On September 30, 1999, the respondent, Ah D. Jafroodi,1 entered a guilty plea in the State of Florida and was convicted of a third-degree felony for unlawful distribution of a controlled substance. In addition, respondent has been the subject of three separate disciplinary orders issued by the Supreme Court of Florida, two of them stemming from his criminal conduct and one based on practicing law while suspended in the earlier disciplinary cases. Respondent failed to report his conviction or any of the disciplinary actions to this court. Once the conviction and the disciplinary matters were brought to our attention by Bar Counsel, we temporarily suspended respondent from the practice of law in separate orders issued on March 13 and March 14, 2007. See D.C. Bar Rule XI, §§ 10(b) and 11(d).
D.C.Code § ll-2503(a) (2001) requires that we disbar a member of our bar whose conviction of a crime of moral turpitude has become final. See In re Colson, 412 A.2d 1160 (D.C.1979) (en banc). As the Board on Professional Responsibility correctly notes in its report and recommendation, this court has consistently held that crimes involving the distribution of a controlled substance or the possession of a controlled substance with the intent to distribute involve moral turpitude. See, e.g., In re Lee, 755 A.2d 1034, 1036 (D.C.2000) (“Possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute is a crime of moral turpitude per se, mandating disbarment.”); In re Valentin, 710 A.2d 879 (D.C.1998) (distribution of a controlled substance is a crime of moral turpitude per se). The Board therefore recommends that we disbar respondent and dismiss the pending reciprocal disciplinary matter as moot.2 Respondent has not filed any exception or otherwise participated in these proceedings.3 Bar Counsel did not file any exceptions to the Board’s recommendation.
*1179Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that the respondent, Ali D. Jafroodi, be and hereby is disbarred from the practice of law in the District of Columbia. Respondent has not filed the affidavit required by D.C. Bar R. XI, § 14(g), and we direct his attention to the requirements of that rule and their effect on his eligibility for reinstatement. See D.C. Bar R. XI, § 16(c). It is
FURTHER ORDERED that the reciprocal disciplinary case (07-BG-89) is hereby dismissed as moot.
So ordered.