On March 20, 2000, Robert David Wickham was charged by accusation in the City Court of Atlanta with driving under the influence of alcohol, in violation of OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (1); disobeying a traffic control device, in violation of OCGA § 40-6-20; and failing to obtain a Georgia license within 30 days of becoming a resident, in violation of OCGA § 40-5-20 (a). Wickham moved to dismiss the charges or, in the alternative, to transfer his case to the State Court of Fulton County, contending that there is no proper constitutional basis for the existence of the City Court of Atlanta. The constitutional challenge to the court was denied, and this Court granted Wickham interlocutory review to address his assertion that the City Court of Atlanta is unconstitutional. For the reasons which follow, we affirm the denial of the constitutional challenge.
Wickham enumerates nine errors by the City Court in denying his challenge; however, Wickham’s attack on the constitutionality of the City Court of Atlanta can be summarized as threefold: (1) The City Court, under Ga. L. 1996, p. 627, offends the exclusivity and uniformity provisions of the 1983 Georgia Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. I, Pars. I1 and V;2 alternatively, the enacting provisions of the 1996 *564Act exceed the bounds of permissible legislation under the 1983 Georgia Constitution, Art. XI, Sec. I, Par. IV,3 and the 19674 and *56519865 constitutional amendments under which the City Court existed prior to 1996; (2) the City Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over traffic misdemeanors cannot be justified on the ground that the City Court is a municipal court; and (3) inasmuch as the City Court lacks constitutional existence and jurisdiction under the 1983 Georgia Constitution, its exercise of traffic misdemeanor jurisdiction violates due process under the State and Federal Constitutions.
The City Court of Atlanta, under Ga. L. 1996, p. 627, does not violate the exclusivity and uniformity provisions of the 1983 Georgia Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. I, Pars. I and V.
It is certainly plain, as Wickham contends, that the 1983 Georgia Constitution provides that the judicial power of the state is to be exercised by “magistrate courts, probate courts, juvenile courts, state courts, superior courts, the Court of Appeals, and Supreme Court.” Art. VI, Sec. I, Par. I. And that with the exception of certain preexisting courts, state courts are to have “uniform jurisdiction.” 1983 Ga. Const., Art. VI, Sec. I, Par. V. However, Par. V expressly acknowledges the existence of non-uniform courts, stating that the courts of each class are to have uniform jurisdiction “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this Constitution.” Art. VI, Sec. X, Par. I cites the City Court of Atlanta by name and provides that it, along with other specified courts and administrative agencies having quasi-judicial powers, “shall continue with the same jurisdiction as such courts and agencies have on the effective date of this article until otherwise provided by law.” Furthermore, with certain exceptions, those non-uniform *566courts in existence on June 30, 1983 are not subject to the exclusivity provisions of Article VI. 1983 Ga. Const., Art. VI, Sec. I, Par. I. Thus, the 1983 Georgia Constitution recognizes the existence of the City Court of Atlanta as a non-uniform city court. See Wojcik v. State, 260 Ga. 260 (392 SE2d 525) (1990).
Yet, Wickham claims that the City Court was undermined by the 1996 Act, Ga. L. 1996, p. 627, because the Act violated the requirements governing the establishment of state courts, in that, the 1996 Act, while purporting to create “a system of state courts,” Ga. L. 1996, p. 627, § l,6 pursuant to Article VI, Sec. I, limited the City Court of Atlanta’s subject matter jurisdiction to state laws regarding traffic and “all other crimes and offenses arising out of the same occurrence. . . .”7 Ga. L. 1996, p. 627, § 3.8 Therefore, he argues, by specifying the court as part of a “system of state courts” yet limiting its jurisdiction, the act is inconsistent with the constitutional requirements for the creation of such courts. But this contention is unavailing.
This Court will not presume that the General Assembly intended to enact an unconstitutional law, and when the language of an act is susceptible of a construction that is constitutional, and another that would be unconstitutional, this Court will apply the meaning or construction which will sustain the act. HCA Health Svcs. v. Roach, 265 Ga. 501, 503 (2) (458 SE2d 118) (1995). This Court too must be mindful of the cardinal rule in construing legislative acts, which is to ascertain the legislative intent. Kemp v. City of Claxton, 269 Ga. 173, 175 (1) (496 SE2d 712) (1998). What is more, the various provisions of the Act should be viewed in harmony and in a manner which will not produce an unreasonable or absurd result. Vollrath v. Collins, *567272 Ga. 601, 604 (2) (533 SE2d 57) (2000); Barton v. Atkinson, 228 Ga. 733, 738 (1) (187 SE2d 835) (1972). That is why we decline to accept Wickham’s premise that the phrase “system of state courts” found in the preamble of the 1996 Act amounts to an unconstitutional attempt by the General Assembly to place the City Court of Atlanta in the class of “state court,” under Article VI, Paragraph I, while restricting its jurisdiction.
Certainly under the 1996 Act, by its terms, the City Court is a court authorized “pursuant to the provisions of Article VI, Section I,” Ga. L. 1996, § 1, but as has already been discussed, Article VI, Section I permits certain non-uniform courts in existence on June 30, 1983, as was the City Court of Atlanta. What is more, § 1 of the 1996 Act further states that the City Court of Atlanta is to exist under the 1967 and 1986 constitutional amendments which authorized the City Court of Atlanta prior to the 1996 Act. See also Ga. L. 1996, p. 639, § 29. Thus, the 1996 Act does not attempt to transform the City Court of Atlanta into the exclusive category of a “state court,” but rather continues its existence as a constitutionally sanctioned city court. In fact, the City Court under the 1996 Act has been characterized as a “state-established city court.” See Waller v. State, 231 Ga. App. 323, 324 (498 SE2d 362) (1998); see also City of Lawrenceville v. Davis, 233 Ga. App. 1 (502 SE2d 794) (1998). The -existence of the City Court of Atlanta, pursuant to the 1996 Act, does not offend the exclusivity and uniformity provisions of the 1983 Georgia Constitution.
Moreover, the fact that the City Court of Atlanta remains a city court under the 1996 Act refutes Wickham’s alternate contention that it is outside the constitutional confines of the 1983 Ga. Const., Art. XI, Sec. I, Par. IV, and the 1967 and 1986 constitutional amendments under which the City Court existed prior to 1996.9 Compare Lomax v. Lee, 261 Ga. 575, 579 (3) (408 SE2d 788) (1991). This fact also defeats Wickham’s arguments regarding defects in the City Court as a municipal court under OCGA § 36-32-1. Although OCGA § 36-32-1 (a) refers to the City Court of Atlanta, the City Court is not established pursuant to the statute.10 Rather, it is an entity pre*568served in the 1983 Georgia Constitution11 and carried forth in the 1996 Act.
Decided March 21, 2001.
William C. Head, for appellant.
Joseph J. Drolet, Solicitor, Katherine Diamandis, Assistant Solicitor, for appellee.
The City Court of Atlanta does not lack constitutional existence; therefore, contrary to Wickham’s contention, its exercise of jurisdiction in his case does not run afoul of state or federal due process.
Judgment affirmed.
All the Justices concur.