ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR STAY PENDING APPEAL
On August 25, 1986, formerly, this court issued its order remanding this civil action, which sounded in contract and breach of contract, to the Circuit Court of Jackson County. The bases of the order of remand, briefly summarized, were (1) that the action was not within the “core” jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court, a principle supported by the letter of Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 102 S.Ct. 2858, 73 L.Ed.2d 598 (1982), and its progeny, including In re Castlerock Industries, Inc., 781 F.2d 159, 162 (9th Cir.1986)1; (2) that, as a “related” case, it would likely be a vain effort for the bankruptcy court to hear the action and make recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court (see Section 157(c)(1), Title 28, United States Code) when, on any timely motion thereafter 2, the district court might be required to abstain under § 1334(c)(1), Title 28, United States Code3; and (3) that the action could not be treated as a diversity action when (a) the district court had refused to treat it as such in transferring the action to the bankruptcy court in an order which had not been appealed or otherwise challenged *982and (b) the removal from the state court had not been accomplished under the diversity removal statute, Section 1441(a), Title 28, United States Code, but rather under the statute providing for removal of actions related to bankruptcy cases, Section 1452 of the same title. The defendant has now filed a notice of appeal of that order to the district court and has presented this court with a motion for stay pending appeal.
This court believes that the requested stay should not be granted for the principal reason that an order of remand under Section 1452(b), Title 28, United States Code, is not an appealable order. That subsection provides as follows:
“The court to which such claim or cause of action is removed may remand such claim or cause of action on any equitable ground. An order entered under this subsection remanding a claim or cause of action, or a decision to not remand, is not reviewable by appeal or otherwise.”
The movant, however, argues that the bankruptcy court should not be permitted to enter an unreviewable order of remand. This is an argument-which finds support in a bankruptcy court decision and in a recent position paper circulated by the National Bankruptcy Conference.4 There is little in the way of helpful reasoning in either of those sources, particularly in an action of the category of that at bar, which, even after the bankruptcy court has heard the action and made recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court, may be bound to be abstained from on a motion for abstention filed thereafter. Even the position paper of the National Bankruptcy Conference recognizes that implementing the Section 157(c)(1) procedure in such a case as this will almost certainly be followed by mandatory abstention.5 There is no reason for the bankruptcy court not to exercise the removal power in such an action as this, in which abstention may not be within the discretion of the district court, but rather may be mandatory.6
To suggest, furthermore, that the bankruptcy court must, in such an action, refrain from making the ruling demanded by the clear letter of the law and instead prepare an additional volume of paperwork to transmit to the district court would threaten to resurrect the same uncertain skirmish lines along which the internecine verbal battles of yesteryear were fought and which all reasonable persons hoped to have been erased by the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984. For, if the decision to remand an action clearly subject to mandatory abstention cannot be committed to the bankruptcy court, it would appear that a host of other similar decisions heretofore made by the bankruptcy court must be made the subjects of reports and recommendations to the district court. The position paper of the National Bankruptcy Conference contains a few examples.7 And, if the goal is to ensure that the bankruptcy court does not err in any interlocutory order, those examples might will be extended to include the hundreds of such orders which are weekly rendered by a bankruptcy court. Would the bankruptcy court, prior to rendering a final decision in any “core” matter, be required to report to the district court on its determination that the matter was not a “related” matter, simply to ensure that the bankruptcy court had not rendered an unreviewable order on the issue of its own jurisdiction? 8 Bankruptcy *983courts would again be caught in the dilemma of protecting themselves from accusations of arrogation of judicial power by transmitting congeries of paperwork to the district court and, at the same time, defeating the purpose of the 1984 Act which in large part was to prevent such a profusion of district court activity in bankruptcy matters by committing interlocutory matters to the bankruptcy court.
The bankruptcy court, after all, is not making a final decision in this case9, nor even one which bars the defendant from any and all access to federal jurisdiction. For, having failed to gain that access through Section 1452, swpra, it appears possible for the defendant to remove the case to the federal courts under the diversity removal statute, Section 1441, supra.10
Even if the appellate courts should ultimately hold the order of remand to be reviewable, despite the clear and unambiguous wording of Section 1452(b), supra, any stay pending appeal should still be denied. The above cited considerations concerning the likely duty of the district court mandatorily to abstain from this action as one “related” to a bankruptcy case (unless otherwise removed under the diversity removal statute) make the current appeal a frivalous one. This is especially true in view of the time considerations which now apply in this action, which has now pended for years before various courts without being brought to trial. Because of the jurisdictional doubts which plague the action’s potential future in this court, it seems propitious for all concerned to proceed promptly to a trial of the merits in the state court, where jurisdiction is virtually beyond question. Otherwise, when the jurisdiction issue may result in the ultimate reversal of any judgment issued by this court or the district court, trial and determination here may be a futile and useless enterprise.
It is therefore
ORDERED that the appellant’s motion for stay pending appeal be, and it is hereby, denied.