287 F.2d 343

Charles R. GODDARD et al., Appellants, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA REDEVELOPMENT LAND AGENCY, a corporation, Appellee. Charles R. GODDARD et al., Appellants, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.

Nos. 15368, 15869.

United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued Nov. 29, 1960.

Decided Jan. 12, 1961.

Petition for Rehearing Denied Feb. 10, 1961.

*344Mr. Daniel Partridge, III, Washington, D. C., with whom Mr. Franklin P. Gould, Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellants.

Mr. Robert S. Griswold, Jr., Attorney, Department of Justice, with whom Messrs. Oliver Gasch, U. S. Atty., Roger P. Marquis, Attorney, Department of Justice, and Mrs. Ellen Lee Park, Asst. U. S. Atty., were on the brief, for appel-lees.

Before Mr. Justice Burton, retired,* and Washington and Bastían, Circuit Judges.

WASHINGTON, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiffs-appellants owned certain parcels of real estate in Project Area C in Southwest Washington, now being redeveloped by the District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency under statutory authority. See Donnelly v. D. C. Redevelopment Land Agency, 1959, 106 U.S.App.D.C. 99, 269 F.2d 546, certiorari denied, 1960, 361 U.S. 949, 80 S.Ct. 402, 4 L.Ed.2d 381; Riley v. D. C. Redevelopment Land Agency, 1957, 100 U.S.App.D.C. 360, 246 F.2d 641. It appears that as to some of these parcels the Government has reached a settlement with plaintiffs-appellants ; as to another parcel compensation was awarded after a jury trial and the resulting judgment has been affirmed by this court, Parcel 5099, Being Lot 831 in Square 544 in District of Columbia v. D. C. Redevelopment Land Agency, 1960, 107 U.S.App.D.C. 95, 274 F.2d 753, and the remaining parcels are the subject of condemnation proceedings awaiting trial.

The appeals now before us are from orders of the District Court dismissing two suits for damages brought by plaintiffs-appellants, one against the Redevelopment Land Agency (No. 15868), and the other against the United States (No. 15869). The suit against the Agency charges that agents of that defendant represented to plaintiff Mills that the Agency’s operations in the area would help Mills’ laundromat business, and that relying on these representations he made extensive improvements to his property. The complaint further alleges that the Agency thereafter “negligently took proceedings which resulted in the increase of the blighting factors in the areas and the decrease of the business of Mills Laundromat.” It also alleges that the Agency “unduly delayed the institution and prosecution of condemnation proceedings for the acquisition of the real properties described above,” with a view to obtaining the properties at a lower price.1 The *345complaint against the United States was filed some two months later, after the Government had moved to dismiss the suit against the Agency. It is couched in almost identical terms, and alleges that the employees of the Agency — if it be regarded as an agency of the Federal Government — were employees of the United States, acting within the scope of their office or employment.

We think the District Court correctly dismissed both suits. Plaintiffs-appellants are entitled to just compensation under the Fifth Amendment. If they do not receive such compensation in the condemnation proceedings, their remedy is by appeal therein. Assuming the truth of the allegations made in each complaint, these are suits against the United States to which it has not consented. Congress expressly excluded from the coverage of the Federal Tort Claims Act suits based on discretionary actions of Government employees, or arising out of misrepresentation or deceit by such employees.2 Under the governing statute, the Agency may acquire property “in the name of the United States by condemnation under judicial process whenever in the opinion of such acquiring authority it is necessary or advantageous to do so.” D.C.Code, § 16-619 (1951). This is a grant of discretionary authority as to the time of taking. See United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 3 Cir., 1954, 215 F.2d 140, 147. Alleged abuses of discretion, under the express terms of Section 2680, supra note 2, are not to be remedied by suits for damages. And the remaining charges are plainly within the category of misrepresentation or deceit. Cf. Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 1947, 332 U.S. 380, 384, 68 S.Ct. 1, 92 L.Ed. 10. The suit against the United States is thus barred.

The suit against the Agency is in substance a suit against the United States, and is unconsented. The District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency, in spite of its name and its limited area of operation, is a Federal agency within the meaning of the governing statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2671, infra note 3. Redevelopment of the Nation’s capital is “the policy of the United States,” D.C. Code, § 5-701 (1951); the Agency receives direct appropriations from the Congress, D.C.Code, § 5-715 (1951); and it acquires land “for the use of the United States,” D.C.Code, §§ 5-704(b), 16-619 and 16-644 (1951). See also Small Business Administration v. McClellan, 1960, 364 U.S. 446, 81 S.Ct. 191, 5 L.Ed.2d 200. Suits based on torts allegedly committed by the Agency or by its employees acting in an official capacity are maintainable, if at all, under the provisions of the Tort Claims Act, and must *346name the United States as defendant.3 The suit against the Agency is barred by the terms of that Act, proeedurally and substantively.

For these reasons the orders of the District Court will be affirmed. We need not reach the remaining contentions of the parties.

Affirmed.

Goddard v. District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency
287 F.2d 343

Case Details

Name
Goddard v. District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency
Decision Date
Jan 12, 1961
Citations

287 F.2d 343

Jurisdiction
United States

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