Is the evidence offered by plaintiff sufficient to take tbe ease to the jury? The answer is Yes, for these reasons:
1. In the deed from ~W. B. Hodges and wife, of'the first part, to “Helen G. Eandle, Trustee for Eunice E. Eandle, minor,” the recital of consideration “paid by the party of the second part” is prima facie evidence that the consideration paid was the property of the minor for whom Helen G. Eandle purported to act as trustee. The consideration for a deed moves from the grantee to the grantor. And decisions of this Court are uniform in holding that in the purchase of land the recital acknowledging receipt of consideration contained in the deed therefor is prima facie evidence of that fact and is presumed to be correct. Miller v. Mateer, 172 N. C., 401, 90 S. E., 435; Ex parte Barefoot, 201 N. C., 393, 160 S. E., 365. See also Barbee v. Barbee, 108 N. C., 581, 13 S. E., 215; Deaver v. Deaver, 137 N. C., 240, 49 S. E., 113; Faust v. Faust, 144 N. C., 383, 57 S. E., 22. See also 16 Am. Jur., 653, Deeds, sec. 378.
2. If the consideraton for the deed be the property of Eunice E. Eandle, minor, Helen G-. Eandle, as the mother of the minor, had no authority to impress upon the property of the minor an express trust, as set forth in the deed, with authority in the trustee to mortgage and convey the same. “A person who has no title or interest in property can create no trust therein.” 25 C. J., 233. Byrne Realty Co. v. South Florida Farms Co., 81 Fla., 805, 89 So., 318. Sansom v. Cornelison, 171 Ga., 764, 155 S. E., 764. Compare N. Y. University v. Loomis Laboratory, 178 N. Y., 137, 70 N. E., 413. In the Georgia case it is said: “The agreement between the mother of deceased father of plaintiff that the defendant and his wife should keep this money in trust for the plaintiff did not create a trust. The mother thus agreeing with the defendant had no interest in the money. She could not create a trust.” But where a person, in loco parentis purchases land with consideration furnished by a child, a resulting trust arises pro tanto. 65 C. J., 416— Trusts, sec. 177. Compare Wallace v. Wallace, 210 N. C., 656, 188 S. E., 96. Moreover, in Devlin on Real Estate, Third Ed., Vol. 2, sec. 1178, p. 2208, quoting from Cotton v. Wood, 25 Iowa, 43, 46, it is said: “It cannot be that the consent of the trustee to hold the title for the benefit of the cestui que trust, or an agreement so to do, in case of a resulting trust, will change its character. By the agreement the trustee simply assents to an obligation imposed by the law; the trust *656would exist without the agreement by operation of law. The agreement cannot destroy the effect of the conditions under which the law presumes the estate is held by the trustee.”
For the same reason, W. B. Hodges and wife, who were selling the property, having no title or interest in the consideration paid except in so far as it related to the purchase price of the land, would have no authority to create a trust in respect thereto.
3. “A purchaser is charged with notice of the contents of each recorded instrument constituting a link in his chain of title and is put on notice of any fact or circumstance affecting his title which any such instrument would reasonably disclose.” Headnote 7, Turner v. Glenn, 220 N. C., 620, 18 S. E. (2d), 197. See also Christmas, v. Mitchell, 38 N. C., 535; Holmes v. Holmes, 86 N. 0., 205; and Smith v. Fuller, 152 N. C., 7, 67 S. E., 48, which are to the same effect. Applying this principle, the defendants deraigning title by mesne conveyances, including the deed from ~W. B. Hodges and wife to “Helen G-. Eandle, Trustee for Eunice E. Eandle, minor,” are charged with notice of the contents and recitals in that deed.
The judgment as of nonsuit is
Eeversed.