Appellee, the International Union of United Brewery, Flour, Cereal and Soft Drink Workers of America, and its predecessors in interest, have for more than forty years contested with appellant, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Stablemen and Helpers of *49America, and its predecessors1 in interest, the exclusive right to organize and claim as members the drivers of brewery wagons and trucks. For convenience, appellee will be referred to as the Brewery Workers Union and appellant as the Teamsters Union. For more than forty years both international unions have been affiliated members of appellant, the American Federation of Labor, and that federation has from time to time attempted to resolve the jurisdictional dispute, concerning membership, which has been carried on between its two affiliates.2
In 1933 the American Federation of Labor adopted an opinion and decision theretofore reached by its Executive Council which reads as follows: “In the case of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Stablemen and Helpers of America vs. The International Union of the United Brewery, Flour, Cereal and Soft Drink Workers of America, the Executive Council is of the opinion and decides that teamsters and chauffeurs in the brewery industry properly belong to and come under the jurisdiction of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters and Chauffeurs.” The Brewery Workers Union refused to abide by this decision and when the Teamsters Union attempted to carry it out, conflict resulted between the two affiliates and their locals. This conflict finally precipitated the case in the lower court from which the present appeal has resulted.
The lower court decided3 (1) that the Brewery Workers Union has the “prior and exclusive right to organize beer drivers as against the claim of defendant Teamsters Union, or any other organisation;’’ [Italics supplied] (2) “That defendant Teamsters Union has never had jurisdiction over beer drivers * * * and became affiliated with the * * * American Federation of Labor, subject to the prior and exclusive right * * * of the said plaintiff Brewery Workers Union to organize beer drivers;” [Italics supplied] (3) that the American Federation of Labor is required to observe and protect the prior and exclusive right of the Brewery Workers Union to organize beer drivers. Pursuant to its determination of these issues, the lower court issued a permanent injunction against appellant, the American Federation of Labor, and nine of the individual appellants “as officers, members and representatives” of the American Federation of Labor, to the effect that they should be permanently enjoined and restrained from notifying any employers of beer drivers, central labor bodies, state federations of labor, or other interested parties, of its action “in transferring jurisdiction of beer drivers from plaintiff Brewery Workers Union to the defendant Teamsters Union;” and also adjudged that the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Stablemen and Helpers of America, and five of the individual defendants, “as officers, members and representatives” of the Teamsters Union should be permanently enjoined and restrained (a) from in any manner carrying out, or attempting to carry out, the action of the American Federa*50tion of Labor, transferring jurisdiction of beer drivers from plaintiff Brewery Workers Union to defendant Teamsters Union; (b) from persuading, by any means, lawful or unlawful, or coercing, intimidating, or threatening, employers of beer drivers who are members of the Bewery Workers Union in any effort to cause employers either to breach any collective bargaining agreement with the Brewery Workers Union, or any local member thereof, or to prevent or discourage the entering into of any new collective bargaining agreements with the Brewery Workers Union or any local member of it, on the ground of the decision of the American Federation of Labor of 1933, or to cause the discharge “of any member of the said plaintiff Brewery Workers Union from employment in a brewery because he failed to join the Teamsters Union under the illegal order of the American Federation of Labor of 1933;” (c) from fostering, encouraging, or conniving at any acts of coercion on the part of any local union affiliated with Teamsters and/or (d) from fostering and encouraging any organizational activities on behalf of the said International Teamsters Union to its local unions, attempting to carry out the decision of the 1933 Convention of the American Federation of Labor above set forth, by notifying any brewery employers of the said decision of the American Federation of Labor, by its Convention of 1933.
It would be difficult to imagine a case which more clearly involves a labor dispute within the meaning of the NorrisLaGuardia Act.4 That Act contains, among other relevant provisions, the following :5 “The term ‘labor dispute’ includes any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.” [Italics supplied]
Appellees contend that the quoted language (Section 13(c)) requires — in order that the case can be said to involve a labor dispute — that the disputants must stand in the relation of employer and employee. But the language is not susceptible of that construction.6 Other sections of the Act, particularly Section 13(a),7 make this conclusion even more certain.8 As was said by Mr. Justice Stephens, speaking for this court, of the dispute involved in the case of Fur Workers Union, etc. v. Fur Workers Union, etc. :9 “ * * * it involves a dispute between ‘one [associa*51tion] * * * of employees’ and another such association — to wit, the appellant and appellee unions. * * * The case involves or grows out of a labor dispute within the meaning of the term ‘labor dispute’ in subsection (c) of Section 13 because it is a ‘controversy concerning * * * the association or representation of persons in negotiating * * * terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.’ That is to say, the controversy concerns the representation of persons — to wit, fur workers — in negotiating terms or conditions of employment, although some of the members of the appellant union (those other than Schwartz and Haley) disputing with Zirkin’s do not stand in the proximate relation of employees to Zirkin’s as employer, and although, to the extent that the dispute is between the appellant and appellee unions, the disputants do not stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee to each other.” The fact was, of course — in the Fur Workers case as in the present case — that the unions did not stand in any sort of employer-employee relationship, proximate or otherwise.10
Nor is it material that no employer was joined as a party. The fact that, in cases previously arising under the Act, employers have appeared as parties, does not exhaust its possibilities or limit the broad scope and meaning which Congress intended to give to the Act.11 It was in*52tended drastically to curtail the equity jurisdiction of federal courts in the field of labor disputes.12 That employer-employee relationships were involved, however, is obvious from the pleadings, the evidence, the judgment, and the injunction issued.13 The essence of the dispute was the right of the Brewery Workers Union, on the one hand, and of the Teamsters on the other, to organize particular workers for collective bargaining purposes, i. e., “the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange [sic] terms or conditions of employment.” The injunction issued by the lower court is primarily concerned with the employer-employee relation. It enjoins the American Federation of Labor from “notifying any employers of beer drivers * * and enjoins the Teamsters Union “from persuading by any means lawful or unlawful, * * * employers of beer drivers * * and “from fostering and encouraging any organizational activities * * * to its local unions * * * by notifying any brewery employers * * *.” That persons “engaged in the same industry, trade, craft or occupation” were involved is equally obvious. The language which runs like a red thread throughout the tremendous record in this case is “beer drivers;” persons who were engaged in the brewery industry; persons engaged in the trade or craft or occupation of driving beer wagons, beer trucks, and soft drink trucks. It will be noted, also, that the “case” which Section 13(a) of the Act defines as coming within its terms is one which involves or grows out of a labor dispute; which involves persons who are engaged in the same industry, or have direct or indirect interests therein.
As the suit involves a labor dispute, Section 1 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act14 becomes applicable and prohibits the issuance of a restraining order or injunction to restrain lawful acts,15 and in any event — assuming the commission of unlawful acts— except in strict conformity with its provi*53sions.16 In at least three respects the lower court failed to conform to the requirements of Section 7 of the Act.17 That section provides, in part, as follows:
“No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue a temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of a labor dispute, as herein defined, except after hearing the testimony of witnesses in open court (with opportunity for cross-examination) in support of the allegations of a complaint made under oath, and testimony in opposition thereto, if offered, and except after findings of fact by the court, to the effect—
>¡í * *
“(e) That the public officers charged with the duty to protect complainant’s property are unable or unwilling to furnish adequate protection.
“Such hearing shall be held after due and personal notice thereof has been given, in such manner as the court shall direct, to all known persons against whom relief is sought, and also to the chief of those public officials of the county and city within which the unlawful acts have been threatened or committed charged with the duty to protect complainant’s property: *
The injunction in the present case was granted on October 6, 1939, and a denial of stay thereof was filed on the same day. Findings purporting to conform to the requirements of the Act were not made until seven days thereafter, on October 13, 1939. This is the first failure of compliance with the requirements of the Act above set out.18
Second, the findings made and the supporting evidence in the record are insufficient to satisfy the requirements of the statute. Thus, Finding No. 66 is inadequate on its face. It states that notice of hearing was given to “all persons against whom relief has been sought,” but it does not state — as the law requires — that such notice was ever given “to the chief of those public officials of the county and city within which the unlawful acts have been threatened or committed.” [Italics supplied] Moreover, it states that the hearing required by the law was had “after hearing the testimony of the chief of the public officials * * Just what this means it is difficult to say. Certainly it does not show the strict compliance with its terms which the law requires,19 and there is no other finding upon this point. In this respect the record shows no more than that John J. Keegan, Chief of Detectives of the City of Portland, testified as a witness for appellees. The record is bare of (1) any showing of service or attempted service of notice upon any of the officials of Multnomah County, Oregon, in which the City of Portland is located; (2) any showing of the offices or names of officers of either Multnomah County or the City of Portland who are “the chief of those public officials of the county and city within which the unlawful acts have been threatened or committed charged with the duty to protect complainant’s property.” Specifically, the record fails to show even (3) whether John J. Keegan was the chief of those public officials of the City of Portland who were charged with that duty. Again, while the record shows violence and destruction of property in Portland, Oregon, and while the court found: “* * * that the local police authorities, as established by the testimony herein of the Chief of Police, were unable to adequately give protection to the members of the Brewery Workers’ Union by reason of the various acts of assault and violence and bombing of both trucks and taverns and breaking of windows and puncturing of tires on beer trucks driven by members of the Brewery Workers’ Union * * [italics supplied] the testimony upon which this finding purports to be based fails to show either unwillingness or inability upon the part of peace officers to fur*54nish adequate protection,20 or that the unlawful acts were not actually abated and the offenders punished21 long before the trial of the present case, to say nothing of its initiation in the District Court. In fact, the record shows that the witness testified concerning events which occurred during 1935; the original complaint in the present case was filed July 15, 1937; and the testimony was given at the trial which commenced on June 7, 1939. Obviously such a record cannot support a finding- — as required by the statute in order to support the issuance of an injunction — that the responsible public officers are unable or um-willing to furnish adequate protection. Under the circumstances the lower court was without jurisdiction to issue the injunction complained of on this appeal.22
Moreover, this defect of jurisdiction could not be remedied, as appellee contends, by waiver upon the part of appellants. Although lack of jurisdiction of the person may be supplied in that manner, as for example by a pleading requesting relief similar to that requested by the other party,23 waiver or consent cannot confer upon a court jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit.24 While every court of *55general jurisdiction has power to determine whether the conditions essential to its exercise exist25 — as the authorities relied upon hy appellee demonstrate — exercise of this power cannot create additional jurisdiction.26 In the instant case, as there was a labor dispute, within the meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the requirements of the Act concerning jurisdiction must be satisfied; absent which, the court had no jurisdiction to grant relief.
The conclusion is inescapable, therefore, that the lower court acted improvidently in granting an injunction and that its judgment must be reversed because of lack of jurisdiction, without more. However, as the case was fully tried on other issues which must necessarily arise again, in the event of a new trial; and as it was fully briefed and argued in this court, on a record of two thousand seven hundred and sixty-seven pages, no useful purpose would be served by limiting our opinion to the jurisdictional question.
Each of the three major labor organizations which are parties to this controversy are voluntary, unincorporated associations ; the American Federation of Labor is the parent and the other two are affiliated units of that Federation. It is a well recognized principle in the law of such voluntary associations that there shall be no judicial interference with intra-association affairs or determinations in the absence of special circumstances showing injustice or illegal action.27 Among other reasons which are said to warrant judicial interference are violation of contract obligations,28 and invasion of property rights.29 Assum*56ing, for the purpose of this decision, the correctness of this interpretation of the law —upon which appellees rely, and upon which the decision of the lower court is grounded— the nature and extent of such obligations as may be owed by the American Federation of Labor to the Brewery Workers Union must be determined by reading, together,30 the constitution of the Federation and the charter31 granted by it to that Union.
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit A, which is set .Out in the margin32, although titled Certificate of Affiliation and issued in 1905, contains the vital language of the original charter, which it replaced. The original constitution of the American Federation of Labor was already in effect when this charter was issued to the Brewery Workers Union. It had been adopted several months prior to the issuance of the charter, and its effective date was March 1, 1887, three days prior to the issuance of that charter. Hence, whatever it may signify, the fact is —contrary to appellees’ assertion on brief —that the Brewery Workers Union did not participate in the creation of the American Federation of Labor, and was not one of the unions which made the original grant or delegation of power to that Federation. From its own pleading it appears that the appellee union came as an applicant to the already existing American Federation of Labor. Consequently, the Brewery Workers Union acquired no rights or powers, and reserved no rights or powers — affecting its jurisdiction over membership, or limiting the power of the Federation over that subject — except to the extent that they are *57set forth or recognized in the constitution and the charter.
By the charter, issued under the circumstances described, the American Federation of Labor empowered and authorized the Brewery Workers Union to initiate into its membership any person or persons in accordance with its own laws. It ordained and secured the autonomy of the Union. And it bound itself to support the Union in the exercise of all its rights, privileges and autonomy as an affiliated union. The constitution then in effect provided, among other things, that the Federation recognized the right of each trade to manage its own affairs and that one of its objects was the establishment of national and international trade unions, based upon a strict recognition of the autonomy of each trade and the promotion and advancement of such bodies.
The foregoing excerpts constitute the only language contained in the constitution and charter which provide affirmative support for appellees’ contention. However, the absence from the constitution of any express provision giving, to the American Federation of Labor, control of membership jurisdiction, is said also to support the contention; which, as previously noted, was successfully urged in the court below. A careful analysis of the constitution and charter leads to the opposite result.
In the language of the two instruments, upon which appellees rely, the most persuasive word used is autonomy. This word has never been defined by an American court, so far as can be determined from the dictionaries and other work books. Webster defines it as meaning the power or right of self-government. Black’s definition reads: “The political independence of a nation; the right (and condition) of self-government; the negation of a state of political in-fluence from without or from foreign powers.” Even if we were to make the farfetched assumption of a full parallel between the Brewery Workers Union and an independent sovereign state, the result contended for still would not follow.33 The assumption is improper in any event because the Brewery Workers expressly agreed to conform to the constitution, laws, rules and regulations of the parent organization, the American Federation of Labor.
In addition to the fragmentary excerpts from the constitution, upon which appellees’ contention is based, that instrument provides: (1) “Art. I, Sec. 1: This association shall * * * consist of such Trades and Labor Unions as shall conform to its rules and regulations.” (2) “Art. VIII, Sec. 1: In all questions not covered by this constitution, the Executive Council shall have power to make rules to govern the same, and shall report accordingly to the Federation.” (3) “Art. VIII, Sec. 2: Charters for the Federation shall be granted by the President of the Federation, by and with the consent of the Executive *58Council, to all National and International and Local bodies affiliated with this Federation.” Furthermore, as previously noted, the charter expressly conditioned its grants of power, and its authorization to the Brewery Workers Union, concerning the initiation of persons into membership, by the following reservation: “Provided, That the said Union do conform to the Constitution, Laws, Rules and Regulations of the American Federation of Labor * * And, finally, the obligation assumed by the Federation was expressly stated to be in consideration of the due performance of the above. 34
Further language of the constitution and charter reveals a large and comprehensive plan for the protection and benefit of toiling millions of laborers; to unite them permanently; to secure recognition of their rights; to encourage the formation of more trades and labor unions; to secure their closer federation; to secure legislation in the interests of working people; to influence public opinion in their favor. In securing these objectives the constitution specified not recognition of the autonomy of unions but of each trade, 35 and it provided expressly: “Art. VI, Sec. 3. While we recognize the right of each trade to manage its own affairs, it shall be the duty of the Executive Council to secure the unification of all labor organizations
Examination of the language of the charter reveals, also, that the assumption, by the American Federation of Labor, of the obligation to support the rights, privileges and autonomy of the Brewery Workers Union, was in terms of that union as om affiliated umion — -not as an independent agency — and was with relation to the well-being of other unions and of labor generally. Moreover, the charter specified that it was granted for the purpose of a thorough organization of the trade, and a more perfect federation•• of all trades and labor, unions. Further, it was specified that the Brewery Workers should conduct its business affairs in compliance with the best interests of the trade and labor in general.
These provisions of the constitution — and of the charter which the original affiliates prepared pursuant to the authorization of Article VIII, Section 2 thereof— leave no doubt as to the broad scope of power vested and intended to be vested in the American Federation of Labor.36 They were accepted and agreed to by appellee union just as they have been accepted and agreed to by more than a hundred other affiliates. They are inconsistent with the contention made by appellees and with the conclusions reached by the lower court. That the members of the Federation, in framing the constitution, had no intention of crystallizing any then existing scheme of membership jurisdiction into permanent form, or of guaranteeing to protect any affiliated union in a “prior and exclusive right” against “any other organization,” as found by the trial court, is thus clearly revealed. How wide of the mark is such an interpretation, is further revealed by the totally inconsistent language of Article VIII, Section 3 of the constitution: “* * * Any seven wage workers of good character, and favorable to Trades Unions, and not members of any body affiliated with this Federation, who will subscribe to this Constitution, shall have the power to form a local body, to be known as a ‘Federal Labor Union’, and they shall hold regular meetings for the purpose of strengthening and advancing the Trades Union movement, and shall have the power *59to make their own rules in conformity with this Constitution, and shall be granted a local charter by the President of this Federation, provided the request for a charter be endorsed by the nearest local or National Trades Union officials connected with this Federation.”
It was inevitable, as industrial development and expansion took place, that new and perplexing problems of membership jurisdiction should arise.37 The fallacy of appellees’ contention in this respect is patent when we consider that drivers of trucks were not even thought of in 1887, because there were no'trucks in existence until a number of years later. Herein lay one of the greatest dangers of fraternal strife. If a united front was to be maintained by organized labor in its efforts to secure just treatment for working people it was necessary to have a strong, efficient, central federation to secure understanding and unification of efforts. These were the considerations which persuaded them to agree, and state in the first section of the first article of their constitution, that affiliated unions of the Federation must “conform to its rules and regulations.” And it was, no doubt, as a result of the counsel of wisdom, that they decided not to attempt to cover in the constitution all the difficult questions of the future, but instead, provided that, as to all of them, not covered in the constitution, the Executive Council should “have power to make rules to govern the same.”38 This, it will be noted, was in addition to the power of amendment which was reserved by Article IX, Section 1, of the constitution. It will be noted, also, that the obedience and compliance required of the appellee union by the constitution and charter was not limited to provisions or rules then existing. Instead, the requirement was broad, comprehensive and unqualified.
It is apparent from the language used in the charter that reluctant compliance, or unwillingness to comply with the constitution, rules and regulations, was anticipated, and provision was made, therefore, that in such case the affiliation might be terminated. What we have in the present case, however, is an insistent desire to retain the benefits of affiliation and federation without giving, in return, the compliance required by the constitution and charter and which, according to the express language of the latter, constitutes the consideration for those benefits.
Nor does the subsequent history of relations between the American Federation of Labor, the Teamsters Union, and the Brewery Workers Union provide any basis upon which to rest a contention that the Federation relinquished any of the powers revealed by the constitution and charter. Assuming that it is proper to look to that history for the purpose of interpretation,39 the record shows that at the second annual convention of the American Federation of Labor the constitution was amended so as to change the name of the charter issued to affiliated unions to Certificate of Affiliation. But the language of the instrument remained the same in all other respects, and the mutual rights, powers and obligations also remained the same.
In 1899, the Teamsters Union became affiliated with the American Federation of Labor, under a Certificate of Affiliation, which contained the same language as the charter issued to the Brewery Workers Union in 1887. Apparently, a feud started between the Brewery Workers and the Teamsters at once. Each claimed jurisdiction over drivers in the brewery industry. In fact, not only did the Brewery Workers claim jurisdiction against the teamsters over beer drivers, but they *60claimed jurisdiction over engineers against the Engineers Union; over firemen, against the Firemen’s Union; over coopers, painters and other crafts, against the respective unions whose membership covered these crafts. There was thus presented to the American Federation of Labor, probably, the most fundamental question with which it has had to deal and which eventually led to the major defection of several international unions and subsequent organization of the rival labor organization, the Committee for Industrial Organization.40
During the years prior to 1899, not only were jurisdictional disputes over membership frequent, but they were frequently brought to the Federation for settlement; in fact, at each succeeding convention of the Federation the great proportion of the grievances presented by the affiliated unions involved questions of jurisdiction.41 The Federation found itself often confronted with the unhappy choice between limiting that trade autonomy which was specified by the constitution as a major objective, or, on the other hand, of disintegrating a composite organization of workers, which, while not trade-autonomous, had nevertheless demonstrated remarkable vitality. And, in spite of the decisions which the Federation made in these cases, the dissatisfied parties would sometimes return year after year with the same complaints— hoping that some succeeding committee or convention would render more favorable decisions — and, indeed, would receive consideration over and over again. This procedure became increasingly burdensome to the committees and to the delegates at their annual conventions.
At the Convention of 1900, the Federation’s Committee on Grievances reported on the unhappy situation; expressed its opinion that in such cases “narrow conceptions of strict trade autonomy should give way to the policy which * * * will best serve the interests of the workers immediately involved, and best promote the power of the general movement.” The Committee reported further as follows:
“As a further result of our experience, we would give it as our opinion that this convention should not attempt to settle disputes of jurisdiction against the will or protest of one of the parties at interest. Believing, as we do, and subscribing to the principle of voluntary arbitration, we are of the opinion that this convention should only assume the privileges and power of a court of arbitration in such questions-by mutual consent of the organizations at interest. Such a policy would have a beneficial effect in avoiding to some degree the friction which develops in this convention as a result of these opposing claims, and would compel the disputants to make a more serious effort to follow a policy of conciliation and get together in conference,, with a view to settling their differences. Were such a course pursued, we feel confident that disputes would be more readily and more satisfactorily adjusted, and the interests of the movement immeasurably advanced.
“It is also the settled conviction of your committee that were half the energy displayed in these inter-union disputes applied to the betterment of the condition of the disputants the effect would be more profitable and redound to the greater credit and prestige of the trade union movement.”
As a result of this report, two amendments of the constitution were adopted by the 1900 Convention, for the purpose of relieving the burden upon the delegates and the committees of the Federation, as-follows:
“Section 11, of Article III: No grievance shall be considered by the convention that does not appear in the program, and no grievance shall be considered by any convention that has been decided by a previous convention (except upon the recommendation of the Executive Council), nor shall any grievance be considered where the parties thereto have not previously held a conference and attempted to adjust the same themselves.
* * * * *
“Section 11, of Article IX: No charter shall be granted by the A. F. of L. to any national or international unio-n without a positive and clear definition of the trade jurisdiction claimed by the applicant, and the charter shall not be granted if the jurisdiction claimed is a trespass on the *61jurisdiction of existing affiliated unions, without the written consent of such union.” In this manner the Federation attempted first, to devise a conclusive method of adjusting old jurisdictional disputes; and second, to prevent such disputes from arising in the future. But it should be noted, also, that no amendment was adopted to limit the power of the Federation in respect of jurisdictional disputes.
To carry out the purpose of the two amendments, the, 1900 Convention also adopted a resolution which instructed the President of the Federation to secure from all affiliated national and international unions written declarations defining their claims of trade jurisdiction. The resolution specified that these claims should become a permanent record of the Federation as a guide to the issuance of charters. In response to an inquiry from President Gompers, the Brewery Workers, in 1901, claimed the following jurisdiction: “Jurisdiction over all regularly employed brewery workers, such as brewers, maltsters, beer drivers and stablemen, beer bottlers, engineers and firemen, oilers and helpers, brewery ice house workers and brewery general laborers; coopers who also partly perform brewers work.”
In response to a similar inquiry from President Gompers, the Teamsters, in 1901, claimed the following jurisdiction:
“Any Teamster engaged driving a truck, wagon, hack, or vehicle, who does not own or operate more than five teams, shall be eligible for membership. All members employing Teamsters, must employ members of this organization and pay the Union scale of wages, prevalent in the district over which the Local Union has jurisdiction.
“A recent decision of the A. F. of L. gives the United Brewery Workmen jurisdiction over men engaged driving beier wagons.” [Italics supplied]
But the controversy continued nevertheless.
The record reveals that throughout these early years, instead of asserting arbitrarily the power which had been delegated to it, the American Federation of Labor, under the diplomatic guidance of Samuel Gompers, attempted, so far as possible, to settle jurisdictional disputes by persuasion and arbitration; looking toward future adjustments as changes occurred in methods of production and employment. A significant report, presented by Mr. Gompers and embodying these ideas, was adopted by the Convention of the Federation in 1901.42 The last sentence of that portion of the report which is set out in the margin, is of particular significance: “Nothing contained in this declaration is intended or shall be construed to mean a reversal of any decision rendered by former Executive Councils or previous Conventions on questions of jurisdiction.” Here is clear evidence of recognition by the Federation of its power, even though, under particular *62circumstances, wisdom might seem to require use of the methods of persuasion and arbitration.
Thereafter, as the record reveals, a practice was followed of requiring agreement in advance, by both participants in each jurisdictional dispute, before the Federation would attempt a settlement and decision. Even in such cases decisions were sometimes reluctantly complied with or even rejected by interested parties.43 This was particularly true of the Brewery Workers Union, which declined to abide by decisions of the Executive Council; refused to abide by arbitration decisions to which it had agreed in advance to be bound; refused to abide by an interpretation of an Executive Committee decision made by President Gompers, which it had agreed in advance should be binding upon it. This arbitrary course of action by the Brewery Workers Union, which resulted from its efforts to control membership jurisdiction of workers in several trades, against other unions whose membership was based upon trade autonomy, led to violence in several cities and to repeated demands by other unions that the Brewery Workers charter be revoked by the American Federation of Labor.
In 1903, the Executive Council reviewed these happenings and warned the Brewery Workers to comply with the decision rendered against it44 in order to relieve the Council “of the disagreeable duty incumbent upon us in dealing with organizations that violate the decisions of the convention.”
In 1904, the Convention of the Federa-' tion adopted a report of its Committee on Grievances providing as follows:
" * * * that all agreements and decisions heretofore made by, or at the instance of, the American Federation of Labor, between the Brewery Workmen, Engineers, Firemen and Teamsters, be and are hereby substituted by a working agreement upon the following basis:
“1. All brewery employes now members of the United Brewery Workmen’s Union may remain such provided that such members of said United Brewery Workmen’s Union as are now employed as Engineers, Firemen, or Teamsters, may withdraw from that organization, and j oin their respective unions, representing these crafts, without prejudice or discrimination on the part of their former associates.
“2. Hereafter the United Brewery Workmen’s Union shall not admit to membership any engineer, fireman or teamster, but shall refer all applicants, members of these trades, to the respective organizations of these trades, now affiliated with the American Federation of Labor where such organizations exist.
“3. All engineers, firemen and teamsters employed in breweries shall conform to the laws, rules and regulations made by that organization of which the majority of the members of the respective crafts employed in each brewery are members.
*63“4. Whenever a majority of men employed as engineers, firemen or teamsters in any brewery are members of the respective unions of these crafts, the organization or organizations representing such majority shall appoint a committee to act co-jointly with the United Brewery Workmen’s Union in any negotiations which may arise with the employers, provided that the United Brewery Workmen shall have equal representation with all the other organizations in joint conference.
“5. Failure to comply with the provisions of this agreement within a period of six months after the date of adjournment of this Convention shall work a revocation of the charter of the organization or organizations so failing.” [Italics supplied]
The 1904 Convention also adopted the following resolutions:
“Resolved, That the United Brewery Workmen be compelled to withdraw those engineers and firemen who have taken the places of striking engineers and firemen in the cities of St. Louis, Mo., and Belleville, 111.
“Resolved, That the United Brewery Workers he requested to withdraw all injunction suits now pending and dissolve such injunctions as have been secured against the International Unions of Stationary Engineers and Firemen, affiliated with the American Federation of Labor.”
In 1905 the Executive Committee reported: “We endeavored to carry out the mandate of the Convention, but found it exceedingly difficult, aye, impossible. In fact, the matter took on aggravated form, particularly in Philadelphia, where we authorized one of our members to make an investigation and endeavor to carry out the decision. Nor have the brewery workmen withdrawn their members in the cities of St. Louis and Belleville.” The Committee also set out a report of its investigator and then stated: “It will be observed that this report sets forth that all three organizations were guilty of improper conduct, and it goes without saying, as Mr. Strasser sets forth, that it was inadvisable to revoke the charters of all three organizations [Brewery Workers, Engineers, and Firemen] ; but for additional misconduct, Mr. Strasser recommended a penalty to be imposed upon the Brewery Workers. However, that penalty your Executive Council did not feel warranted in imposing, believing that it had no such power; that after all, such right and power was vested m the Convention itself. We therefore transmitted to the three organizations Mr. Strasser’s report and recommendation, omitting the specific penalty he recommended.” [Italics supplied] In accord with this action of the Executive Council, President Gompers wrote to each of the three offending organizations urging an adjustment of differences “in a spirit of fraternity, mutual good will and mutual concessions, for the benefit of the members they represent, and for the benefit of the labor movement at large.”
However, no adjustment occurred and the Convention of 1905 adopted the decision, a copy of which is set out in the margin.45 The last paragraph of this de*64cisión is significant in that the action there directed to be taken approximates closely the action of the Federation and of the Teamsters Union of which complaint was made in the present case. This decision is significant, also, because it reflects the attitude of President Gompers, who, while opposed to revocation of charters as a matter of policy, nevertheless approved decisions by the Federation in jurisdictional disputes and the application of discipline and pressure to make such decisions operative and effective. This is clearly evidenced by the argument which he made, during debate,46 in support of the proposed decision.
As a result of action taken at the 1906 Convention, the Brewery Workers charter was revoked in June, 1907. At the following 1907 Convention, the Executive Council, in explaining its action, recited facts concerning continuing trouble between the warring organizations; reported that an investigation had been made; that a hearing was held for several days; that: “It was clearly proven, and not denied, that the decision of the convention had been violated, and on the part of the representatives of the Brewery Workmen it was declared that that organization would not abide by the decision;” that the Brewery Workers were given until May 1, 1907 to abide by the decision of the Federation’s Convention; that on May 29, 1907, the Brewery Workers refused to abide by the decision; whereupon its charter was revoked.
At the 1907 Convention, upon a resolution introduced by President Gompers,47 *65the charter of the Brewery Workers Union, was restored, but the resolution expressly' reaffirmed the previous decisions of the Federation concerning jurisdiction claims-of the Brewery Workers, the Engineers, the Firemen, and the Teamsters, and directed the Executive Council to impose such disciplinary punishment upon the organization responsible for failure to abide by the decision of the Convention, as the judgment of the Executive Council might direct. This action constituted another victory for the Gompers policy of conciliation, but it by no means acknowledged lack of power in the Federation. To the contrary it expressly reaffirmed the decisions previously made, and by necessary implication the power to make them.
Moreover, as the restoration of the charter was made with the express reaffirmation of previous decisions concerning membership jurisdiction, and as it occurred after the adoption of the amendments to Section 11, Article IX, and Section 11, Article III, it is doubly clear that after 1907 the Brewery Workers Union was subject to the rules and decisions of the American Federation of Labor concerning membership jurisdiction.
Following the 1907 Convention the Teamsters, Engineers and Firemen informed the Brewery Workers of their willingness to abide by the decision of the 1905 and 1906 Conventions, but the representatives of the Brewers “stated positively that no agreement could be reached on the basis of that decision.” Nevertheless, the Executive Council restored the charter of the Brewery Workers and in the communication transmitting it, said, over the signature of President Gompers: “In restoring this charter to the International Union of United Brewery Workmen, it in no wise modifies or changes the decision of the Convention of the American Federation of Labor- as to claims of jurisdiction. The duty imposed upon the Executive Council of disciplinary punishment, to any organization violating the decision of the Convention of the American Federation of Labor is not changed or modified by the restoration of this charter to your organization.”
At its 1908 Convention, the Executive Council reported to the Federation that the conflict had not yet been settled, but that steps had been taken toward adjustment of the dispute as it concerned the Brewery Workers and the Engineers. At the 1909 Convention, the Council reported an agreement between the Brewery Workers and the Engineers. At this Convention, also, the Teamsters Union requested the Convention to grant to it jurisdiction over all chauffeurs and stablemen, and to change its name accordingly.
At the 1911 Convention, the whole question of jurisdiction over teamsters and chauffeurs, including such workers in the new soft drink industry, was referred to the Executive Council. At the 1912 Convention, the proceedings state that the jurisdictional controversy between the Teamsters and the Brewers should be adjusted under the direction of President Gompers and that failing such adjustment, the “Executive Council should render a decision setting forth clearly the jurisdiction of each organization.” The Council reported to the 1913 Convention that efforts at adjustment were unsuccessful, hence that it had given its decision in favor of the Brewers. This decision, which was inconsistent with the Federation’s decisions of the preceding thirteen years, was adopted by the Convention. This was an assertion, by exercise, of the power to decide such questions.
In 1915,48 the Teamsters Union and the Brewery Workers Union entered into a compromise agreement,49 which bears no *66date and specifies no term of duration. By this agreement the Teamsters conceded the jurisdiction of the Brewery Workers Union over drivers, chauffeurs and stablemen employed in the delivery of products of breweries, agencies or beer bottling establishments.
In 1915, the Executive Council reported to the Federation that “Jurisdiction over the drivers of brewery wagons was recognized as belonging to the United Brewery Workers.” The Brewery Workers Union contends that the 1915 agreement has been in force for twenty-five years. The Teamsters Union contends that it was violated by the Brewery Workers Union and terminated by the Teamsters long before the jurisdictional dispute was reopened in 1933. In any event, the American Federation of Labor took no further action on the subject until 1933. The coincidence of the period during which the Eighteenth Amendment was in effect, perhaps, explains the quiescence of inter-union conflict. The repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment by the adoption of the Twenty-First Amendment', perhaps, explains the sudden reopening of the conflict. Thereafter, in 1933, the question was again presented to the Federation and
decided in favor of the Teamsters Union. This decision was reaffirmed in 1935.
The lower court concluded: “That the
International Working Agreement entered into between the Brewery Workers Union and the Teamsters Union on February 15, 1915, is a binding agreement between the parties and establishes its [sic] respective rights. That the American Federation of Labor, under its Constitution, is required to recognize an agreement of this character between two of its member International Unions, such agreement being entered into under the autonomous rights of the said National or International Unions.” In so concluding, the court erred.
Appellees assert the applicable, general rule of law to be that a contract which fixes no period of duration, and which by its inherent nature does not imply a power of revocation, is terminable only by mutual consent, but if by its nature it is not deemed to be perpetual it is terminable at will by either party on reasonable notice.
Careful analysis of the cases cited which declare and apply this proposition will quickly reveal by contrast that the 1915 agreement, here involved, is not one of a non-terminable character.50 In Western *67Union Telegraph Co. v. Pennsylvania Co.,51 upon which appellees place great reliance, the court stated the rule as follows: “If a contract is not revocable at the will of either party, or otherwise limited as to its duration, by its express terms, or by the inherent nature of the contract itself, with reference to its subject-matter or its parties, it is presumably intended to be permanent and perpetual in the obligation it imposes.” [Italics supplied]
Whether or not the agreement was a mere working adjustment without binding contractual character or, on the other hand, had contractually binding effect, it could not have such effect as against the power of the association to make a determination contrary to that reached in the agreement and in any event as between the unions directly parties to the agreement for longer than a reasonable time. The Brewery Workers Union had, for more than ten years, continued to bring its jurisdictional disputes to the Federation following adverse decisions, to some of which it had agreed in advance to be bound whatever the decisions might be. The trade autonomy of the Teamsters was violated by the 1913 decision of the Federation, as was the constitutionally declared and theretofore consistently maintained principle of the Federation. Considerations, both of subject matter and of parties, therefore, are persuasive that the contract was not intended to be permanent and that the contract by reason of its inherent nature was terminable.52 The error of the contrary contention is further demonstrated by the history of technological developments which have produced constant changes in the organization of American industries. The essence of modern industrial economy is its ability quickly to adapt itself to such changes.
The historical facts above mentioned have caused increasing legislation in the field of labor relations, culminating in the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the Wagner Act. In each of these the public policy is declared to be that workers shall have full freedom of association, self-organization and designation of representatives.53 This could not be achieved if a mere working agreement, set up as a basis of negotiation and adjustment, were permitted to be crystallized, by injunction, into permanent and perpetual form. For this reason, also, the determination of the lower court was erroneous.54
Finally, whatever its virtues or defects, this agreement of 1915 neither extended nor diminished the obligations of the parent organization toward its affiliates; nor limited its delegated powers over membership jurisdiction, when the question was again presented for its determination. Nothing in the constitution of the Federation, or in the charters of the affiliates, provides that such an agreement can limit the constitutional powers of the Federation. The absurdity of such a result becomes apparent when consideration is given to the *68large objectives of that Federation as- set out in its constitution, and when it is remembered that there are over one hundred affiliates, which might be affected Ly collusive agreements between two or more, intended to limit the rights, powers and privileges of others by thus limiting the powers of the parent Federation.
Upon analysis of the applicable law and consideration of the facts, our conclusion, therefore, is that the American Federation of Labor acted within the scope of its delegated constitutional power,55 and that no contractual or other rights of the Brewery Workers Union were violated by its decision of 1933. This being true, there is no foundation for equitable relief, or reason for judicial interference, as regards any proper action by the Federation or the Teamsters Union in carrying out that decision.56 As we have already pointed out, no sufficient showing has been made to warrant the decision of the lower court, in view of the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. It is not necessary to speculate upon whether a sufficient showing could be made upon new pleadings and a new trial. In any event, the injunction granted by the lower court was too broad in its terms.57 It enjoined the former from notifying employers, drivers, central labor bodies, state federations of labor, or other interested parties, of its action in transferring jurisdiction of beer drivers from the Brewery Workers Union to the Teamsters Union; in other words, from performing its normal functions as an international federation of labor unions. It enjoined the Teamsters Union from carrying out, or attempting to carry out, the decision of the Federation in any manner; in other words from performing its normal functions as an affiliated international union.58 But the lower court went farther in the case of the Teamsters Union and specified that it should be enjoined from persuading employers, by any means, lawful or unlawful, and from any effort to prevent or discourage any new collective bargaining agreements with the Brewery Workers Union, on the ground of the decision of the American Federation of Labor. The effect of its decision would be to crystallize labor organizations and collective bargaining agencies according to appellees’ mistaken notion of the situation existing in 1887 and would require the American Federation of Labor to guarantee that set-up against all organizations in perpetuity. This would be nothing less than an abrogation of important sections of the National Labor Relations Act,59 and *69gratuitous interference with the normal functions of labor organizations, which that Act and the Norris-LaGuardia Act were designed to prevent.60
The judgment is reversed; the injunction is dissolved; and the lower court is instructed to proceed in conformity with this decision.
Reversed.