(after stating the facts). The action of ejectment is a possessory action, and may be maintained in this State in all cases where there is a legal right of possession against one who wrongfully holds possession from the person having the better right. Hill v. Plunkett, 41 Ark. 465; Ritchie v. Johnson, 50 Ark. 555, 8 S. W. 942, 7 Am. St. Rep. 118; and §§ 3686, 3694, C. & M. Digest. See also Osborne v. Ark. Ter. Oil & Gas Co., 103 Ark. 175, 146 S. W. 122.
It is not necessary to determine what estate is conveyed in the minerals in the land described in the mining leases before discovery thereof is made, in order to determine the right to the possession of such lands under a lease from the owner of the lands granting the possession thereof, with the exclusive right to develop and miñe for such minerals for a designated period.
The court held, in Mansfield Gas Co. v. Alexander, 97 Ark. 167, 133 S. W. 837, that by such a lease an exclusive right to make search for and to mine the discovered product is given to the lessee for a limited time. Osborne v. Ark. Ter. Oil & Gas Co., supra, and Kolachny v. Galbraith, 26 Okla. 772, 110 Pac. 902, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 451.
The leases, as specifically set out and relied upon in the complaint, unquestionably gave the appellant the exclusive right to possession of the lands for exploitation *138and development of gas and oil therein for the time designated in the leases in accordance with their terms.
The allegations of the complaint show the making of the leases in the first instance by the owners of the lands to Conyers and Hunt and their assignment to appellant; the making of the second leases of the same lands a few days before the end of the year given in the first leases-for the drilling of the well, and at the end of which time it was provided the leases should -become void if the test well had not been drilled; the ousting of plaintiff, about three years after the making of the second leases, on February '21, 1923, from possession of the lands, which it was. alleged are -now unlawfully held and occupied by Conyers and the other appellees, to whom the second leases had been transferred for the development and production of oil on the leased lands b3r them, and the damages to plaintiff on account thereof.
The execution of these second leases by the owners of the lands to appellant’s assignor, even conceding it was sufficiently -alleged that the right and estate conveyed thereby inured immediately to the benefit of the plaintiff under the terms of the statute, could have had no- effect to convey any further or other right to plaintiff than had already been conveyed under the terms of the first leases in any event, and it was not alleged that the lessors did not have a right to convey the leasehold estates in the first instance, as was done.
It is only in cases where the grantor attempts to convey a greater estate in the lands than he has the right and title to at the time of the conveyance that any -after-acquired title passes to the grantee under the terms of the statute, and then no greater estate would pass than that attempted to be conveyed in the first instance.
It is true that the complaint alleges that the plaintiff had performed all the - conditions precedent, as required in the leases, and that -oil was being produced from the leased lands, which would have, if produced by him, extended the life of the leases beyond the five-year term in the first leases executed, under the express- terms *139thereof, and, although no facts are alleged showing such performance or compliance with such terms and conditions, and another allegation of the complaint, with the necessary inferences arising from the leases pleaded set out therein, appears to be somewhat in conflict and contradictory of the conclusions alleged, we are of opinion the complaint was not subject to demurrer; the allegations thereof, with the necessary inferences arising from the facts alleged, rendering it indefinite and uncertain rather than insufficient; and the defect should have been corrected by a motion to make more definite and certain rather than by demurrer.
The court erred in holding otherwise, and the judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded with directions to overrule the demurrer, and for such other proceedings as are necessary in accordance with the principles of law and not inconsistent with this opinion.