Prom a judgment in favor of defendants after trial before the court without a jury in an action for declaratory relief seeking interpretation of certain provisions in a written contract, plaintiff appeals.
The undisputed facts are these:
On August 17, 1944, plaintiff and defendants entered into a collective bargaining agreement which contained among others a provision reading as follows:
“Article XVII. Term of Agreement. Section 1. This agreement shall begin and remain in full force and effect for one year from date of execution, and thereafter unless either party signifies their desire to modify, amend or terminate said contract by notifying the other party in writing thirty (30) days prior to the anniversary date of agreement.”
Letters passed between the parties on the following dates, April 30, 1945,1 June 8, 1945,2 June 9, 1945,3 and August 8, 1945.4 Each of the foregoing letters made reference to the contract between the parties.
*423Plaintiff in its brief contends that the trial court refused plaintiff’s offer of proof that the letter of June 9, 1945, was written after a telephone conversation between the vice-president of plaintiff company and defendants’ representative in which conversation plaintiff told defendants that plaintiff would definitely terminate the contract on August 17, 1945.
The trial court found that (1) neither party had complied with the necessary requisites for the purpose of terminating said contract prior to August 17, 1945, as provided in Article XVII, supra, (2) the collective bargaining agreement was not terminated on the 17th day of August, 1945, but should remain in full force and effect until the the 17th day of August, 1946, and (3) the collective bargaining agreement was not subject to modification, amendment or termination upon 30 days’ notice or other reasonable notice during the period from August 17, 1945, to August 17, 1946.
There are three questions presented for our determination which will be stated and answered hereunder seriatim;
First: Did the trial court err in holding that plaintiff had not signified in writing 30 days prior to August 17, 1945, *424its desire to modify, amend or terminate the contract between the parties?
This question must be answered in the negative. There is nothing in the letters of April 30, 1945, or June 9, 1945, indicating an intention upon the part of plaintiff to modify, amend or terminate its contract with defendant. The letter of August 8, 1945, was ineffective for such purpose since it was sent to defendants less than 30 days prior to August 17, 1945. In view of the fact that the foregoing constituted all the evidence before the trial court the finding that plaintiff had not terminated the contract in accordance with the provisions of Article XVII was correct.
Second: Was the trial court correct in finding that the contract should remain in force until August 17,1946, and that *425such contract was not subject to modification, amendment or termination prior to said date upon 30 days’ written notice?
This question must be answered in the affirmative. Article XVII provided that the contract should remain in force for one year from the date of execution “and thereafter unless either party signifies their desire to modify, amend or terminate said contract by notifying the other party in writing thirty (30) days prior to the anniversary date of agreement.” It appears clearly that by this provision the contract was to remain in effect for successive periods of a year unless thirty days prior to the anniversary date, to wit, August 17th, either party should signify in writing its desire to modify, amend or terminate the contract. In the instant ease plaintiff signified *426such intention by its letter of August 8, 1945, which would be effective on August 17, 1946.
Third: Did the trial court commit prejudicial error in refusing plaintiff’s offer of parol evidence relative to the telephone conversation between its vice-president and defendants’ representative?
This question must be answered in the negative. Even if it be conceded that the agreement was ambiguous as to its terms the proffered evidence had no bearing upon the claimed ambiguity. The fact that one party to the agreement said that it would terminate the contract on a certain date did not tend to throw any light upon the intention of the parties as to the terms of the contract when it was executed.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment is affirmed.
Moore, P. J., and Wilson, J., concurred.