OPINION
ALDRICH, Senior Circuit Judge.
This is an action brought as a class action, to enjoin, as unconstitutional on its face, the enforcement of a Massachusetts statute, Mass.G.L. c. 112, § 12P, enacted to take effect November 1, 1974, by Mass.Acts 1974, c. 706. The statute makes it a criminal offense to perform an abortion upon a minor without the consent of both parents as well as that of the minor, with certain exceptions, the most important being that the parents’ refusal may be overruled by a superior court judge “for good cause shown.” The pertinent paragraph reads as follows.
“Section 12P(1). If the mother is less than eighteen years of age and has not married, the consent of both the mother and her parents is required. If one or both of the mother’s parents refuse such consent, consent may be obtained by order of a judge of the superior court for good cause shown, after such hearing as he deems necessary. Such a hearing will not require the appointment of a guardian for the mother.”
Standing.
Plaintiffs are William Baird; Mary Moe I, hereinafter Mary Moe;1 Parents Aid Society, Inc., hereinafter Parents Aid, and Gerald Zupnick. Defendants are Francis Bellotti, Attorney General of the Commonwealth;2 Garrett Byrne, district attorney for the County of Suffolk, and the district attorneys' of all other counties in Massachusetts. Intervening defendants are Kathleen Roth et al., whom we permitted to intervene on behalf of, and as representatives of, Massachusetts parents *850having unmarried minor daughters who are, or who might become,3 pregnant. No evidence or stipulation was introduced as to any intervenors except Jane Hunerwadel. To be consistent, n. 1, ante, we must dismiss as to all the others. Mrs. Hunerwadel has three minor daughters, one in her teens, none pregnant as far as she knows. Like defendants, she does not know the identity of Mary Moe, and represents her only in the general sense that she may represent parents of all nubile minor females in Massachusetts who may, in their opinion unwisely or improperly, wish to have an abortion without informing them.
Plaintiff Mary Moe is an unmarried minor residing at home with her parents in Massachusetts. At the time of the institution of the action she was 16 years of age and about 8 weeks pregnant.4 She has not informed her parents of her condition, and does not wish to. Her father had told her, in connection with the pregnancy of a contemporary friend, that if that happened to her he would evict her and kill her boy friend. She did not know how far to believe this, except that she felt certain he would take some physical action against the boy. The boy, also 16, was a three-months acquaintance with whom she is no longer associating. Her relations with and affection for her family are “average good.” There was no sexual instruction, no one caring to initiate the subject. There is no religious factor. She knew vaguely about contraception, but had no access to materials, and “didn’t care to wait until [she] was 18.” Her reasons for not informing her parents were in part apprehension of what might .happen to her as a result of their learning she had had intercourse, in part the fear of what would happen to her boy friend, and in part the desire to spare her parents' feelings. She did confide in her older sister. Pregnancy would not have kept her from attending school.5
In connection with Mary Moe's capacity to represent a plaintiff class, F.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(4), we find, following examination and cross-examination in camera, that she is of average intelligence and awareness; that her emotional age at least corresponds with her chronological age, and that she had made a considered decision, before she learned of her pregnancy, that in case of pregnancy she would seek to abort, and that she was competent to make and effectuate that decision. If relevant, she did not learn of the other plaintiffs until someone else had determined that she was pregnant. We find that she is fairly representative of a substantial class of unmarried minors in Massachusetts who have adequate capacity to give a valid and informed consent, and who do not wish to involve their parents. This, of course, requires standing, but there can be no *851question of Mary Moe’s standing to bring this action. Though the statute does not in terms subject her to criminal liability, its enforcement6 would prevent her, absent violation by someone, from obtaining an abortion without compliance with its terms. Thus, she exhibits “such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues,” Baker v. Carr, 1962, 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S.Ct. 691, 703, 7 L.Ed.2d 663, thereby demonstrating “a logical nexus . . . between the status asserted by the litigant and the claim [she] presents . . . .” Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 1953, 20 L.Ed.2d 947. See Roe v. Wade, ante, 410 U.S. at 124, 93 S.Ct. 705. Abele v. Markle, 2 Cir., 1971, 452 F.2d 1121, 1125.7
Plaintiff William Baird is the founder and director of plaintiff Parents Aid. He describes himself as being, among other things, a pioneer and advocate for the free availability of abortions. He has a strong personal interest in that sense, but no financial or other tangible concern. But cf. Sierra Club v. Morton, 1972, 405 U.S. 727, 738, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 31 L.Ed.2d 636; Data Processing Service v. Camp, 1970, 397 U.S. 150, 154, 90 S.Ct. 827, 25 L.Ed.2d 184. Baird claims standing because he wishes to assist Parents Aid, which allegedly, if the statute were in force, would make him an accessory. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 1965, 381 U.S. 479, 481, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510. Arguably, this is too remote an interest to confer standing. If any citizen who might like to violate a law may contest it, the doctrine of standing would be meaningless. Cf. Roe v. Wade, ante, 410 U.S. at 128, 93 S.Ct. 705, and cases cited. On the other hand, Baird’s contemplated activities are far less speculative than those there found insufficient. As director of Parents Aid, Baird for some time has provided minors with abortion counseling and services, and the mere continuation of this activity, the mere preservation of the status quo, would subject him to criminal liability. Cf. Griswold, ante, 381 U.S. at 481, 85 S.Ct. 1678; Abele, ante, 452 F.2d at 1125. In the light of the unassailable standing of other plaintiffs, however, see post, we do not pass on the question of Baird’s standing.
Plaintiff Parents Aid is organized as a Massachusetts non-profit corporation. It provides, through its medical director and supporting personnel, abortions for varying fees, depending upon ability to pay. About 15% it performs without charge. The Society’s standing is conferred not only by its direct subjection to criminal liability, but also by the recognition that even general enforcement of the statute against physicians alone would seriously interfere with its ongoing activities. Doe v. Bolton, 1973, 410 U.S. 179, 188, 93 S.Ct. 739, 35 L.Ed.2d 201; Truax v. Raich, 1915, 239 U.S. 33, 38-39, 36 S.Ct. 7, 60 L.Ed. 131.
Plaintiff Gerald Zupnick, a resident of New York, is a physician licensed in Massachusetts, and is Parents Aid’s medical director. He works regularly at the latter’s place of business two days a week, performing abortions on a fee basis. Dr. Zupnick’s standing in this action is beyond question. The statute at issue applies directly to his activities, *852and although Dr. Zupnick was receiving a substantial income from performing these procedures, we credit his testimony that the threat of prosecution would force him to cease.
We find that Mary Moe, Parents Aid Society, Inc., and Gerald Zupnick have standing, as representative party plaintiffs, and Jane Hunerwadel as intervenor. From the standpoint of their being due and adequate class representatives, we find they have a strong personal interest and are competently and vigorously represented by legal counsel, and we certify this as a valid class action as to all.
Before leaving the question of standing we note that Parents Aid and Dr. Zupnick by hypothesis cannot lawfully, with exceptions too unusual for us to be concerned with, perform abortions upon minors incapable of consenting. Nonetheless, we hold that they do have standing to attack the statute as applied to all minors, at least insofar as it requires the consent of both parents. We find nothing about abortions that requires the minor’s interest to be treated differently from other medical and surgical procedures, as to which we find the custom to be to proceed on the consent of one parent.
Controversy.
Defendants contend that there is no “case or controversy” because none of the plaintiffs has been actively, or affirmatively, threatened with criminal proceedings. However, this is not the test. Plaintiffs need not act so as to precipitate their prosecution under a statute they wish to challenge as unconstitutional in order to constitute a case or controversy. Nor must they show that prosecution has been actively or verbally threatened in order to establish that the government’s posture is adverse. See Doe v. Bolton, ante, 410 U.S. at 188, 93 S.Ct. 739. Rather, we must make a realistic appraisal of the total circumstances to determine whether the prospect of enforcement of the statute is “chimerical,” Steffel v. Thompson, 1974, 415 U.S. 452, 459, 94 S.Ct. 1209, 39 L.Ed.2d 505, or “concrete,” Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 1937, 300 U.S. 227, 240, 57 S.Ct. 461, 81 L.Ed. 617. Cf. Younger v. Harris, 1971, 401 U.S. 37, 42, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669; Abele, ante, 452 F.2d at 1125; Montalvo v. Colon, D.P.R., 1974, 377 F.Supp, 1332, 1334 (per curiam). We find that the subject of abortions has excited a great amount of feeling in Massachusetts; that the defendants, as is evident from their activities in this case, are satisfied that the statute is constitutional; that there will be extensive pressure upon them to prosecute in case of a violation, and that it is highly improbable that they would not immediately respond to such pressures. Baird testified that he had been arrested without warning in connection with the Massachusetts birth control statute, so-called, and we believe that public opposition to abortion is more organized and more vocal than was the opposition to birth control. Under all the circumstances we find that plaintiffs had every reason to believe that they had only two alternatives, to continue their current activities and face immediate arrest, or to bring the present suit.
The “controversy” requirement, like the standing requirement, is to assure that there will be a vigorous contest with active participation on both sides by parties immediately interested, as distinguished from parties engaging in theoretical disputes as an intellectual pastime. See Roe v. Wade, ante, 410 U.S. at 123, 93 S.Ct. 705; Golden v. Zwickler, 1969, 394 U.S. 103, 108, 89 S.Ct. 956, 22 L.Ed.2d 113; Maryland Cas. Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 1941, 312 U.S. 270, 273, 61 S.Ct. 510, 85 L.Ed. 826. It is correspondingly requisite that the court’s time not be wasted. We find that the present case fits the requirements in both respects, and hold that there is a sufficient controversy.
The Underlying Facts.
We were offered nearly three days of testimony. The principal purpose, as we *853gather it, was to demonstrate on the one side the need, and on the other the objections; the interests served, and the interests countered, by the statute. In some areas there was considerable disagreement between the experts. We do not propose to resolve those disagreements. Even though in some instances our findings might not correspond with defendants’ experts, we may accept their factual evidence for present purposes in cases of conflict because, either way, our ultimate conclusions would be the same. It is to be understood that throughout this opinion, unless the contrary is noted, we are talking about abortions during the first trimester.
There are presently three common methods of performing an abortion; injection of a saline solution; the so-called vacuum method, and a hysterotomy. The first two are performed under local anesthesia. The vacuum procedure, apparently the one generally performed by Dr. Zupniek, requires five to seven minutes. It is followed by minor bleeding and occasional pains, spanning perhaps three to six weeks. There is a possibility of infection and other complications, as with any procedure, and there is a possibility, minor, or very remote, depending on whose testimony is accepted, of subsequent sterility. Plaintiffs’ doctors, who had performed a very substantial number of first trimester abortions, gave a very low percentage of complications or “morbidity” in the case of lawful, as distinguished from illicitly performed abortions. Defendants’ doctor’s considerably higher figure we attribute to the fact that he does not do abortions as such, but only “terminates pregnancy” when there is already some medical necessity. Even he did not suggest any greater risks for minors than for adults.
In addition to such physiological risks, there are possible emotional risks. Abortion is commonly looked upon as offering “instant relief.” In many cases this may be so, but in some it may be followed by various feelings of guilt. We also respect defendants’ expert’s view that it is undesirable to make too speedy a decision. At the same time we note his opinion that this decision, as the minor reaches the end of the first trimester, has great psychological as well as medical weight, and should be made as soon as possible.
All experts agreed that pregnancy in an unmarried minor is a period of great emotional stress; that support is needed, and that parental support, if forthcoming, is most desirable. Probably most parents are supportive. We are obliged to find, however, that an appreciable number are not, for a variety of reasons. Moreover, as may be the case with Mary Moe’s father, parents may seek to control sexual behavior by threats that they do not mean, or would not carry out in the actual eventuality, but which nonetheless serve to destroy intercommunication.
We must find, however, that a significant number of minors who are capable of consenting are unwilling to tell their parents, either because they correctly fear what would happen to themselves, or, although they would expect support from their parents in one sense, they know their parents would under no circumstances consent to the abortion they wish, or, because of their views on illegitimacy and the stigma attaching to unmarried mothers, would attempt to make them enter into a marriage they do not want.
There are also minors who, understandably, do not wish to have their parents know of their condition because of the distress that it would cause them, and the minor’s own consequent feelings. While we shall not deal with this aspect further, we note that in a very real sense it precisely fits standard concepts of the right of privacy.
From the standpoint of parents, we believe that most would wish to know of their daughter’s pregnancy, and we may assume that most would seek to be supportive. However, we cannot think that all would be. We accept the testimony *854of plaintiffs’ experienced expert that some parents would insist upon the continuance of the pregnancy simply as a punishment, or to teach a lesson. We might find difficulty in regarding this reaction as other than unusual if we did not recall that the Commonwealth itself argued in Baird v. Eisenstadt, 1 Cir., 1970, 429 F.2d 1398, 1401, aff’d, 405 U.S. 438, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 31 L.Ed.2d 349, that the prevention of fornication is so important that it justified withholding birth control devices from unmarried adults, with the resultant risk of pregnancy. The fact that the Court of Appeals expressed shock at this view does not mean it does not exist, but merely illustrates the degrees of variance and the strength of opinions on this subject.
Of unquestionable numerical importance, we cannot overlook the fact that many parents believe with total sincerity that abortion is morally impermissible, either under all circumstances or unless to save the life of the pregnant woman. This leads to the significant contention pressed upon us by defendants as well as by intervenor, that some parents believe that they have separate rights as parents, and that there is a family interest, separate and apart from that of the minor. These interests, which are asserted to be of constitutional proportions, they variously describe as “parents’ liberties;” the parents’ right to “control,” and their right to “promote and preserve the family as an important societal unit.” These rights being, by hypothesis, antithetical to the minor’s, it may not be unnatural for the minor to feel that she is in trouble enough without having to become subservient to claims of others.
We have not stated all of the factual issues in this difficult area, but we believe we have stated enough to delineate the issues for present purposes. More facts will appear later when relevant.
The Minor’s Consent.
The greatest divergence in the testimony related to the capacity of minors to given an informed consent.8 At one extreme, Baird testified that in his many years experience he had never met a minor who was incapable, a conclusion supportable only on a hypothesis, which we reject, that an abortion, if not medically contra-indicated, is always the best solution, so that a minor who wants one must be presumed capable. We are also not impressed by the observation in Washington v. Koome, 1975, 84 Wash.2d 901, 530 P.2d 260, which recognized a 16-year old’s consent, that “[t]he age of fertility provides a practical minimum age requirement for consent to abortion, reducing the need for a legal one.” Fertility marks a physical, not emotional or intellectual maturity, and a “fertile” minor may become pregnant precisely because she lacks the capacity to reason and consent maturely. No expert testified that every minor of any age was able to make a considered decision.9 Of necessity, there will be factual questions to weigh in each case.
Plaintiffs’ experts were of the view that a majority of 16 and 17 year olds are capable. Defendants’ experts, although they felt that essentially all are capable at 18, considered the 18th birthday a significant turning point, and would concede only a substantial minority at age 17. Whatever may be the value of conclusive presumptions making the 18th birthday a turning point for such matters as voting, the purchase of liquor, and entering into contracts other than certain contracts for necessaries, cf. J. G. Pierce Co. v. Wallace, 1925, 251 Mass. 383, 146 N.E. 658, we can attach *855no such factual magic to that birthday. We may also remark, parenthetically, that it is singular for the state to provide that a minor may consent to intercourse at age 16, Mass.G.L. c. 265, § 23 (statutory rape), but cannot consent to get rid of the product until she is two years older. But whichever experts are correct, it is enough for present purposes that we find that a substantial number of females under the age of 18 are capable of forming a valid consent. Our overall question, accordingly, is whether the state can be permitted to restrain the free exercise of that consent, to the extent that it has endeavored to do so.
We consider first what the statute does not do.
1. The statute does not purport to require simply that parents be notified and given an opportunity to communicate with the minor, her chosen physician, or others. We mention this obvious fact because of the persistence of defendants and intervenor in arguing that the legislature could properly enact such a statute. Whether it could is not before us, and there is no reason for our considering it.
2. The statute does not exclude those capable of forming an intelligent consent, but applies to all minors. The statute’s provision calling for the minor’s own consent recognizes that at least some minors can consent, but the minor’s consent must be supplemented in every case, either by the consent of both parents, or by a court order.
3. The statute does not purport simply to codify what we find to be accepted medical practice in Massachusetts hitherto, namely, that certain medical procedures involving minors require the consent of a parent. This statute creates a special, unique exception by requiring the consent of both parents.
4. The statute does not purport simply to provide a check on the validity of the minor’s consent and the wisdom of her decision from the standpoint of her interests alone. Rather, it recognizes and provides rights in both parents, independent of, and hence potentially at variance with, her own personal interests. On being told by the court during argument that this appeared to be the statutory meaning, counsel agreed. It is the- Commonwealth’s position “that a parent in the decision-making process can consider interests other than the minor’s. . . . The concept of liberty embraces parental rights of supervision and control over children, and really what we are dealing with are competing rights of a constitutional dimension.” Intervenor took the same position. We agree that this is the clear statutory intent. Whatever may be accorded to the minor by allowing her judicial review “for good cause shown,” we do not regard it as meaning that the court should reverse a refusal of consent it finds reasonably made in the parent’s interests.
5. As a corollary to the foregoing, the statute is not to be weighed in terms of permissible overbreadth, unavoidably applying to minors in fact capable of consenting because necessary for proper administration or enforcement with respect to minors considered incapable. The legislature made no such determination. Rather, the direct purpose is to encumber the rights of all minors facially coming within its terms.
We make this extensive analysis, which we take it all parties are in agreement with,10 to demonstrate the two basic issues: the minor’s personal rights, and the separate rights of the parents.
The Minor’s Wights.
Passing for the moment the question whether there are conflicting rights, there can be no doubt but that a female’s constitutional right to an abor*856tion in the first trimester does not depend upon her calendar age. While the Court in Roe v. Wade, ante, 410 U.S. at 165 n. 67, 93 S.Ct. 705, failed to pass upon whether there were any special rights in the state, or elsewhere, that could be of greater significance when the female is a minor, the Court in no way suggested that a minor lacked personal rights. “[N] either the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone,” In re Gault, 1967, 387 U.S. 1, 13, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 1436, 18 L.Ed.2d 527; see Coe v. Gerstein, S.D.Fla., 1974, 376 F.Supp. 695, 698; Merriken v. Cressman, E.D.Pa., 1973, 364 F.Supp. 913, 918-19; Washington v. Koome, ante, 530 P.2d at 263; Note, the Minor’s Right to Abortion and the Requirement of Parental Consent, 1974, 60 Va.L.Rev. 305, 316-19. Cf. In re Winship, 1970, 397 U.S. 358, 365, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368; Stull v. School Board of Western Jr.-Sr. High School, 3 Cir., 1972, 459 F.2d 339, 345. We see no room for dispute. Furthermore, in the case at hand that right cannot be subordinated to the state any more than can be an adult’s. We say this because, as previously pointed out, the statute is cast not in terms of protecting the minor, cf. Ginsberg v. New York, 1968, 390 U.S. 629, 638, 88 S.Ct. 1274, 20 L.Ed.2d 195; Prince v. Massachusetts, 1944, 321 U.S. 158, 168, 64 S.Ct. 438, 88 L.Ed. 645, but in recognizing independent rights of parents. In this circumstance the statute does not attain validity vis-a-vis the minor by virtue of her ability (such as it is) to appeal to a Superior Court judge; this is merely a constraint on the assertion of unreasonable claims of her parents. The question comes, accordingly, do parents pbssess, apart from right to counsel and guide, competing rights of their own ?
The Competing Rights of Parents.
The importance of the last-mentioned distinction is not to be overlooked. It is not to deny parents all rights if we invalidate this statute. As intervenor herself well illustrated, parents have years in which to teach their children, counsel them, and guide them. We may wonder how much would be accomplished by compulsorily affording a parent an eleventh hour opportunity, if adequate communication had not been established before. And we may wonder, also, whether imposing such burden on the minor would necessily improve the family relationship. But this, as we have said, is not the statute’s aim. The parents not only must be consulted, they are given a veto. Defendants do not like this word. The fact, however, that because of the right of appeal this veto may not be absolute, modifies it only to a degree. So long as parents’ independent rights may be enforced, they remain formidable.
Except to assert that such rights exist, defendants and intervenor do little to demonstrate why parents should be granted individual rights independent of the minor’s best interests. It is not they who have to bear the child. Once born, the minor, and not they, will be responsible for it in all senses, financially and otherwise.11 It is difficult to think of any self interest that a parent would have that compares with those significant interests of the pregnant minor.
Turning from discussion to decided authority, the cases cited by defendants and intervenor involving rights of parents uniformly concern situations where the parents’ claimed rights are compatible with the minor’s, not adverse. Such cases are of no assistance. Of course parents have rights in proper *857instances, to act in their children’s interests. What is claimed here is something altogether different. But even if it should be found that parents may have rights of a Constitutional dimension vis-a-vis their child that are separate from the child’s, we would find that in the present area the individual rights of the minor outweigh the rights of the parents, and must be protected. The single exception to this is Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, (E.D.Mo., 1975), 392 F.Supp. 1362. We do not agree with the majority opinion.
Consequently, the parental consent requirement of Massachusetts General Laws, Chapter 112, Section 12P, is constitutionally invalid. Judgment will be entered permanently enjoining defendants from enforcing Chapter 112, Section 12P, as it relates to parental consent in any fashion. Plaintiffs to have their costs. Attorneys’ fees against defendants are denied.
So ordered.