MEMORANDUM OPINION
The Plaintiffs in this action, Albert H Bor-que, a New Hampshire resident; Bourque Association, a New Hampshire limited partnership and Auto Imports, a New Hampshire Corporation each filed a petition for Chapter 11 protection in December, 1992. By order of the Court, the three cases have been jointly administered since February, 1993. The Defendant, Yerres Financial Corporation (hereinafter VCF) filed a proof of claim on February 22, 1993 for a secured claim of $856,073.65.
The Debtors commenced the Adversary Proceeding now before the Court on a complaint filed by the Debtors against VCF. All of the Plaintiffs’ allegations relate to loans made by VCF or loans made by Dartmouth Bank and later assigned to VCF and the security interests, guarantees and mortgages provided as collateral for the loans.
On August 6, 1993, the Plaintiff filed a motion requesting a jury trial on all issues triable to a jury in the Adversary Proceeding. For the reasons outlined below, the Plaintiffs motion is hereby denied.
ANALYSIS
The bankruptcy court has the statutory and constitutional power to conduct a jury trial when it is otherwise authorized to enter final judgment on a matter in dispute. Bertholet v. Harman, 126 B.R. 413 (Bankr.D.N.H.1991); Weiss v. Avenir Acquisition Corp. II, 139 B.R. 761 (D.Mass.1991). In other words, the Court has the authority to conduct a jury trial in a proceeding where it has the authority to enter final judgment on a matter explicitly granted by statute1 or by parties’ consent2. Bertholet v. Harman, 126 B.R. at 418. However, the question before the, Court is not whether the bankruptcy court has the authority to conduct a jury trial on this matter but rather whether the debtor as plaintiff has the option of requesting one in the bankruptcy court.
It is clear that VCF, the defendant in the action, would not be entitled to request a jury trial. A third party who is otherwise involved in the bankruptcy proceedings as a creditor to the bankruptcy estate may not validly assert a Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. In re Bedford Computer Corp., 61 B.R. 594 (Bankr.D.N.H.1986). By filing a claim against the bankruptcy estate, a creditor submits itself to the equitable power of the Court and the process of the allowance and disallowance of claims. In re Bedford Computer Corp., 61 B.R. at 595; Langenkamp v. Culp, 498 U.S. 42, 43, 111 S.Ct. 330, 331, 112 L.Ed.2d 343, 347 (1990); Granfinanciera S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 57-59, 109 S.Ct. 2782, 2798-99, 106 L.Ed.2d 26, 50-51 (1989). In this context, any rights the creditor may have had to a jury trial outside of the bankruptcy court, no longer apply.
In the present case, from the commencement of the bankruptcy proceedings, VCF has been actively involved in the pursuit and protection of their claim in the bankruptcy estate. Through its continued involvement in the case, VCF has explicitly lost any jury trial right relating to its claim which they may have had outside the bankruptcy proceeding. The question then is whether the Debtor, as plaintiff, has relinquished the right as well.
*72By filing for bankruptcy protection, the Debtor submits itself to the Court’s equitable determination of the claims against it. In re Frost, 145 B.R. 878 (Bankr.W.D.MI.1992); In re Haile Company, 132 B.R. 979 (Bankr.S.D.Ga.1991); Matter of Hallahan, 936 F.2d 1496 (7th Cir.1991). By voluntarily submitting itself to the Court’s equitable power in the determination of claims against the bankruptcy estate, the Debtor thereby waives its jury trial right on the resolution of those claims. Id.
In this case, the Debtors’ claim is in essence a counterclaim to the proof of claim asserted by VCF in the bankruptcy ease-in-chief. Notwithstanding the legal or equitable nature of the allegations in the complaint 3, the adversary lawsuit is directly related to the Court’s determination of the status of VCF’s proof of claim in the bankruptcy estate and in substance is a part of the claims allowance process4. From the original Supreme Court decision under the prior Act in Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 86 S.Ct. 467, 15 L.Ed.2d 391 (1966) (a creditor who has filed a claim in the bankruptcy estate has submitted issue to equity jurisdiction of bankruptcy court and has no right to a jury trial in ensuing preference action filed by Trustee), through Langenkamp, 498 U.S. 42, 111 S.Ct. 330 (there is no right to a jury trial when a creditor’s claim and the ensuing preferenee action by the Trustee are “integral to the restructuring of the debtor-creditor relationship”), the creditor’s right to a jury trial has turned upon whether the creditor’s actions invoked the claims allowance process and not whether the particular claim was legal or equitable in nature. Katchen, 382 U.S. at 336, 86 S.Ct. at 476; Langenkamp, 498 U.S. at 44, 111 S.Ct. at 331; See also Granfinanciera, S.A., 492 U.S. at 58-59, 109 S.Ct. at 2799 (creditors who have not filed a claim against the bankruptcy estate are entitled to jury trial on consequent fraudulent conveyance action filed by trustee because action does not arise “as part of the process of allowance and disallowance of claims”).
CONCLUSION
Under the facts of this case, the debtors, by voluntarily initiating a reorganization ease to seek the protection of the bankruptcy court, with the concomitant triggering of the claims allowance process that occurs in such proceedings, have implicitly waived any right to a jury trial that may have existed outside the bankruptcy court relating to the determination of the claims in question5. As noted, the determination as to whether a jury trial right exists in this context is not dependent on a determination of the legal or equitable nature of the allegations in the complaint. *73Instead, the focus is on the substantive nexus between the complaint with the defendant’s proof of claim. In this case, the Debtors’ complaint is inescapably intertwined with VCF’s active assertion of its secured status in the bankruptcy estate.
Accordingly, the Pretrial Order to be entered separately setting this adversary proceeding for trial will include a provision.denying the demand for a jury trial in accordance with this opinion.