Kenneth W. Kennison appeals an order adjudging him to be a juvenile offender guilty of robbery in the first degree.
The sole issue presented on this appeal is whether the adjudicatory hearing was held within the time required by JuCR 7.8.1 We answer in the affirmative.
On August 28, 1978, a Seattle grocery store was robbed and Kennison was identified as one of the participants. On September 26, 1978, an information was filed charging Kennison with first-degree robbery and asking the juvenile court to decline jurisdiction in the case. Kennison's arraignment on this and another unrelated charge was held on September 27, 1978. At the arraignment defense counsel asked that the decline hearing be set off for no less than 5 weeks because the case required considerable investigation. The decline hearing was set for November 15, 1978, and jurisdiction was retained on that date. On November 15, *3981978, after the decline hearing, the trial court set the adjudication hearing for December 14, 1978, without objection by Kennison's counsel.2
On December 7,1978, Kennison filed a motion to dismiss for denial of a speedy trial. The motion was subsequently denied on the ground that defense counsel violated his duty to correct the court when the erroneous trial date was set. The trial court found Kennison guilty of first-degree robbery.
The language of JuCR 7.8 is similar to that of former CrR 3.33 prior to its 1978 amendment. Whenever possible, similar provisions in speedy trial rules applicable to the superior courts and courts of limited jurisdiction should be construed in a consistent manner. State v. Mack, 89 WN.2d 788, 576 P.2d 44 (1978). This same policy applies when considering juvenile court rules. Under former CrR 3.3, counsel had no duty to inform the court of a violation of the speedy trial time limits. State v. White, 23 Wn. App. 438, 441-42, 597 P.2d 420 (1979). Counsel, therefore, has no *399such duty under similarly worded JuCR 7.8. Although the trial court erroneously found such a duty when denying the motion to dismiss, we affirm that ruling on other grounds. State v. Carroll, 81 Wn.2d 95, 500 P.2d 115 (1972).
A decline hearing on a felony must occur within 14 days after the information is filed, but that time may be. extended for good cause. JucR 8.1(b).4 The time necessarily involved in hearing pretrial proceedings is not excluded from the computation of the time for trial or adjudication hearing unless the time for that proceeding is specially named as an excluded period in the rule. State v. DeLong, 16 Wn. App. 452, 455, 557 P.2d 14 (1976). JuCR 7.8 does not expressly exclude the time required for a decline hearing, and therefore the 14 days in which the decline hearing should occur are not excluded. Delays of that hearing, however, are excluded when they are granted by the court on the motion of the alleged offender on a showing of good cause. JuCR 7.8(c)(3) and (d)(1); State v. Dowell, 16 Wn. App. 583, 557 P.2d 857 (1976).
Fourteen days after the filing of the information was October 10, 1978. The delay caused by the defense request for a delayed setting of the decline hearing was from October 10 until November 15, a period of 36 days. The adjudicatory hearing began on December 14, 1978, 78 days after arraignment. Exclusion of 36 days, however, places the hearing on the 42nd day, well within the 60-day time limit in JuCR 7.8.
*400Affirmed.
Callow, C.J., and James, J., concur.