ORDER
Now before this Court is the motion by Plaintiffs Sun Company, Inc. and Texaco, Inc. for reconsideration of this Court’s Order of March 21, 1996. Plaintiffs’ motion raises several issues of contention. Plaintiffs disagree with this Court’s ruling that they are not entitled to bring an action under CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607. And with respect to their remaining cause of action under CERCLA § 113, 42 U.S.C. § 9613, Plaintiffs take exception with the accrual rule devised by the Court for the statute of limitations.1
At the outset, this Court reaffirms its ruling that the Tenth Circuit has unequivocally decided the question of whether a CERCLA § 107 action is available to PRPs, such as Plaintiffs, seeking to reapportion response costs among other PRPs. In United *173 States v. Colorado & Eastern Railroad, 50 F.3d 1530, 1539 (10th Cir.1995), the Tenth Circuit foreclosed § 107 actions to such claimants, and this Court is duty-bound to follow the circuit, notwithstanding Plaintiffs’ public policy arguments to the contrary. United States v. Spedalieri, 910 F.2d 707, 709 n. 2 (10th Cir.1990).
Plaintiffs are therefore limited to a CERCLA § 113 contribution action. This Court held that the three-year statute of limitations for Plaintiffs’ § 113 contribution action accrued once they had paid more than their fair share of the common liability. Plaintiffs disagree. They advance an interpretation of CERCLA whereby the statute of limitations potentially would never accrue against PRPs, such as Plaintiffs, who incur response costs pursuant to a § 106 unilateral administrative order. In other words, under Plaintiffs’ literal construction of the statute, CERCLA provides for a three-year statute of limitations for contribution actions that in some instances never begin to run.
This position is untenable in light of both general principles of law and the structure and purpose of the CERCLA statute. The Supreme Court has explained,
Statutes of limitations ... represent a pervasive legislative judgment that it is unjust to fail to put the adversary on notice to defend within a specified period of time and that “the right to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them.” Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 349, 64 S.Ct. 582, 586, 88 L.Ed. 788 (1944). These enactments are statutes of repose; and although affording plaintiffs what the legislature deems a reasonable time to present their claims, they protect defendants and the courts from having to deal with cases in which the search for truth may be seriously impaired by the loss of evidence, whether by death or disappearance of witnesses, fading memories, disappearance of documents, or otherwise. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 322, n. 14, 92 S.Ct. 455, 464, n. 14, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971); Burnett v. New York Central R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 428, 85 S.Ct. 1050, 1054, 13 L.Ed.2d 941 (1965); Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314, 65 S.Ct. 1137, 1142, 89 L.Ed. 1628 (1945); Missouri K. & T.R. Co. v. Harriman, 227 U.S. 657, 672, 33 S.Ct. 397, 401, 57 L.Ed. 690 (1913); Bell v. Morrison, 1 Pet. 351, 360, 7 L.Ed. 174 (1828).
United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117, 100 S.Ct. 352, 356, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979).
These principles clearly informed the drafting of CERCLA, which establishes specific and definite statutes of limitations for the various causes of actions available under its terms. This Court held, therefore, that to construe the statute, as Plaintiffs do, to give a certain species of claimants unlimited time to bring a contribution action would frustrate CERCLA’s legislative purpose. Consequently, this Court endeavored to interpret the CERCLA statute in a manner consistent with its overriding purpose in order to avoid such an absurd result. Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575, 102 S.Ct. 3245, 3251, 73 L.Ed.2d 973 (1982) (holding interpretations of a statute which would produce absurd results are to be avoided if alternative interpretations consistent with the legislative purpose are available). Referring to federal common law for guidance in deriving an operable statute of limitations for actions such as Plaintiffs’, see Baker v. Bd. of Regents, Kansas, 991 F.2d 628, 632 (10th Cir.1993), this Court held that the statute of limitations for Plaintiffs’ contribution action would accrue once they had paid more than their fair share of the common liability. See Sea Land Service, Inc. v. United States, 874 F.2d 169, 171 (3rd Cir.1989).
Plaintiffs assert that it is unfair and inconsistent with CERCLA’s statutory scheme to trigger a three-year statute of limitations against a party who has incurred response costs “prior to a fixed determination of liability.” (Plaint.Br.Mot.Recon. at 6.) This Court does not agree. Parties who have incurred response costs pursuant to an EPA unilateral administrative order have ample notice that they must seek contribution from other PRPs. Under the accrual rule devised by this Court, such parties have more than three years from the issuance of the order to file their contribution action—that is, three years in addition to the time it takes to *174expend more than their fair share.2 Nor is it inconsistent with the operation of CERCLA to trigger the statute of limitations before liability is “fixed.” CERCLA, as amended by the Superfund Amendment and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (“SARA”), 100 Stat. 1613 (1986), fully anticipates that the total extent of liability may not be known at the time of litigation and therefore provides mechanisms such as declaratory relief, see § 113(g)(2)(B), to establish liability for costs to be incurred in the future. See Kelley v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours and Co., 17 F.3d 836, 844-A5 (6th Cir.1994).3
For the reasons explained herein, Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.