OPINION
In this declaratory judgment action, appellant, Mrs. Shorty, unsuccessfully sought *492to regain custody of her two preschool age daughters from her mother, the maternal grandmother of the children, Mrs. Scott. Mrs. Shorty appeals.
Mrs. Shorty and her late husband, Larry Shorty, were living in Gallup in 1970, when Mr. Shorty was killed in a traffic accident. The Shortys had one daughter, Frances Lucille. A posthumous child, Carrie Ann was born later.
Mrs. Scott was invited to live with the Shorty family following Mr. Shorty’s death. In February, 1971, the parties returned to Las Vegas with the children where they lived together until February, 1972.
Mr. Shorty’s sudden death was a traumatic experience for Mrs. Shorty. She suffered emotional difficulties. She decided to leave, apparently without very definite plans, and in February, 1972, went first to Clovis and then to Phoenix, Arizona. She left the little girls in Mrs. Scott’s care and before her departure arranged with the Social Security Administration to send her child support payments to Mrs. Scott for the support of the children. During her absence, she evinced an interest in the children. She sent letters, called, and made several trips back to Las Vegas to see them. She also gave Mrs. Scott money to help with support and, as the latter admitted, “she used to pawn things to get them some milk.” In April, 1974, Mrs. Shorty returned to Las Vegas and sought to regain custody of her children. Mrs. Scott refused and this action ensued.
After hearing testimony, the trial court found, inter alia, “that the children have been well cared for by the defendant, Lilly Scott, who is a proper person to have the custody of said minor children, and that their best interests will be served by having the children continue in her custody.” He then concluded that Mrs. Scott should be granted custody of the girls “and should continue to receive the social security payments in her name.”
A guardianship proceeding had also been filed, apparently by Mrs. Scott. From the transcript, it appears that those proceedings, No. 20559 on the district court docket, were “consolidated” with this case. There is no appeal of the guardianship action nor is the record thereof before us. As to it, we express no opinion.
Mrs. Shorty appeals, contending only that the trial court erred as a matter of law by awarding custody of the minor children to the grandmother without any finding that the natural mother was unfit or otherwise unsuitable to perform her maternal duties.
At the outset, Mrs. Shorty asserts that New Mexico recognizes the “parental right” doctrine1 while Mrs. Scott argues the “welfare and best interests of the minor child” doctrine prevails.2 The stalemate is understandable. Our cases fail to maintain a clear distinction between the two concepts. In practice, they have served* as broad policy statements to guide trial judges in exercising their unquestionably broad discretion in deciding custody disputes.3 The New Mexico cases seem to *493bear out the proposition that these maxims have been loosely applied and that the real determinate in each case has been the particular facts, substantial evidence and whether the trial judge has abused his discretion. It is not surprising therefore that several of our decisions stating the rule have inserted minor variations, apparently intending to tailor them to the particular case.4 The resulting murkiness in the status of child custody law has brought this case here for clarification of the guiding standards in this difficult and emotionally charged field.5
In a custody case in which the parents are opposed, the welfare and best interests of the minor child is the paramount consideration. Kotrola v. Kotrola, supra, n. 2. That standard also is determinative in an action between parents for the modification of a custodial decree. Kotrola v. Kotrola; Fox v. Doak, supra, n. 3. In such cases, a consideration of parental rights is unnecessary because both parties are on equal footing in the eyes of the law. § 32-1-4, N.M.S.A.1953;6 Bassett v. Bassett, supra, n. 4. And though a specific finding of unfitness on the part of the parent to be denied custody is not necessary in all such cases, parental unfitness would be a consideration in determining the welfare and best interest of the minor child. See Ettinger v. Ettinger, supra, n. 2.
In a custody dispute where the opposing parties are the natural parents, or one of them, versus grandparents or other persons having no permanent or legal right to custody of the minor child we hold the rule to be different. In such instances, the “parental right” doctrine is to be given prominent, though not controlling, consideration. It has long been the rule that “Parents have a natural and legal right to custody of their children. This right is prima facie and not an absolute right.” Roberts v. Staples, supra, n. 1. This rule creates a presumption that the welfare and best interests of the minor child will best be served in the custody of the natural parents and casts the burden of proving the contrary on the non-parent. Focks v. Munger, supra, n. 1;7 Wallin v. Wallin, 290 Minn. 261, 187 N.W.2d 627 (1971); *494cf. Rules of Evidence, Rule 301 (§ 20-4—301, N.M.S.A.19S3 (Supp.1973)).
In a case similar to this one, the Supreme Court of Minnesota proclaimed the applicable standard of proof:
“[A]s against a third person, a natural [parent] would be entitled as a matter of law to custody of [the] minor child unless there has been established on the [parent’s] part neglect, abandonment, [8] incapacity, moral delinquency, instability of character, or inability to furnish the child with needed care, [citations omitted] or unless it has been established that such custody otherwise would not be in the best welfare and interest of the child.9 [citations omitted].” Wallin v. Wallin, supra at 266, 187 N.W.2d at 630 (1971).
The rule also requires that the trial court make express findings, if the natural parent is to be denied custody, not only that the parent is unfit,10 but that the third person seeking to obtain or retain custody is fit11 and the welfare and best interests of the child would best be served by giving custody to that third person. Of course, these findings must be supported by substantial evidence.
In this case, there are no express findings concerning the fitness of the parties and the evidence adduced at trial was meager. It is our opinion that the case should be reversed and remanded for a new proceeding to be held consistently with the presumption and burden of proof stated in this opinion.
It is so ordered.
McMANUS, C. J., and OMAN, J., concur.