*849OPINION.
Issue No. 1.
The petitioner’s argument, in substance, is that the nationalization of Nitra’s properties by the Czechoslovakian Government resulted in a loss to him in 1946 which is deductible in full *850under the provisions of section 23( e),1 or section 117 (j) (2),2 or section 112 (f)3 of the Internal Revenue Code. The pertinent provisions of these sections are set forth in the margin.
The respondent meets this argument as follows. First, he contends that, assuming a loss was suffered in 1946, the question is moot because the loss was a capital loss and thus limited by section 23 (g) ,4 the full *851amount of which as so limited has been allowed. Second, he contends that the record is devoid of evidence fixing the amount of the loss incurred, if any deductible loss was in fact incurred. And third, he argues that 1945 rather than 1946 was the year of loss.
We think the respondent’s determination must be sustained. The property owned by the petitioner was stock in Nitra. So far as we can ascertain from the record this stock as such was never seized or nationalized or confiscated by Czechoslovakia. As we read and interpret the decrees of the Czechoslovakian Government on which the petitioner relies, these decrees nationalized the assets of Nitra and not the stock. Perhaps this had the effect of destroying the value of the corporate assets, but even this is not established by the evidence. The fact remains that the petitioner’s stock itself was not seized or confiscated. We are not overlooking the fact that the petitioner’s stock was in April of 1946 turned over to representatives of Czechoslovakia “purportedly” pursuant to Czechoslovakian Decree No. 95. Nevertheless, the record before us does not contain this decree, we are unable to determine its effect or purpose, and for all that appears, this transfer was made at the voluntary instruction of the petitioner and cannot be considered a seizure or confiscation.
Presumably the nationalization of corporate assets had the effect of rendering the petitioner’s stock worthless. Cf. United States v. S. S. White Dental Mfg. Co., 274 U. S. 398; Emil Stern, et al., 5 B. T. A. 89. But losses from the worthlessness of stock are by section 23 (g) (2) “to be considered as a loss from the sale or exchange * * * of capital assets.” Such a loss would avail the petitioner nothing in this proceeding since for 1946 he has already claimed and been allowed the full amount of capital losses permitted him by the statute. Accordingly, there might be some justification for not deciding the point at all. Cf. Corn Products Refining Co., 16 T. C. 395.
Furthermore, we think the respondent’s contention that the year of loss was 1945 instead of 1946 is correct. The fundamental nationalization Decree No. 101 was dated October 24, 1945. This decree nationalized “as of the date of [its] publication” sugar processing plants and sugar refineries. True, the “enterprises” so nationalized were to be subsequently “announced” and it was not until January 9,1946, that it was so announced with respect to Nitra. Nevertheless the decree of January 9,1946, states that Nitra was among those enterprises which “were by [Decree No. 101] nationalized” and further *852that by “this nationalization the Czechoslovak State acquired the possession” of Nitra. In the light of this language, which speaks of past action and is merely confirmatory of what had been done, we determine that the nationalization of Nitra took place in 1945 and that whatever loss the petitioner suffered because of the nationalization occurred in 1945 and not in 1946 as claimed by the petitioner.
On the amount of the loss the evidence is very unsatisfactory, but in view of what we have said above it is unnecessary to discuss or attempt to make any finding in that respect.
Neither do we think it necessary to discuss the possible application of section 127, “War Losses,” to this situation. The respondent has stressed the possible application of this section on brief, but the petitioner has ignored it entirely and our disposition of the issue has been made without reference to it. Accordingly, nothing would be gained by further analysis of that section.
Furthermore, since we are unable to determine that the petitioner’s stock was seized or confiscated, the petitioner’s contention that his property was “involuntarily converted” by seizure by the Czechoslovakian Government is without merit and we do not see that section 117 (j) or 112 (f) is brought into play.
Issue No. %.
On the issue involving deduction of the amount paid to the petitioner’s mother, the respondent emphasizes that the arrangement between the petitioner and his mother is to be scrutinized with the care that interfamily arrangements resulting in the splitting of family income require. He further argues that the amount paid by the petitioner to his mother was not “interest” since the agreement between them did not contemplate interest. Also that since the mother was not a partner in Cereal Products Company she was not entitled to share in the partnership income. But even if we agree with these arguments it does not follow that the respondent’s determination is correct that the petitioner cannot deduct the $4,602.31 paid to his mother.
She furnished $25,000 (or one-half) of the capital which the petitioner put into Cereal Products Company. This was done pursuant to an agreement under which the petitioner bound himself to pay his mother 40 per cent of his 50 per cent share of the profits from the company. Bepayment of the cash thus advanced was to be made upon liquidation or termination of the partnership. Although the mother was not a partner we think the over-all fact of the arrangement was that the required payment by the petitioner could be treated either as a payment in the nature of interest for the use of the cash *853advanced by his mother or that the arrangement amounted to a sub-venture between the two pursuant to which the petitioner’s profits from the partnership were to be divided in the agreed ratio. Sommers v. Commissioner, (C. A. 2) 195 F. 2d 680; Dorzbach v. Collison, (C. A. 3) 195 F. 2d 69. We decide against the respondent on this point.
Decision will be entered under Rule 50.