The “first sale doctrine” in copyright law permits the owner of a lawfully purchased copy of a copyrighted work to resell it without limitations imposed by the copy*212right holder.1 The existence of the doctrine dates to 1908, when the Supreme Court held that the owner of a copyright could not impose price controls on sales of copies of a copyrighted work beyond the initial sale.2 Congress codified the doctrine in successive Copyright Acts, beginning with the Copyright Act of 1909.3
The principal question presented in this appeal is whether the first sale doctrine, 17 U.S.C. § 109(a), applies to copies of copyrighted works produced outside of the United States but imported and resold in the United States. Under another basic copyright statute, it is ordinarily the case that “[importation into the United States, without the authority of the owner of copyright under [the Copyright Act], of copies ... of a work that have been acquired outside the United States is an infringement of the [owner’s] exclusive right to distribute copies....” 4
Defendant contends, however, that individuals may import and resell books manufactured abroad pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 109(a), which provides that “the owner of a particular copy ... lawfully made under [the Copyright Act], or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy.”
Defendant’s claim is an issue of first impression in our Court.5
BACKGROUND
A. The Parties
Plaintiff-appellee John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (“plaintiff’ or “Wiley”) is the publisher of academic, scientific, and educational journals and books, including textbooks, for sale in domestic and international markets. Wiley relies upon a wholly-owned *213subsidiary, John Wiley & Sons (Asia) Pte Ltd. (“Wiley Asia”), to manufacture books for sale in foreign countries.6 While the written content of bo.oks for the domestic and international markets is often similar or identical, books intended for international markets can differ from the domestic version in design, supplemental content (such as accompanying CD-ROMS), and the type and quality of materials used for printing, including “thinner paper and different bindings, different cover and jacket designs, fewer internal ink colors, if any, [and] lower quality photographs and graphics.” Joint App’x at 18. The foreign editions, moreover, are marked with a legend to designate that they are to be sold only in a particular country or geographic region. One example of such a designation reads as follows:
Authorized for sale in Europe, Asia, Africa and the Middle East Only.
This book is authorized for sale in Europe, Asia, Africa and the Middle East only [and] may not be exported. Exportation from or importation of this book to another region without the Publisher’s authorization is illegal and is a violation of the Publisher’s rights. The Publisher may take legal action to enforce its rights. The Publisher may recover damages and costs, including but not limited to lost profits and attorney’s fees, in the event legal action is required.
Joint App’x at 406 (emphasis in original).
Defendant Supap Kirtsaeng (“defendant” or “Kirtsaeng”) moved to the United States from Thailand in 1997 to pursue an undergraduate degree in mathematics at Cornell University. According to Kirtsaeng, he later moved to California to pursue a doctoral degree.
B. The Instant Action
To help subsidize the cost of his education, Kirtsaeng allegedly participated in the following scheme: Between 2007 and September 8, 2008, Kirtsaeng’s friends and family shipped him foreign edition textbooks printed abroad by Wiley Asia. In turn, Kirtsaeng sold these textbooks on commercial websites such as eBay.com. Using the revenues generated from the sales, Kirtsaeng would reimburse his family and friends for the costs that they incurred during the process of acquiring and shipping the books and then keep any remaining profits for himself. Kirtsaeng claims that, before selling the textbooks, he sought advice from friends in Thailand and consulted “Google Answers,” a website which allows web users to seek research help from other web users, to ensure that he could legally resell the foreign editions in the United States.
On September 8, 2008, Wiley filed this action against Kirtsaeng in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Donald C. Pogue, Judge of the United States Court of International Trade, sitting by designation), claiming, among other things, copyright infringement under 17 U.S.C. § 501,7 *214trademark infringement under 15 U.S.C. § 1114(a), and unfair competition under New York state law.8 Wiley sought a preliminary and permanent injunction under 17 U.S.C. § 502(a),9 and statutory damages under 17 U.S.C. § 504(c).10
C. Relevant Pre-Trial Proceedings
In anticipation of trial, Kirtsaeng submitted proposed jury instructions charging that the first sale doctrine was a defense to copyright infringement. By Order dated October 9, 2009, the District Court prohibited Kirtsaeng from raising this defense and rejected the applicability of the first sale doctrine to foreign editions of textbooks, holding that “[t]here is no indication that the imported books at issue here were manufactured pursuant to the U.S. Copyright Act ... [and,] [t]o the contrary, the textbooks introduced as evidence purport, on their face, to have been published outside of the United States.”11
On October 23, 2009 and November 3, 2009, Kirtsaeng filed-motions in limine to preclude the introduction at trial of (1) his online “PayPal” sales records, and specifically, evidence of his gross revenues from the sales of the foreign editions of Wiley’s books, and (2) the profits he earned on unrelated sales activities. From the bench during a pre-trial conference on November 3, 2009, the District Court granted the motions in part and denied them in part. The Court explained that Wiley could not introduce evidence of profits earned by Kirtsaeng from the sales of textbooks produced by other publishers, but “in ... anticipation that the net worth testimony [would indicate] that [Kirtsaeng did not have] significant net worth ... [Wiley’s counsel had the] right to inquire about additional revenues and the profits there*215from and where they went in order to make sure that we had an accurate record about [Kirtsaeng’s] net worth.” Joint App’x at 195. The Court further stated that Wiley’s counsel “must be careful not to refer to these [unrelated] sales in any way as infringing sales, because that would be entirely improper.” Id.
D. Events at Trial
At trial, during direct examination, Wiley’s counsel asked Kirtsaeng, “Now sir, if we were to go back and look at January 1st of 2008, what were your financial assets at that point in time?”
The District Court sustained an objection by Kirtsaeng’s counsel and a sidebar discussion followed.
After the sidebar conference and a recess, the first question by Wiley’s counsel to Kirtsaeng was: “Mr. Kirtsaeng, before the break we were talking about your net worth during the period of 1999, correct? Excuse me. 2009.” Kirtsaeng answered “yes.” Wiley’s counsel proceeded to ask Kirtsaeng a series of questions about his “net worth” in an attempt to impeach his previous statements. Specifically, he attempted to enter into evidence a record of Kirtsaeng’s PayPal revenues, showing $1.2 million in revenues, in contrast to Kirtsaeng’s previous testimony that he had earned only $900,000 in revenues. Joint App’x at 295-97.
At a second sidebar conference, during which the jury was excused from the courtroom, the District Court excluded the record of the PayPal evidence as “confusing and unfairly prejudicial.” Id. at 298.
When the jury reentered the courtroom, Wiley’s counsel continued to ask Kirtsaeng about his revenues from eBay sales. Although Kirtsaeng’s counsel immediately objected to the line of questioning on the basis that it had already been “asked and answered” — an objection the District Court initially sustained — the Court subsequently allowed the questioning, explaining that it was uncertain whether the same questions had in fact been asked of the witness earlier in the examination.
At the end of the trial, the District Court charged the jury to determine whether Kirtsaeng had infringed the copyrights of each of eight works and whether any such infringements had been willful. The District Court explained that, under the statutory damages scheme found at 17 U.S.C. § 504(c), see note 10, ante, if the jury found that Kirtsaeng had infringed Wiley’s copyright, it could award no less than $750 and no more than $30,000 in damages for each infringed work.
The District Court identified two exceptions to this rule. First, the District Court instructed the jury that, if it found that Wiley had proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the infringement was willful, under the statutory scheme the jury had the option of awarding up to $150,000 in damages per infringed work. Second, if the jury found that Kirtsaeng had proved by a preponderance of the evidence “that he was not aware and had no reason to believe that his acts constituted an infringement of copyright,” the jury could choose to impose an award of statutory damages as low as $200 per infringed work. The jury ultimately found Kirtsaeng liable for willful copyright infringement of all eight works and imposed damages of $75,000 for each of the eight works.
Kirtsaeng filed a timely notice of appeal. He claims that (1) the District Court erred in holding that the first sale doctrine was not an available defense in the circumstances presented; (2) the District Court should have advised the jury of the first sale doctrine as a defense to the claim of willful infringement; and (3) with respect to the jury’s assessment of statutory dam*216ages, the admission into evidence of testimony regarding the amount of Kirtsaeng’s gross receipts was unduly prejudicial.
DISCUSSION
A. The first sale doctrine does not apply to goods produced outside of the United States.
1. Standard of review
The threshold question is whether, pursuant to § 109(a) of the Copyright Act, see note 1, ante, the District Court correctly determined that the phrase “lawfully made under this title” does not include copyrighted goods manufactured abroad.
Where the decision of a district court “presents only a legal issue of statutory interpretation ... [w]e review de novo whether the district court correctly interpreted the statute.” 12
2. Interpreting the First-Sale Doctrine
In the Copyright Act of 1976, Congress enacted what is now 17 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1).13 That section provides:
Importation into the United States, without the authority of the owner of copyright under this title, of copies or phonorecords of a work that have been acquired outside the United States is an infringement of the exclusive right to distribute copies or phonorecords under section 106, actionable under section 501.
Even if the conduct at issue in this case is otherwise covered by this statutory language, Kirtsaeng contends that he is shielded from any liability under the Copyright Act by § 109(a), see note 1, ante. Again, in relevant part, that section provides: “Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3) [of the Copyright Act], the owner of a particular copy ... lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy.” Section 109(a) is a codification of the longstanding “first sale doctrine.” 14
*217There is at least some tension between § 602(a)(1), which seemingly seeks to give copyright holders broad control over the circumstances in which their copyrighted material may be imported (directly or indirectly) into the United States, and § 109(a), which limits the extent to which the copyright holder may limit distribution following an initial sale. The Supreme Court first had occasion to address the interplay between § 602(a)(1) and § 109(a) in Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L’anza Research International, Inc.15
Quality King involved the sales practices of L’anza Research International, a California corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling shampoos, conditioners, and other hair care products. L’anza sold its products domestically and internationally, but its prices to foreign distributors were 35% to 40% lower than the prices charged to its domestic distributors. L’anza brought suit against Quality King Distributors, Inc., which had purchased shipments of L’anza’s products from one of L’anza’s foreign distributors and then re-imported the products into the United States for re-sale. L’anza alleged that Quality King’s actions violated its “exclusive rights under 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 501 and 602 to reproduce and distribute the copyrighted material in the United States.”16 The Supreme Court heard the case in order to decide the question of “whether the ‘first sale’ doctrine endorsed in § 109(a) is applicable to imported copies.” 17
In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court held that § 109(a), operating in combination with § 106(3), does in fact limit the scope of § 602(a).18 However, there was a key factual difference at work in Quality King that is of critical importance to our disposition of the instant appeal. In Quality King, the copyrighted items in question had all been manufactured in the United States. Indeed, this important fact provided the basis for Justice Ginsburg’s brief concurring opinion, in which she explained: “This case involves a ‘round trip’ journey, travel of the copies in question from the United States to places abroad, then back again. I join the Court’s opinion recognizing that we do not today resolve cases in which the allegedly infringing imports were manufactured abroad.”19
Although the majority opinion did not directly address the question of whether § 109(a) can apply to items manufactured *218abroad, the opinion contains instructive dicta that guides our disposition of the issue. In particular, the Court took pains to explain ways in which § 109(a) and § 602(a) do, and do not, overlap. As the Court stated: “[AJlthough both the first sale doctrine embodied in § 109(a) and the exceptions in § 602(a) may be applicable in some situations, the former does not subsume the latter; those provisions retain significant independent meaning.”20 For instance, § 602(a) “encompasses copies that are not subject to the first sale doctrine — e.g., copies that are lawfully made under the law of another country!.]”21 The Court even pondered the following hypothetical:
If the author of [a] work gave the exclusive United States distribution rights — enforceable under the Act — to the publisher of the United States edition and the exclusive British distribution rights to the publisher of the British edition, ... presumably only those made by the publisher of the U.S. edition would be ‘lawfully made under this title’ within the meaning of § 109(a). The first sale doctrine would not provide the publisher of the British edition who decided to sell in the American market with a defense to an action under § 602(a) (or, for that matter, to an action under § 106(3), if there was a distribution of the copies).22
In these passages, the Court suggests that copyrighted material manufactured abroad cannot be subject to the first sale doctrine contained in § 109(a).
The Supreme Court recently seemed poised to transform this dicta into holding when it granted a writ of certiorari to review the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp.23 That case involved the importation into the United States of Omega-brand watches by unidentified third parties without the permission of Omega;' the watches were ultimately purchased and resold by Costco Wholesale Corporation. The' Ninth Circuit maintained its well-settled position that § 109(a) does not apply to items manufactured outside of the United States unless they were previously imported and sold in the United States with' the copyright holder’s permission.24 After hearing oral argument, an equally divided Supreme Court (with Justice Kagan recused) was obliged to affirm the judgment rendered by the Ninth Circuit.25
Without further guidance from the Supreme Court, we now consider the extent to which the protections set forth in § 109(a) may apply to items manufactured abroad. In doing so, we rely on the text of § 109(a), the structure of the Copyright Act, and the Supreme Court’s opinion in Quality King.
8. Textual Analysis
We start, of course, by turning to the statutory language enacted by Congress. “Statutory interpretation always begins with the plain language of the statute, assuming the statute is unambiguous.” 26 In the instant case, we are principally called upon to give meaning to the *219phrase “lawfully made under this title” contained in § 109(a).27
In arriving at a satisfactory textual interpretation of the statutory language at issue, we focus primarily on the words “made” and “under,” but this task is complicated by two factors: (1) the word “made” is not a term of art in the Copyright Act,28 and (2) “[t]he word ‘under’ is [a] chameleon” and courts “must draw its meaning from its context.”29 Wiley contends that we must interpret “lawfully made under this title” to mean “lawfully made in the United States.” This view of the law — which was also adopted by the United States in its amicus brief before the Supreme Court in Cosico30 — is certainly consistent with the text of § 109(a).31 It is also the logical consequence, Wiley submits, of the general presumption against the extraterritorial application of statutes,32 a presumption which we have specifically applied to the copyright laws.33 Wiley argues that Title 17 only applies in the United States, and thus, copyrighted items can only be “made” under that title if they were physically made in this country.
But the extraterritorial application of Title 17 is more complicated than Wiley allows, since certain provisions in Title 17 explicitly take account of activity occurring abroad. Most notably, § 104(b)(2) provides that “[t]he works specified by sections 102 and 103, when published, are subject to protection under this title if the work is first published in the United States or in a foreign nation that, on the date of first publication, is a treaty party[.]”34 because § 104(b)(2) provides that copyright protection can apply to works published in foreign nations, it is possible to interpret § 109(a)’s “lawfully *220made under this title” language to mean, in effect, “any work that is subject to protection under this title.”
There are other reasons why a textual analysis alone is not sufficient to support Wiley’s preferred reading of § 109(a). Most obviously, if Congress had intended the first sale doctrine — at least as codified by § 109(a) — to apply only to copies of works made in the United States, it could have easily written the statute to say precisely that.35 Moreover, “lawfully made under this title” appears in other provisions of Title 17 where it is at least arguable that Congress intended this language to apply to copies of works manufactured outside of the United States. For instance, § 1006(a)(1) of the Audio Home Recording Act provides for applicable royalty payments to be made to “any interested copyright party whose musical work or sound recording has been embodied in a digital musical recording or an analog musical recording lawfully made under this title that has been distributed....”36 It is the view of the U.S. Copyright Office that distribution of royalty payments under this Act is not limited to those recordings manufactured in the United States.37
But while a textual reading of § 109(a) does not compel the result favored by Wiley, it does not foreclose it either. The relevant text is simply unclear. “[Ljawfully made under this title” could plausibly be interpreted to mean any number of things, including: (1) “manufactured in the United States,” (2) “any work made that is subject to protection under this title,” or (3) “lawfully made under this title had this title been applicable.”38
lp. Section 602(a)(1) and Quality King
Confronted with an utterly ambiguous text, we think it best to adopt an interpretation of § 109(a) that best comports with both § 602(a)(1) and the Supreme Court’s opinion in Quality King.39
*221Section 602(a)(1) prohibits the importation into the United States of copies of copyrighted works acquired abroad without the authorization of the copyright holder. This provision is obviously intended to allow copyright holders some flexibility to divide or treat differently the international and domestic markets for the particular copyrighted work. If the first sale doctrine codified in § 109(a) only applies to copyrighted copies manufactured domestically, copyright holders would still have a free hand — subject, of course, to other relevant exceptions enumerated in Title 17, such as those in §§ 107, 108, and 602(a)(3) — to control the circumstances in which copies manufactured abroad could be legally imported into the United States. On the other hand, the mandate of § 602(a)(1) — that “[ijmportation into the United States, without the authority of the owner of copyright under [the Copyright Act], of copies ... of a work that have been acquired outside the United States is an infringement of the [owner’s] exclusive right to distribute copies” — would have no force in the vast majority of cases if the first sale doctrine was interpreted to apply to every copy manufactured abroad that was either made “subject to protection under Title 17,” or “consistent with the requirements of Title 17 had Title 17 been applicable.”40 This reading of the Copyright Act militates in favor of finding that § 109(a) only applies to domestically manufactured works. While the Ninth Circuit in Omega held that § 109(a) also applies to foreign-produced copies of works sold in the United States with the permission of the copyright holder, that holding relied on Ninth Circuit precedents not adopted by other courts of appeals. Accordingly, while perhaps a close call, we think that, in light of its necessary interplay with § 602(a)(1), § 109(a) is best interpreted as applying only to copies manufactured domestically.
In adopting this view, we are comforted by the fact that our interpretation of § 109(a) is one that the Justices appear to have had in mind when deciding Quality King. There, the Court reasoned, admittedly in dicta, that § 602(a)(1) had a broader scope than § 109(a) because, at least in part, § 602(a)(1) “applies to a category of copies that are neither piratical nor ‘lawfully made under this title.’ That category encompasses copies that were ‘lawfully made’ not under the United States Copyright Act, but instead, under the law of some other country.”41 This last sentence indicates that, in the Court’s view, copies “lawfully made” under the laws of a foreign country—though perhaps not produced in violation of any United States laws—are not necessarily “lawfully made” insofar as that phrase is used in § 109(a) of our Copyright Act.42
*222Applying these principles to the facts of this case, we conclude that the District Court correctly decided that Kirtsaeng could not avail himself of the first sale doctrine codified by § 109(a) since all the books in question were manufactured outside of the United States.43 In sum, we hold that the phrase “lawfully made under this Title” in § 109(a) refers specifically and exclusively to copies that are made in territories in which the Copyright Act is law, and not to foreign-manufactured works.44
We freely acknowledge that this is a particularly difficult question of statutory construction in light of the ambiguous language of § 109(a), but our holding is supported by the structure of Title 17 as well as the Supreme Court’s opinion in Quality King. If we have misunderstood Congressional purpose in enacting the first sale doctrine, or if our decision leads to policy consequences that were not foreseen by Congress or which Congress now finds unpalatable, Congress is of course able to correct our judgment.
B. The District Court did not err in its instructions to the jury.
“We review jury instructions de novo, and reverse only when the charge, viewed as a whole, constitutes prejudicial error.”45 Kirtsaeng claims that the District Court erred by rejecting proposed jury instructions that acknowledged that the applicability of the first sale doctrine to foreign-produeed goods was an unresolved question in the federal courts. Specifically, Kirtsaeng argues that he was prejudiced by the Court’s failure to charge that the first sale doctrine was an unsettled area of law because the charge was *223essential to his argument that he had performed pre-sale internet research regarding the legality of his sales and therefore had not “willfully” infringed the copyrights.
It is undisputed that Kirtsaeng’s counsel did not object to the final jury instructions during trial. “[FJailure to object to a jury instruction ... prior to the jury retiring results in a waiver of that objection.”46 Nonetheless, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 51(d)(2), we “may consider a plain error in the instruction that has not been preserved as required [under Rule 51] if the error affects substantial rights.”
“To constitute plain error, a court’s action must contravene an established rule of law.”47 Kirtsaeng does not meet his burden under this stringent standard. Although the District Court was free to permit the jury to consider the unsettled state of the law in determining whether Kirtsaeng’s conduct was willful,48 we can find no binding authority for the proposition that it was required to do so.49 Furthermore, Kirtsaeng was provided ample opportunity to introduce evidence at trial and to argue to the jury that his internet research had led him to believe that his conduct was not unlawful. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the District Court plainly erred in declining to give Kirtsaeng’s proposed instruction.
C. The District Court did not err in allowing into evidence the amount of defendant’s gross revenues.
Kirtsaeng argues that admission of evidence regarding his gross revenues prejudiced him by confusing the jury as to the amount of damages that should have been awarded to Wiley. He suggests that the majority of his revenues came from the sale of other publishers’ used volumes, many of which were produced in the United States, and claims that because of the evidence of revenues that the judge permitted to be presented to the jury, he was inappropriately forced to pay high statutory damages.
To determine whether evidence of the amount of defendant’s gross revenues was properly admitted, ordinarily we first determine the appropriate standard of review. As stated above, where a party does not contemporaneously object to an evidentiary ruling, that party must demonstrate that the District Court committed “plain error.”50 However, even if a proper objection was asserted in a timely fashion, we accord “considerable deference to a district court’s decision to admit ... evidence” pursuant to Federal Rule of Evi*224403(b)51 and will reverse a district court’s evidentiary ruling only if it constitutes an abuse of discretion.52 When we review a district court’s “judgment regarding the admissibility of a particular piece of evidence under [Federal Rule of Evidence] 403, we generally maximize its probative value and minimize its prejudicial effect.”53 Here, however, we need not reach the question of whether Kirtsaeng’s counsel properly objected to the admission of evidence regarding his gross revenues because we hold that admission of the evidence by the District Court was not error or an abuse of discretion, and certainly not plain error.
At trial, the jury awarded $75,000 in statutory damages per copyrighted work for Kirtsaeng’s willful infringement of eight works. Under the relevant statutory provision, 17 U.S.C. § 504(c), see note 10, ante, the jury could have awarded damages of up to $150,000 per copyrighted work. Because abundant evidence was available to support the jury’s finding of willfulness, the admission of information about Kirtsaeng’s revenues was not prejudicial — that is, the jury could have imposed the same amount of damages without knowledge of Kirtsaeng’s revenues. For example, the books in question clearly stated the following:
This book is authorized for sale [in a foreign region] only and may not be exported out of this region. Exportation from or importation of this book to another region without the Publisher’s authorization, is illegal and is a violation of the Publisher’s rights. The Publisher may take legal action to enforce its rights. The Publisher may recover damages and costs, including but not limited to lost profits and attorney’s fees, in the event legal action is required.
In these circumstances, it does not seem anomalous or extraordinary that the jury made the findings it did, and we see no reason to conclude that the District Court’s decision was improper under Rule 403(b).
CONCLUSION
To summarize, we hold that (1) the first sale doctrine does not apply to copies manufactured outside of the United States; (2) the District Court did not err in declining to instruct the jury regarding the unsettled state of the first sale doctrine; and (3) the District Court did not err in admitting evidence of Kirtsaeng’s gross revenues.
Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.