(after stating the-facts). Under our practice, where both parties request a peremptory instruction and ask no other instructions, they thereby submit the case to the court sitting as a jury, and the court’s finding will be affirmed on appeal if-there-is 'any testimony legally sufficient to support it. St. L. Sw. Ry. Co. v. Mulkey, 100 Ark. 71, and Staggs v. Joseph, 158 Ark. 133.
The undisputed evidence shows that the defendant purchased goods from the plaintiff in the sum of $167.50.' The defendant admits this to be true, and'seeks to recover by way of counterclaim from the plaintiff the sum of $302 -alleged to be due' for a breach- of contract of the sale of merchandise.
The record shows that the Creasy Corporation, which was organized under the laws of Delaware, entered into what is called -a service contract with various - retail grocery dealers throughout the United States, whereby it was to- furnish groceries to its members at. -a smaller price than is usually paid to wholesale grocers. The *1050theory upon which the members were secured was that the Creasey Corporation was to establish branch wholesale stores in the various States where its members could purchase goods, and save a material amount in freight on account of the nearness of their retail stores to the branch wholesale stores. Under this agreement or service contract, the defendant became a member entitled to credit with the Creasey Corporation, and was to purchase goods from a wholesale branch house of the Creasey Corporation to be established at Ft. Smith.
It is conceded that there is evidence sufficient to show a breach of contract on the part of the Creasey Corporation, and the defendant seeks to maintain its counterclaim against the Creasey Grocery Corporation on the ground that the Creasey Corporation and the Creasey Grocery Corporation are the same. The manager of the plaintiff testified that he had been employed !as manager for the Creasey Grocery Corporation, and had become a stockholder in it; that he had formerly been employed by the Creasey Corporation, and that the two corporations were two separate and distinct corporations. To establish the fact that they were the same corporation, the' defendant adduced evidence tending to show that when the Creasey Corporation ceased to operate its branch wholesale house at Fort Smith, it notified the defendant to purchase goods from the Creasey house at St. Louis, Mo. The defendant purchased the bill of g-oods sued on from the Creasey Grocery Corporation, believing it to be the same as the Creasey Corporation. This fact, however, would not make the Creasey Grocery Corporation liable. There must be something tending to -show that the two corporations were the same, or that the plaintiff agreed to ibe bound by the contract of the Creasey Corporation, or that it acquiesced in the representation of the Creasey Corporation that it would carry out its contracts.
It is true there is a letter in the record from the plaintiff to the defendant in which it states that a Missouri corporation can not buy back its stock; but this is *1051not sufficient to constitute an admission that the Creasey Grocery Corporation and the Creasey Corporation are the same. The statement just referred to is coupled with the further statement that the certificate in question was not from the 'Creasey Grocery Corporation. So, instead of being an ¡admission that the two corporations are one and the same, it is a denial that such is the case.
It is also true that the Creasey Grocery Corporation 'became the successor to the Brite-Mawnin Mercantile Company in business, and that the latter company was represented by the Creasey Corporation as being a wholesale grocery house founded by it. Here again, however, we must not confound conjecture with proof. The representation of the Creasey Corporation that the Brite-Mawnin Mercantile Company of St. Louis, Mo., was a wholesale grocery house founded by it would not make the plaintiff liable for its contracts simply 'because it succeeded to its business without proof to the effect that the plaintiff knew of the representation, and in some way acquiesced in it.
There is not sufficient evidence in the record to establish any connection whatever between the plaintiff and the Creasey Corporation, or to show that the plaintiff agreed directly or indirectly to carry out the contracts of the Creasey Corporation. As we have just seen, the mere fact that it succeeded to the business of a corporation which was associated with the Creasey Corporation would not render it liable for the contracts of the Creasey Corporation, in the absence of an agreement, express or implied, that it would become liable therefor. Neither would the fact that the defendant believed the plaintiff to be a part of the Creasey Corporation make it liable for the contracts of the latter in the absence of knowledge on the part of the plaintiff that the Creasey Corporation had represented to the defendant that it would carry out its contracts. Therefore, there was a lack of proof to establish the finding of the circuit court that the Creasey Grocery Corporation was a subsidiary *1052part of the Creasey Corporation, and that the two wei*e in fact one and the same concern.
It follows that the court erred in directing a verdict for the defendant on its counterclaim, and for that error the judgment must he reversed, and the cause will he remanded for a new trial.