The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of BizCapital Business & Industrial Development Corporation (“BizCapital”) and the district court’s order requiring disclosure of a Suspicious Activity Report (“SAR”).
I
BizCapital filed a request with the OCC, seeking disclosure of any SARs filed by Union Planters National Bank concerning Media Direct and its principal, Raymond Reggie.1 In its request, BizCapital ex*872plained that such information was critical to the success of a civil action it had brought against Union Planters Bank in state court. The OCC denied BizCapital’s request, asserting that disclosure was contrary to the Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g), OCC regulation 12 C.F.R. § 21.11(k), OCC Interpretive Letter No. 978, and case law suggesting that disclosure of SARs is prohibited.
BizCapital filed suit in federal district court, seeking review of the OCC’s final administrative decision. See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (“Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review.”). After briefing and oral argument, the district court granted BizCapital’s cross-motion for summary judgment, rejecting the OCC’s argument that it was absolutely prohibited from revealing SARs to third parties and determining that the OCC improperly failed to weigh the factors outlined in its own regulations2 prior to denying BizCapital’s request. BizCapital Bus. & Indus. Dev. Corp. v. OCC, 406 F.Supp.2d 688, 692-93 (E.D.La.2005).3 Although it acknowledged that remand is normally appropriate where “a district court arrives at an issue that an agency has not yet evaluated,” the district court concluded: (1) “when there [i]s no procedural defect in agency decision-making, i.e., when the agency had a complete record before it and simply made an unlawful decision, there is no need to remand”; and (2) remand would be futile because the OCC had “taken the position that the factors are pre-weighed and that all requests for SARs will be categorically denied.” Id. at 697. The district court then ordered an in camera review of “any SAR responsive to plaintiffs administrative request.” Id. The court reviewed the document provided *873by the OCC, determined that disclosure was appropriate, but stayed disclosure pending this appeal.
We review de novo a district court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 44 F.3d 334, 335 (5th Cir.1995).
II
The OCC limits its appeal to one issue: whether the district court erred in failing to remand the case to the OCC for an initial administrative determination of BizCapital’s request, using the standard imposed by the district court. Significantly, the OCC explicitly states that it “does not challenge the district court’s conclusion that SARs are not categorically privileged under the circumstances presented in this case, but are subject to the balancing test set forth in the OCC’s Touhy regulation.” See 12 C.F.R. §§ 4.31-4.40. BizCapital argues that remand is inappropriate because the district court found that such a remand would have been futile.
“Generally speaking, a court ... should remand a case to an agency for decision of a matter that statutes place primarily in agency hands.” INS v. Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16, 123 S.Ct. 353, 154 L.Ed.2d 272 (2002).
If the record before the agency does not support the agency action, if the agency has not considered all relevant factors, or if the reviewing court simply cannot evaluate the challenged agency action on the basis of the record before it, the proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency for additional investigation or explanation. The reviewing court is not generally empowered to conduct a de novo inquiry into the matter being reviewed and to reach its own conclusions based on such an inquiry.
Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744, 105 S.Ct. 1598, 84 L.Ed.2d 643 (1985); see Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 905 (5th Cir.1983) (“If the agency decision is not sustainable on the basis of the administrative record, then ‘the matter should be remanded to [the agency] for further consideration.’ ” (quoting Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 143, 93 S.Ct. 1241, 36 L.Ed.2d 106 (1973))).
Here, the OCC never applied the facts pertinent to BizCapital’s request against the factors in the OCC’s regulations. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 4.31-4.40.4 Rather, it denied *874BizCapital’s request based upon a conclusion of law that the district court subsequently rejected. Under such circumstances, remand is usually required.
BizCapital does not dispute that remand is usually required. Instead, it argues that this is the type of rare circumstance where remand “would be an idle and useless formality” because the agency will inevitably adhere to its prior decision. NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 766 n. 6, 89 S.Ct. 1426, 22 L.Ed.2d 709 (1969). It argues that the district court expressly found that the OCC “took the position that the factors are pre-weighed and that all requests for SARs will be categorically denied.”
At oral argument, the OCC stated that “[t]here would be no circumstances in which a private litigant would be entitled to [a SAR] under the absolute privilege created by the bank secrecy act .... ” We disagree that this statement requires a finding of futility. To the contrary, the OCC merely reiterated its legal position that SARs are absolutely privileged — a position that was expressly rejected by the district court. Having conceded argument on this point, upon remand, the OCC will be required to review BizCapital’s request based upon the factors in its regulations. See NLRB v. Enter. Ass’n, 429 U.S. 507, 522 n. 9, 97 S.Ct. 891, 51 L.Ed.2d 1 (1977) (“When an administrative agency has made an error of law, the duty of the Court is to ‘correct the error of law committed by that body, and, after doing so to remand the case to the (agency) so as to afford it the opportunity of examining the evidence and finding the facts as required by law.’ ”). That the OCC is likely to deny the request after properly applying its regulations does not render remand a mere formality. See FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 25, 118 S.Ct. 1777, 141 L.Ed.2d 10 (1998) (“If a reviewing court agrees that the agency misinterpreted the law, it will set aside the agency’s action and remand the case' — even though the agency (like a new jury after a mistrial) might later, in the exercise of its lawful discretion, reach the same result for a different reason.”).
Ill
For the reasons stated, we VACATE that part of the district court’s decision requiring disclosure and REMAND for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.