Maryland Code, § 16-103.1 of the Transportation Article (TR) provides, in relevant part, that the Maryland Motor Vehicle Administration (MVA) “may not issue a driver’s license to an individual ... [djuring any period for which the individual’s license to drive is revoked, suspended, refused, or canceled in this or any other state, unless the individual is eligible for a restricted license under § 16-113(e) of this subtitle.” Less than three years ago, in Gwin v. MVA, 385 Md. 440, 869 A.2d 822 (2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 823, 126 S.Ct. 359, 163 L.Ed.2d 67 (2005), we held that the statute means what it says and that MVA may not issue a Maryland driver’s license to someone whose license to drive has been revoked or is currently in suspension in another State, even if the revocation or suspension is permanent in that State. That holding, based on the unambiguous, plain wording of the statute, also dooms petitioner, Ramiro Alavez’s, quest for a Maryland driver’s license.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner, currently a resident of Maryland, is a citizen of Mexico. He said that he came to the United States in 1988 and resided initially in California, where he was able to obtain a driver’s license from that State. Two years later, he obtained a Virginia driver’s license. He claims that in 1991 he *730applied for a license in New Jersey but was turned down because he was not “a legal immigrant.”
The actual history of what occurred in New Jersey, as revealed in the records of the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission (NJMVC) is not entirely consistent with that assertion. Under New Jersey law, a driver’s license is issued for a 48-month period, subject to renewal in the manner prescribed by the NJMVC. See N.J.S.A. § 39:3-10. At least since 1993, New Jersey law has also provided:
“In addition to requiring an applicant for a driver’s license to submit satisfactory proof of identity and age, the commission also shall require the applicant to provide, as a condition for obtaining a permit and license, satisfactory proof that the applicant’s presence in the United States is authorized under federal law.
If the commission has reasonable cause to suspect that any document presented by an applicant as proof of identity, age or legal residency is altered, false or otherwise invalid, the commission shall refuse to grant the permit or license until such time as the document may be verified by the issuing agency to the commission’s satisfaction.”
Id. Those provisions also apply to identification cards issued by NJMVC to persons who do not have a New Jersey driver’s license. See N.J.S.A. § 39:3-29.3.
Regulations adopted by NJMVC allow a person from a foreign country who is in New Jersey for a year or less to operate a motor vehicle in the State if the person holds a current driver’s license from that country. See N.J. Admin. Code tit. 13, § 21-8.2(e). The regulations also permit a person from a foreign country who is in New Jersey for a year or less but who does not hold a current license from the foreign country to apply for a New Jersey license or permit The Administrator, however, must suspend or revoke such a license upon its expiration or upon expiration of the holder’s “lawful presence in the United States unless it is demonstrated that the person’s continued presence in the United States is authorized under Federal Law.” Id., § 21-8.2(f).
*731One of the NJMVC regulations requires an applicant for a license, permit, or non-driver identification card to furnish to the Commission, upon its request, “proof of identity and date of birth and proof that the applicant’s presence in the United States is authorized under Federal law,” and it lists the kinds of documents that will suffice. Among the documents pertaining to proof of lawful presence in the U.S. are a U.S. birth certificate, adoption papers, a certificate of naturalization or citizenship, a current and verified alien registration card, specific documents establishing refugee status, and a photo employment authorization card. N.J. Admin. Code tit. 13, § 21-8.2.
NJMVC records, placed into evidence in this case, indicate that Alavez received a commercial and a non-commercial driver’s license on September 30, 1987, which is before he said he emigrated to the U.S. It would appear that NJMVC was unaware, when it issued the licenses, that Alavez maintained his Virginia license, as New Jersey law, like that of Maryland, requires that a foreign license be surrendered prior to the issuance of a domestic one. See N.J.S.A. § 39:3-10; TR § 16-111.1(f)(2). When the New Jersey licenses expired four years later, on September 30, 1991, they were “withdrawn” because of “misrepresentation of identity or other facts on application for driver license.”1 Nonetheless, Alavez continued to drive in New Jersey. On February 12, 1995, his two licenses, which somehow were treated as still in effect, were suspended, again for misrepresenting facts on his application (D02). In March, 1995, Alavez was convicted of driving on a suspended license, and, when the licenses actually expired in 1995, they were again “withdrawn,” this time because of the “driving while license suspended” conviction (ACD Code B26).
*732During the entire time Alavez was in New Jersey, he maintained his Virginia driver’s license. In December, 2002, he surrendered that license and was issued a Maryland driver’s license. There is no indication that MVA was then aware that his New Jersey licenses had been suspended or withdrawn. In January, 2003, that fact was discovered, and MVA notified Alavez that, as a result of the New Jersey suspension, his Maryland license would be cancelled on February 27, 2003. To avoid cancellation or to re-apply for a Maryland license after cancellation, he was told, he would need to submit a “clearance letter or driving record” confirming that his driving privilege had been restored in New Jersey. No such confirmation was forthcoming, and his license was cancelled.
At some point in 2005, Alavez made inquiry to NJMVC about his New Jersey license and was informed, on November 3, 2005, that, if he were foreign-born, he would need to submit notarized copies of documents that prove his presence in the United States to be lawful under Federal law. Through counsel, Alavez then requested some sort of review by MVA, which contacted NJMVC. The New Jersey Commission confirmed that it had suspended Alavez’s license “because of failure to present acceptable proof of legal name, date of birth, valid address, social security number, legal presence in this country and/or provide testimony concerning fraud/misuse of the driver license and/or registration under investigation at the time of the application for a New Jersey driver license.” The letter further advised that unless Alavez “can provide proof that [his] presence here is authorized under Federal Law by providing valid and acceptable immigration documentation, [he] will not be eligible for a New Jersey license or permit or for restoration of [his] New Jersey driving privileges.”
Apart from this written response, MVA officials had a number of telephone conversations with their New Jersey counterparts, including counsel to NJMVC. Based on those conversations, MVA advised Alavez on April 4, 2006 that the “identity suspensions” in New Jersey were “as the result of [Alavez] submitting fraudulent [United States Citizenship and *733Immigration Services] identification to obtain and/or retain a New Jersey permit or license” and that the suspensions will “stay suspended until valid and acceptable immigration documentation is presented proving that [his] legal presence is authorized by federal law.” Citing TR § 16-103.1 and Gwin v. MVA, supra, MVA advised that it could not issue a Maryland driver’s license until the New Jersey suspensions were cleared. MVA confirmed that decision on April 25, 2006, and advised that its decision was final.
Rather than seek immediate judicial review, as suggested by MVA, Alavez requested an administrative hearing, and the matter was referred to the Office of Administrative Hearings.2 After hearing the evidence, essentially as recounted above, the Administrative Law Judge (AL J) found as a fact that Alavez’s New Jersey driver’s license had been suspended in 1991 for obtaining the license “with forged documents,” that the suspension remained in effect, and, based largely on Alavez’s concession, that he could not take the steps identified by NJMVC as necessary to terminate the suspension. She concluded that TR § 16-103.1 was not a discretionary statute, but precluded MVA from issuing a Maryland license during the period of the New Jersey suspension. Addressing Alavez’s argument that his due process rights were violated because he is unable to comply with the New Jersey requirement, the AL J noted that, if there was any due process violation, it arose from the New Jersey statute, as implemented by NJMVC, not from TR § 16-103.1. Upon those findings and conclusions, the ALJ sustained the cancellation of Alavez’s Maryland driver’s license.
*734The Circuit Court for Baltimore County, on Alavez’s petition for judicial review, affirmed the ALJ’s ruling, concluding that there was sufficient evidence to support her findings and agreeing that TR § 16-103.1 mandated the action taken by MVA. We granted Alavez’s petition for certiorari to consider the broad question raised of whether MVA erred in canceling the Maryland license. We shall affirm.
DISCUSSION
The issue before us is not whether Maryland should issue a driver’s license to undocumented or illegal aliens. We do; it is not prohibited. Nor are we concerned with whether New Jersey’s contrary policy is wise or fair; that is an issue for the New Jersey legislature, which established the policy. Maryland has a statute, TR § 16-103.1, which prohibits MVA from issuing a driver’s license to an individual during any period in which the individual’s license to drive is revoked, suspended, refused, or cancelled “in this or any other state.” The two questions presented by Alavez are (1) whether § 16-103.1 was intended by our General Assembly to apply only to out-of-State revocations, suspensions, refusals, or cancellations based on conduct that would lead to a suspension or refusal of a license in Maryland, and (2) if not, whether the statute violates Alavez’s substantive due process and equal protection rights under Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. To the extent our resolution of those questions hinges on Gwin v. MVA, supra, 385 Md. 440, 869 A.2d 822, we are asked to overrule that decision.
Construction of TR § 16-103.1
The rules of statutory construction are well-established. As we pointed out most recently in Sprenger v. PSC, 400 Md. 1, 29, 926 A.2d 238, 254 (2007), our goal is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the Legislature, and, to do that, we look first to the language of the statute, giving that language its natural and ordinary meaning. As stated in Price v. State, 378 Md. 378, 387, 835 A.2d 1221, 1226 (2003) and confirmed in Sprenger, supra, at 29, 926 A.2d at 254, “[a] *735court may neither add nor delete language so as to reflect an intent not evidenced in the plain and unambiguous language of the statute; nor may it construe the statute with forced or subtle interpretations that limit or extend its application.”
There is nothing uncertain or ambiguous about the pertinent part of TR § 16-103.1. It says that MVA “may not issue a driver’s license to an individual ... [d]uring any period for which the individual’s license to drive is revoked, suspended, refused, or canceled in this or any other state, unless the individual is eligible for a restricted license under § 16—113(e) of this subtitle.” Alavez would have us insert another exception—unless the revocation, suspension, or cancellation in the other State is for conduct that would not warrant that result in Maryland. To add that exception, to read the statute in that manner, would be to do precisely what we have consistently said a court may not do—add words to create an exception or limitation that the Legislature chose not to create.
Not only does the plain wording of the statute preclude such a “forced or subtle” interpretation, the legislative history of the provision makes clear a legislative intent not to create such an exception. The prohibition against the issuance of a Maryland driver’s license to one whose license to drive has been revoked, suspended, refused, or cancelled dates back at least to the 1943 rewriting of the Motor Vehicle Code. See 1943 Md. Laws, ch. 1007. The 1943 law provided, in pertinent part:
“[t]he Department [of Motor Vehicles] shall not issue any license hereunder:
3. To any person, as an operator or chauffeur, whose license has been suspended during such suspension nor to any person whose license has been revoked, until the expiration of three (3) months after such license was revoked ...”
In modified form, that provision survived a substantive rewriting of the Motor Vehicle Code in 1970 (1970 Md. Laws, ch. 534, enacting Art. 66/6, § 6-103 ¶ 2) and the 1977 code revision enactment of titles 11 through 27 of the Transporta*736tion Article (1977 Md. Laws, ch. 14, enacting TR § 16-1.03.1). In that penultimate form, the statute precluded MVA from issuing a driver’s license to an individual “[d]uring any period for which his license to drive is revoked, suspended, refused, or canceled.”
MVA construed the statute, as so written, as applying to revocations, suspensions, refusals, and cancellations in both Maryland and other States, but apparently that approach was challenged, on the ground that the term “license” was defined in TR § 11-128 as any “(1) Driver’s license; and (2) Any other license or permit to drive a motor vehicle that is issued under or granted by the laws of this State ...” Seeking to remove any ambiguity and make clear that its approach was correct, MVA, through the Department of Transportation, proposed a Departmental bill in the 1993 Legislative Session to add to the existing language in § 16-103.1 “in this or any other State unless the individual is eligible for a restricted license under § 16-113(e) of this subtitle.” With one technical amendment to correct a printing error, the bill was enacted as proposed.
The addition of “in this or any other State” certainly clarified any ambiguity regarding the duty of MVA to honor and enforce revocations, suspensions, refusals, and cancellations decreed in other States, but the exception is equally telling. Section 16-113(e) allows MVA to issue (1) a driver’s license valid only in Maryland when the applicant’s driving privilege was suspended in another State for failing to comply with the financial responsibility requirements of that State, and (2) subject to certain conditions, a temporary driver’s license valid only in Maryland and good for only 90 days when the applicant’s driving privilege was suspended in another State for failing to comply with the licensing requirements of that State, for which a comparable violation in this State would not have resulted in revocation or suspension. One of the conditions to that exception is that MVA determine that the applicant “will be able to take any actions required by the other jurisdiction for reinstatement of the privilege to drive in that jurisdiction.” TR § 16-113(e)(1)(ii)4.
*737What this shows is that the Legislature, understanding that it was mandating a very broad reciprocity and that, by doing so, would be precluding the issuance of a Maryland driver’s license to anyone whose license or privilege to drive had been revoked, suspended, refused, or cancelled in any other State, even for reasons that would not produce such action in Maryland, was willing to draw two specific exceptions to that broad reciprocity, but only those two. No argument is, or could reasonably be, made here that Alavez falls within either of those exceptions.3 It is not for this Court, by judicial fíat, to add another one.4
Article 24
Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights provides, in relevant part, that no person ought to be disseized of his liberties or privileges or in any manner deprived of his life, liberty, or property “but by the judgment of his peers, or by the Law of the Land.” That provision has been held to be the State counterpart to both the due process and the equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Kane v. Board of Appeals, 390 Md. 145, 169, n. 16, 887 A.2d 1060, *7381074, n. 16 (2005) (due process); Bowie Inn, Inc. v. Bowie, 274 Md. 230, 235, n. 1, 335 A.2d 679, 683, n. 1 (1975) (due process); Matter of Easton, 214 Md. 176, 187, 133 A.2d 441, 447 (1957) (due process); Murphy v. Edmonds, 325 Md. 342, 353-54, 601 A.2d 102, 107-08 (1992) (equal protection).
At no time during the administrative hearing before the ALJ did Alavez mention either Art. 24 or equal protection. He did mention that “[t]he due process section is that he went to the MVA one time and asked for a license” and that MVA made clear that as long as the New Jersey suspension, which Alavez could not cure, remained extant, he could not get a Maryland license. Fleeting as that reference was, the ALJ addressed the issue. Her response was that any due process issue would arise from the New Jersey law and would need to be dealt with in that State and that, based on Gwin v. MVA, there was no due process violation emanating from the Maryland TR § 16-103.1.
The due process and equal protection argument seems to be based on the notion that, because Maryland would not refuse to issue a driver’s license simply because the applicant is unable to prove legal residence in the United States, it has no legitimate interest in denying such a license to a qualified applicant simply because New Jersey has a different policy, especially when that policy, if implemented through the revocation, suspension, refusal, or cancellation of a New Jersey license, would permanently bar the applicant from obtaining a Maryland driver’s license. There are two responses. First, as we pointed out in footnote 4, above, Alavez’s license was not suspended in New Jersey because he is an illegal resident, but because he used forged documents to obtain that license, and Maryland would do the same. He is being treated the same as any other person whose license is suspended for that reason. Maryland does have a legitimate interest in assuring that persons who have resorted, or attempted to resort, to fraud or forged documents in order to obtain a driver’s license elsewhere and who, as a result, have had that license revoked, suspended, refused, or cancelled in the other State, not be rewarded for that conduct by receiving a Maryland driver’s *739license. The fact that the out-of-State revocation or suspension maybe permanent does not suffice to make the Maryland reciprocity statute unconstitutional. That was also the case in Gwin, which, despite Alavez’s request, we decline to overrule. It was right when filed, and it remains right today.5
JUDGMENT OF CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE COUNTY AFFIRMED; COSTS TO BE PAID BY PETITIONER.
Dissenting Opinion by ELDRIDGE, J., which GREENE, J. joins.