempts to distinguish Shope from her own case by arguing that New Mexico law on stacking policies distinguishes between inter-policy and intra-pol-icy stacking. Shope concerned intrapolicy stacking, while Saveraid’s case involves interpolicy stacking. Accordingly, she argues that Shope’s holding applies only to intra-policy stacking cases.
In Shope, the New Mexico Supreme Court confronted a choice-of-law dispute over whether to enforce an anti-stacking provision from a Virginia insurance contract. 925 P.2d at 515-16. Virginia law enforces anti-stacking provisions. Id. at 516. While the court noted that New Mexico public policy favors stacking in UIM cases when separate premiums have been paid, “this rule is one of contract interpretation that does not rise to the level of a fundamental principle of justice.” Id. at 517. Saveraid argues that New Mexico treats inter- and intra-policy stacking provisions differently, and so Shope *496only applies to intra-policy stacking. She argues to us that inter-policy stacking rises to the level of a fundamental principle of justice. We are not persuaded. As we show below, the New Mexico Supreme Court does not meaningfully distinguish between inter- and intra-policy stacking and so Saveraid cannot successfully distinguish her facts from Shope.
A brief review of New Mexico law on stacking establishes that it does not distinguish between inter- and intra-policy stacking when evaluating whether such provisions violate a New Mexico fundamental principle of justice. Two of the foundational cases are Sloan v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 86 N.M. 65, 519 P.2d 301 (1974), and Lopez v. Found. Reserve Ins. Co., 98 N.M. 166, 646 P.2d 1230 (1982). In Sloan, the New Mexico Supreme Court permitted inter-policy stacking when the insured had paid separate premiums for each of the policies. 519 P.2d at 302-03. In Lopez, the court permitted intra-policy stacking on the same public policy grounds. 646 P.2d at 1235. It explained that “[t]he crucial question, therefore, is not whether multiple vehicles are insured under one policy or several, but whether the insured has paid one premium or several for the particular uninsured motorist coverage sought to be stacked.” Id. The critical issue is not the number of policies but the number of premiums paid.
The district court relied on Lopez for the proposition that New Mexico does not make “a firm distinction between intra-policy stacking and inter-policy stacking.” Appellant App. at 217. Saveraid criticizes the court for this reliance, claiming that Lopez does in fact distinguish between the two types of stacking. We agree with the district court. In fact, the Lopez court explained that “[t]he reasoning adopted in the Sloan case is applicable to the issue in the present case.” Lopez, 646 P.2d at 1233. The cited cases have all treated inter- and intra-policy stacking cases the same.
Saveraid also criticizes the district court for relying on Konnick v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Ariz., 103 N.M. 112, 703 P.2d 889 (1985). But she misses the point yet again — the district court relied on Konnick, a case in which the New Mexico Supreme Court allowed inter-policy stacking, because it cites both Lopez (intra) and Sloan (inter) for support, again demonstrating that New Mexico courts treat inter- and intra-policy cases the same.5 Thus, we agree with the district court that New Mexico courts do not distinguish between inter- and intra-policy stacking.
2. Fundamental Principle of Justice
Because New Mexico law equally enforces both inter- and intra-policy stacking prohibitions in choice-of-law analysis, Saveraid’s argument that this issue rises to the level of a fundamental principle of justice fails under Shope. See Shope, 925 P.2d at 517. The Shope court held that “[wjhile we interpret New Mexico insurance contracts to avoid repugnancy in clauses that prohibit stacking of coverages for which separate premiums have been paid, this rule is one of contract interpreta*497tion that does not rise to the level of a fundamental principle of justice.” Id. (emphasis added).
And if Shope is not enough, the New Mexico Court of Appeals has recently reaffirmed Shope’s view in Wilkeson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., — N.M.--, 329 P.3d 749 (N.M.Ct.App.), cert. denied, — N.M.-, 328 P.3d 1188 (2014). The facts of Wilkeson are similar to Saver-aid’s. Wilkeson was insured under two separate California policies, both of which contained inter-policy anti-stacking provisions for UIM coverage. Id. at 750. After a car accident, Wilkeson’s insurer paid her the UIM coverage under one policy, but it denied coverage under the second. Id. After reviewing the history of stacking jurisprudence in New Mexico, including the inter- and intra-policy stacking cases, the New Mexico Court of Appeals agreed with Wilkeson that New Mexico generally favors stacking. Id. at 751. However, it explained that choice-of-law issues require a different sort of analysis, as laid out in Shope. Id. at 752. To overcome New Mexico’s policy of applying the substantive law from where the contract was executed, a party must show “a countervailing interest that is fundamental and separate from general policies of contract interpretation.” Id. (quoting Shope, 925 P.2d at 517) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because Shope concluded that the stacking of insurance coverages is purely a question of contract interpretation that did not violate a fundamental interest of justice in New Mexico, the Wilkeson court declined to apply New Mexico law. See id. at 753 (“Although there is an important public policy favoring stacking that ... may outweigh conflicting concerns within the same or related insurance policies, it does not alter the New Mexico policy to interpret insurance contracts according to the law of the place where the contract is executed.”). It consequently upheld the anti-stacking provision in the California policies. Id at 754.
Saveraid also depends heavily on Sloan to support her claim that New Mexico public policy should control the enforceability of the anti-stacking provision. In doing so, she misunderstands the fundamental question at stake. In Sloan, an inter-policy case, the New Mexico Supreme Court refused to apply an anti-stacking provision in a New Mexico insurance policy because it conflicted with New Mexico public policy. 519 P.2d at 303. These are two distinct questions. Under Sloan, the court was applying the standard for whether the contract — which was created in New Mexico — contained a provision that violated New Mexico public policy. Id. at 301-03. Conversely, in Shope, the court was tasked with determining whether a contract provision from Virginia violated a New Mexico fundamental principle of justice, a choice-of-law question. 925 P.2d at 515-16. What Saveraid fails to acknowledge is that Sloan had no choice-of-law question, and its holding is inapplicable to the issue she raises in her case.6 *498Thus, we pivot away from whether New Mexico courts enforce stacking as part of New Mexico’s general public policy, and instead, we ask whether the anti-stacking provision rises to the level of a violation of a fundamental principle of justice in New Mexico. To this, Shape already has answered no. 925 P.2d at 517.
Shape and Wilkeson are dispositive of this case. Inter- and intra-policy stacking cases are interchangeable when interpreting the validity of anti-stacking provisions in New Mexico. Both types of provisions are preferred for the same reason: “to ensure that the insured gets what he or she pays for, and to fulfill the reasonable expectations of the insured.” Rehders, 135 P.3d at 245 (citing Montano v. Allstate Indem. Co., 135 N.M. 681, 92 P.3d 1255 (2004)).
For the first time on appeal, Saveraid asserts that Jordan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 149 N.M. 162, 245 P.3d 1214 (2010), and Progressive Nw. Ins. Co. v. Weed Warrior Servs., 149 N.M. 157, 245 P.3d 1209 (2010), support her position that anti-stacking provisions are not enforceable in New Mexico. We see no reason to deviate from our general rule that we do not address arguments that are presented for the first time on appeal.7 See United States v. Mora, 293 F.3d 1213, 1216 (10th Cir.2002). Thus, we do not address it fully here.
In sum, Saveraid’s Iowa UIM policy contained an anti-stacking provision, and there is not a fundamental principle of justice under New Mexico law that precludes its application here.8 Both parties agree that under Iowa law, anti-stacking provisions are enforceable. State Farm has already paid Saveraid the UIM benefits under her Towed Vehicle policy. Therefore, she has no basis to recover UIM benefits under her Motor Home policy-
B. Reformation Under Jordan
Saveraid next argues that she is entitled to reformation of her UIM coverage limits under Jordan. We disagree. Under the facts of this case, denying Saveraid the ability to reform her UIM coverages does not violate a New Mexico fundamental principle of justice.
For insurance policies originating in its state, New Mexico requires that an insured’s UIM coverage limits must equal her liability limits unless the insured waives this requirement in writing as part of the insurance policy delivered to her. Jordan, 245 P.3d at 1217. If an insurer fails to obtain a valid rejection, New Mexico courts will reform the policy to provide UIM coverage that equals the limits of the liability coverage. Id. But Iowa has no such requirement. See Iowa Code §§ 516A.1, 321A.1 (2014). Saveraid’s UIM coverage is less than her liability coverage. Because her policies originated in Iowa, we will apply Iowa law unless reformation un*499der Jordan is a fundamental principle of justice in New Mexico.
Saveraid argues that the policy behind Jordan — to protect insureds by requiring the insurer to get an explicit rejection— rises to the level of a fundamental principle of justice in New Mexico. She supports this assertion by noting that Jordan says nothing about “other insurance” clauses or their effect on inter-policy stacking, so Sloan remains good law. But, she claims, Jordan completely changed inter-policy stacking because, according to her interpretation of the case, no matter how unambiguous an anti-stacking provision is, Jordan mandates that UIM coverages on a multi-vehicle policy must be stacked unless the Jordan requirements are met. The district court declined to determine whether the Jordan requirements rise to the level of a fundamental principle of justice in New Mexico. It found that, based on the facts in this particular case, applying Iowa law would not conflict with fundamental New Mexico principles of justice and thus no reformation should occur. We agree.
If Iowa law applies, Saveraid would not be entitled to additional UIM coverage. Iowa does not require its insurers to offer policy holders UIM coverage equal to their liability coverage. See Iowa Code §§ 516A.1, 321 A. 1 (2014). Instead, Iowa merely requires that an insurer provide UIM coverage equal to the statutory minimum of $20,000 for one person, absent a written rejection. See Iowa Code §§ 516A.1, 321A.1 (2014). Saveraid’s UIM coverage already exceeds that statutory minimum under Iowa law. Consequently, she would not be eligible for reformation of her UIM coverage and would not receive additional compensation beyond the $100,000 in UIM benefits State Farm already paid her.
If New Mexico law applies, Saveraid also would not be eligible for additional UIM benefits. As previously stated, in New Mexico, an insured is entitled to have her UIM coverage reformed (increased) to equal her liability coverage, absent a legally sufficient rejection pursuant to Jordan. 245 P.3d at 1217. Saveraid’s UIM coverage is less than her liability coverage, so she falls into the category of insureds that Jordan addresses.
However, New Mexico’s law governing UIM coverage has a limitation that Iowa law does not, thus prohibiting Saveraid from recovering additional UIM benefits. Under Iowa law, an insured is permitted to recover her UIM benefits until she is fully compensated for her injuries or until her policy limits are exhausted. Am. States Ins. Co. v. Estate of Tollari, 362 N.W.2d 519, 522 (Iowa 1985) (holding that UIM benefits are not decreased by the amount of the underinsured’s liability coverage if the insured’s injuries exceed the limit). In contrast, under New Mexico law, an insured is entitled to UIM benefits only to the extent that her UIM coverage exceeds the underinsured’s liability coverage. Schmick v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 103 N.M. 216, 704 P.2d 1092, 1098 (1985). In Sehmick, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that an insured’s UIM coverage may be offset by the tortfeasor’s liability coverage. Id. at 1099. For example, imagine the insured has $30,000 in UIM coverage. She gets into a car accident with an underinsured driver, who has $25,000 in liability coverage. The insurer owes her $30,000 (her UIM coverage) minus $25,000 (the tortfeasor’s liability coverage) for a total of $5,000.
In this case, even if Saveraid’s UIM benefits were reformed under Jordan to $500,000 (the amount of her liability coverage), that amount would not exceed the liability coverage she received from Hall’s *500insurance coverage, also $500,000. That liability coverage from Hall would offset Saveraid’s own UIM coverage.9 Thus, even if New Mexico law governed the policy and the policy was reformed, Saveraid would not receive additional UIM benefits because they would be offset by the liability coverage she received from Hall’s insurance.
Because Saveraid would remain in the same financial position whether or not Jordan applies, we do not have to reach the question of whether Jordan constitutes a fundamental principle of justice in New Mexico. Moreover, Saveraid is attempting to pick and choose the laws from each state that benefit her the most. She would like us to reform her UIM coverage limits under Jordan while asking us to ignore New Mexico’s settled law of deducting liability benefits from her UIM coverage. Such an approach contravenes the intentions behind each state’s laws, and we refuse to engage in such arbitrary lawmaking.
In sum, we agree with the district court that Saveraid is not entitled to a reformation of her UIM benefits. Under both Iowa and New Mexico law, she could not recover more money than she already has recovered. Therefore, we decline to decide whether the rule from Jordan constitutes a fundamental principle of justice in New Mexico and reject Saveraid’s contention that she is entitled to reformation of her UIM benefit limits.
C. Certification to the New Mexico Supreme Court
Saveraid argues that all of the issues in this case are questions of first impression for New Mexico. Thus, she asks us to reverse the district court’s order granting summary judgment to State Farm and certify this case in its entirety to the New Mexico Supreme Court. We decline.
Tenth Circuit Rule 27.1(A) governs the certification of state-law questions. It provides that “[w]hen state law permits, this court may: (1) certify a question arising under state law to that state’s highest court according to that court’s rules; and (2) abate the case in this court to await the state court’s decision of the certified question.” 10th Cir. R. 27.1(A). New Mexico permits its Supreme Court to “answer a question of law certified to it by a court of the United States ... if the answer may be determinative of an issue in pending litigation in the certifying court and there is no controlling appellate decision, constitutional provision or statute of this state.” N.M. Stat. Ann. § 39-7-4 (2014).
This case does not raise any novel issues of state law that the New Mexico Supreme Court has not already addressed. “[W]e will not trouble our sister state courts every time an arguably unsettled question of state law comes across our desks. When we see a reasonably clear and principled course, we will seek to follow it ourselves.” Pino v. United States, 507 F.3d 1233, 1236 (10th Cir.2007).
Both of the issues on appeal have reasonably clear courses that we can follow. *501The first issue, dealing with the anti-stacking provisions, has already been resolved by Shope and confirmed by Wilkeson. The second issue, involving the reformation of UIM benefits under Jordan, similarly does not involve any novel issues of state law. We can avoid the question of whether the rule set forth in Jordan amounts to a fundamental principle of justice by looking at the specific facts of this case. Based on these facts, we can apply settled New Mexico state law to decide the case on the merits.
Therefore, we deny Saveraid’s request to certify any of these issues to the New Mexico Supreme Court.
CONCLUSION
In sum, we reject Saveraid’s arguments. First, the anti-stacking provisions from insurance policies issued in Iowa do not violate a fundamental principle of justice in New Mexico, and they are thus enforceable. Second, Saveraid’s UIM benefits are ineligible for reformation under Jordan because she would not receive any additional compensation for her injuries. Therefore, both issues can be decided under settled New Mexico state law; we decline to certify them to the New Mexico Supreme Court. We AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment.