William Stackpole, Jun., versus George Newman and Al. and Israel Munson, Trustee.
The exhibiting to one summoned as trustee in a foreign attachment, of a letter of one not a party to the suit, nor claiming the property, and authenticating its signature, but not its contents, by the oath of the trustee, is not enough to introduce the contents of such letter as facts disclosed by the trustee.
In this action, the only question agitated was, whether Munson was the trustee of Thun and Newman, the principal defendants.
The facts disclosed by Munson, in his answer to the interrogatories put by the plaintiff, were, in substance, — that he received, in the autumn of 1805, from Thun and Newman, merchants of Philadelphia, a consignment of seventeen hogsheads of molasses, with a bill of lading and invoice enclosed in a letter, stating the shipment to be for the account and risk of Joseph Hill, from whom also he *81received a letter at the same time, in which he refers to the shipment, and gives directions about the sale of the molasses, and the investment of the proceeds. In another letter, written shortly after, Hill mentions Thun &f Newman, as his agents, and directs Munson to address the proceeds of the adventure to them on his, Hill’s, account. Some time after, another letter from Hill to Munson directed him to ship the proceeds of the adventure, with an account of the sales of the molasses, to Mr. J. F. Echará. Munson never received any other letter on the subject from Thun Sp Newman, but corresponded wholly with Echará and Hill, engaging on his part to comply with the directions of the latter as far as in his power, having always regarded him as the original owner of the property.
The plaintiff then produced a paper, purporting to be a letter from Hill, dated at Philaáelphia, October 4th, 1805, to the defendant Newman, then in Boston, [in which he says, * “ Jjust write these few lines to guará you against any evils [ * 86 J that may happen from the molasses consigneá to Mr. Munson, which are in my name, though actually belonging to your house,” and in another part of the same letter, he adds, “I have áone this to serve you, aná shoulá be sorry to have myself exposeá,”] and inquired of Munson if the said letter was in the hand-writing of Hill. Munson. answered, that he believed it to be so, from its resemblance to the other writing of Hill’s in his possession, but that he had never seen him write his name, nor had he ever seen the paper until it was shown him in Court, and that he knew nothing further of it or its contents.
In January, 1806, Hill writes to Munson, expressing regret that the proceeds of the molasses had not been received by Echará, whom he mentions as his friend, and as having made him considerable advances on account of that consignment.
Munson, when informed of the assignment from Hill to Echará, which he believes to be boná fiáe, and for a good consideration, agreed to pay over the proceeds to the latter when they should be received. And he acknowledges to be now in cash, on account of them, 571 dollars 52 cents.
And now Morton, of counsel for the plaintiff, contended that from the whole of the transactions disclosed, it was apparent that this adventure was, and always had been, the property of Thun Sp Newman. Although Munson considers himself to be the trustee of Echará, the assignee of Hill, yet we have Hill's own confession that he is not so. And there is the same evidence of the genuine ness of the letter containing this confession, as there is to the other letters produced by the trustee, viz., his oath that he believes it to be written by Hill.
*82
Channing, e contra.
The letter from Hill to Newman, in which the supposed confession is contained, was improperly introduced into the cause, and in truth, though here, it makes no part of the answer of the trustee to the interrogatories. If it were properly before the Court, yet, being collateral to the answer of the [ * 87 ] trustee, it cannot be considered.
*Hill ought not to be permitted to show his own fraud. Though Munson believes that letter to be Hill’s, yet he knows nothing as to the truth of the facts asserted or insinuated therein ; and if he is adjudged trustee of the present defendants, he is still liable to the action of Echará upon his express engagement to him ; or, if he is not, the rights of third persons are to be bound by a judgment in this action, to which they are strangers.
The opinion of the Court was afterwards delivered by
Parsons, C. J.
[After a brief statement of the answers given to the interrogatories put by the plaintiff.] The statute, on which this process is founded, confines the Court, in giving judgment, to the answers of the trustee on oath, and it has been frequently determined that no other evidence can be admitted. We have, therefore, to consider whether the contents of the exhibit, the supposed letter from Hill to Newman, are to stand as facts disclosed by the answer of the trustee.
It appears from the answer, that the trustee - claims to hold the proceeds of the molasses for the use of Echará, who is not a party to this suit; and the plaintiff claims to recover them as the property of the defendants. The judgment in this cause will not be any bar to an action by Echard against Munson. The facts, therefore, disclosed by Munson must be of that nature that he can defend himself against Echard by giving them in evidence. Now, Munson does not know the letter to be genuine, or that the contents are true, or that the letter might not have been recently written by Hill, to defeat his assignment to Echard. All these facts must be the subject of inquiry in another suit, and may be found against Munson, who swears that he knows nothing about them.
It is, therefore, our opinion that the exhibiting of a letter of one not a party to the suit, nor claiming the property, and authenticating its signature, without authenticating the contents of the letter, is not enough to introduce the contents of such letter as facts disclosed by ' the trustee; because Hill might have written the letter, and the contents may be wholly untrue ; and we cannot presume them to be true, against the claims of third persons.
[ * 88 ] * Hill's letter, therefore, can have no other effect in this cause, than it would have had, if the signature had been *83proved by any other person, as a witness in the cause. And laying out of the case the contents of that letter, it is clear that Munson has discharged himself by his answers. If we were to give a different opinion, we should charge him on the presumption of the truth of the contents of Hill’s letter, and not on the answers of the trustee.
Let Munson be discharged,