100 F. Supp. 757

In re RAINEY et al.

Nos. 2249, 2252.

United States District Court S. D. Texas, Houston Division.

Oct. 4, 1951.

Vinson, Elkins, & Weems, Earl A. Brown, Jr., and H. C. Huston, Houston, Tex., for FIeights State Bank of Houston.

Baker, Botts, Andrews & Parish, J. Curtiss Brown, Houston, Tex., for Trustee in Bankruptcy.

Walker F. Johnston and A. Milton Vance, Houston, Tex., for Bankrupt.

Elbert Roberts, Houston, Tex., Referee in Bankruptcy.

KENNERLY, Chief Judge.

This is a hearing on the Petition of the Heights State Bank of Houston to Review an Order made in this case by the Referee in Bankruptcy.

During 1949 and 1950, the Bank, made three loans to the Bankrupt (Walter M. *758Rainey, doing business as Walter M. Rainey Construction Company) which were unpaid, wholly or in part, at the date of the filing of the Petitions in Bankruptcy and the Adjudications herein. These were the Loan of January 29, 1949 (referred to by the Referee as Claim A), of February 19, 1949 (referred to by the Referee as Claim B), and of March 13, 1950 (referred to by the Referee as Claim C). The first two loans (Claims A and B) were secured by Chattel Mortgage on certain personal property. The third loan of March 13, 1950, for $10,-000 (Claim C), was secured by a Deed of Trust or Mortgage on certain Houston real estate.

The Bank claimed and claims that such Deed of Trust (dated March 13, 1950, and in the Record) was also intended to secure and does secure the then unpaid indebtedness of the first two loans (Claims A and B). This, the Trustee, in appropriate proceedings, disputed. The Referee, by his Order of August 7, 1951, decided for the Trustee and against the Bank. . The Bank filed its Petition to Review his action, and the question is here for decision.

Further, the Referee refused to allow the attorneys’ fees stipulated in the Notes, constituting Claims A, B and C, allowing only what he finds to be a reasonable 'attorneys’ fee. Of this, the Bank complains in its Petition for Review, and that question is also here for decision.

(a) The Order of the Referee. (August 7, 1951) on the first point sought to be reviewed is as follows (italics mine) : “The Referee is of- the opinion by reason of the findings herein above made that the contest of the Trustee to the allowance of the bank’s claim as a secured claim for the balance due on the two notes secured by chattel mortgage should be sustained and that the secured claim should be limited to the amount due on the note set out" in sub-paragraph C of the claim and being the balance due on the note secured by the deed of trust, with the exception that the attorneys’ fees should be reduced.” etc.

(b) The findings referred to in such Order are apparently as follows (italics mine) : —

“The bank is claiming that its total indebtedness is secured by the motor vehicles, the tractor, the Gunite machine, and the real estate, basing this claim upon a paragraph in the deed of trust, being subdivision 2 of paragraph 2 of the deed o-f trust, to which paragraph reference is made. The portion of said paragraph claimed to be applicable seems to be the following words included in said paragraph, ‘Any and all other direct and indirect obligations and indebtedness now or at any time in the future owing and to be owing by grantor (any or all of them) to bank, its successors, and assigns, regardless of how evidenced or how incurred;’ I find that the indebtedness claimed under subparagraphs A and B of the claim occurred prior to the indebtedness under the deed of trust as set out in subparagraph C of said claim, and that said indebtedness under A and B were renewed and extended subsequent to the date o-f the note and deed of trust on the real estate as set out in subsection C of the claim. No-mention was made in the renewals of these-two indebtednesses that they were in anyway secured except by the chattel mortgages, and no reference was made therein-that they were additionally secured under the deed of trust.
“The deed of trust loan was made on-March 13, 1950, and the deed of trust was-of even date therewith, and the two indebtednesses under A and B were not specifically mentioned in the deed of Trust as-indebtedness being secured thereby, but is-claimed to be secured by reason of the-printed provision in the deed of trust above-quoted.”

1: — These do not appear to be fact-findings of the Referee which may not be disturbed, Phillips v. Baker, 5 Cir., 165 F.2d 578, but they are conclusions of law reached by the Referee upon proven or undisputed facts.

2: — This brings us at once to a discus- - sion of the first question of whether such-Deed of Trust of March 13 1950, secures-the first two loans (Claims A and B). I think the question may be and must be-decided by determining the legal effect of; the Deed of Trust itself.

*759Such Deed of Trust is partly printed and partly typewritten. It contains five Sections which are lettered I, II, III, IV, and V. Each of the lettered Sections contains Paragraphs which are numbered and designated by figures.

Section I contains two numbered Paragraphs. The first paragraph is a clause conveying the Houston real estate (which is described) to a Trustee in Trust, and the second paragraph is the habendum clause.

Passing now to Section II. The first line of Section II reads: "This conveyance is made in trust, however, to secure and enforce the full and prompt payment when due of:”

Then follow two paragraphs numbered (1) and (2). Paragraph (1), shown in the margin, is a typewritten description of the $10,000 note of March 13, 1950.1 Paragraph (2), shown in the margin,2 contains the language substantially as stated by the Referee and other pertinent language.

I find myself unable to agree with the Referee. If we stop here, I think there is no escape that under the quoted provisions of the Deed of Trust, all indebtedness of Bankrupt to the Bank, including the first two loans (Claims A and B), as well as the third loan '(Claim C), are secured thereby.

But the provisions discussed are not all. Other provisions of the Deed of Trust, when looked to, support the Bank’s contention, particularly the provisions of Paragraph (1) of Section III, quoted in *760thé margin.3 This provides that the conveyance shall become null and void upon payment, not only of the $10,000 Note (Claim C), but also all other amounts and indebtedness secured and to ‘be secured, etc. Note also those provisions in Para*761graph (2) of Section III, quoted in the margin 4 which direct the payment of the proceeds from any Trustee’s sale thereunder to be applied, after the payment of the $10,000 Note (Claim C), to any and all other indebtedness secured thereunder, Also the provisions quoted in the margin5 that all rights, titles, liens, or equities held under the Deed of Trust, or Iby any other instruments, shall be considered cumulative, one of the other and not exclusive. Also the provision quoted in the margin6 that *762the security which has been given for the payment of indebtedness shall be taken, considered, and held as cumulative, etc.

The Deed of Trust, when read from its four corners, is perfectly plain and unambiguous, clearly shows the intention of the parties, and may not be varied by extraneous evidence. It secures not only the third loan $10,000 Note (Claim C), 'but all other indebtedness of the Bankrupt to the Bank, including the notes executed for the first and second loans (Claims A and B).

This being true, if it was error for the Referree to consider the circumstances that when Claims A and B were renewed, the Deed of Trust was not mentioned, such error is immaterial. It was not error for him to refuse to hear the witness J. D. Larrabee as to the intention of the parties in executing the Deed of Trust. As stated, their intention clearly appears from the Deed of Trust itself.

3: — The Bank also complains o*f the refusal of the Referee to allow the full amount of attorneys’ fees stipulated in all the notes. On this point, the Referee in his Order of August 16, 1951, says: “At the beginning of hearing on protest of the Trustee in Bankruptcy to allowance of Claim No. 4 of Bank, said hearing being held on May 11, 1951 in the Scanlon Building, Houston, Texas, Bank and the Trustee in this bankruptcy matter stipulated in open court that the total aggregate indebtedness of $26,429.57, as shown by Proof of Claim No. 4 filed herein by Bank, was correct and undisputed, and that the only issue to be determined on the protest of Trustee was whether loans (a) and (b) in said claim were secured by the deed of trust dated March 13, 1950.”

The Referee says in his Order of August 7, 1951:

“The contest of the Trustee does not specifically raise a contest as to the attorneys’ fees charged and included in the claim. It is the Referee’s understanding of the Bankruptcy Act that even though the instrument upon which the claim is based provides for ten per cent attorneys’ fees, that unless the note or instrument is placed in the hands of an attorney prior to bankruptcy the fees cannot be allowed unless the instrument provides that if collection is made through the Bankruptcy Court and that when it so provides, the Referee, if the amount claimed is excessive, can reduce the attorneys’ fees to what is established as a reasonable fee for the services rendered. In this instance the attorneys for the bank filed a claim and in their calculations on the indebtedness under sub-paragraph A claim attorneys’ fees of $999.77, on the indebtedness under subparagraph B attorneys’ fees of $505.97, and on the indebtedness under subparagraph C attorneys’ fees of $887.51, or a total of $2,393.25 for services in connection with the filing of the claim, which in the opinion of the Referee is excessive, but there is no contest of the same, no allegation in the claim that the amount claimed is a reasonable fee, or that the claimant had contracted with the attorneys to pay-the same, and the Referee is constrained to disallow the attorneys’ fees in the amount claimed, and. feels that $750.00 would be a reasonable fee for the services rendered, chargeable pro rata to each of the items constituting the .total claim and to be dealt with under the provisions of this order with reference to the disposition made of each of the separate items of the claim. * * *
“The Referee is of the opinion * * * that the attorneys’ fees should be reduced to what in the opinion of the Referee is a reasonable attorneys’ fees, there being no allegations or proof in the record of any services justifying this charge, and viewing the attorneys’ fees as an unliquidated claim and not having been established by proper pleadings and proof, the feeling that the claimant is entitled to recover a reasonable attorneys’ fee and in view of the fact that such fee as allowed under subparagraph C will be secured by the deed of trust, the Referee is of the opinion that the $750.00 fee allowed should be applied as follows: $375.00 to the secured claim under the sub-paragraph C of the proof and the other $375.00 should be allowed in connection with the two notes secured by chattel mortgage.”

According to the statement of the Referee, the parties stipulated that the aggregate amount owing on all loans (Claims *763A, B and C) was $26,429.57. amount, $2,393.25 was attorneys’ fees as called for in the Notes, which the Referee has reduced to $750. The Bank’s complaint may best be stated by quoting from its Petition to Review: Of this

“At the commencement of hearing on this protested claim, counsel for Bank asked in open court whether there was any contest with respect to the amount of the principal indebtedness, interest and attorneys’ fees as reflected by said Claim No. 4, and the Trustee in open court advised the Referee that the total aggregate indebtedness of $26,429.57 reflected 'by said Proof of Claim No. 4 was correct and undisputed. (See Order of Referee in Completion of Record, paragraph 1). Nevertheless, the Referee in his Order has reduced the aggregate amount of such fees to the sum of $750.00.
“On such 'hearing, Bank was prepared to make proof of services rendered in support of its claim for said attorneys’ fees, the attorney who had performed such services for Bank to the date of said hearing being present in the court for such purpose. Plowever, in view of the stipulation and the absence of any proof or claim that such attorneys’ fees were unreasonable, this proof was not offered. Thus, there being no proof in the record of this case that said amount of attorneys’ fees is excessive, there exists no basis for the determination by the Referee that said amount of attorneys’ fees is unreasonable.”

The reasons of the Referee in not following such Stipulation of counsel for the Trustee and the Bank made at the hearing are not shown by the Record; hence I do not pass on the question. Apparently the Bank was not heard on the question, nor was evidence heard as to the right of the Bank to recover attorneys’ fees independently of the Stipulation. This necessitates a rehearing before the Referee in the matter of attorneys’ fees.

From what has been said, it follows:

(a) That the Order or Orders of the Referee refusing to recognize the Deed of Trust Lien of the Bank as securing Claims A and B, as well as Claim C, should be reversed, and Order here entered so recognizing and enforcing such Lien.

(b) That the Order or Orders of the Referee refusing to allow the full amount of the attorneys’ fees provided for in Claims A, B, and C, should be reversed and the matter of the attorneys’ fees sent back to the Referee so that he may consider the legal effect, if any, of the Stipulation made before him and hear and consider all proper evidence offered in such matter.

Let appropriate Order, drawn in accordance herewith, be presented.

In re Rainey
100 F. Supp. 757

Case Details

Name
In re Rainey
Decision Date
Oct 4, 1951
Citations

100 F. Supp. 757

Jurisdiction
United States

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