MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This is an action in which Penny R. Scar-berry, the Plaintiff, seeks recovery as sole beneficiary of death benefits allegedly due her because of the , death of her husband Charles, an insured under a life insurance policy allegedly in force at his death. The Defendant, Peoples Security Life Insurance Company (Peoples), has moved for summary judgment on the claims. Scarberry filed a response and supplemental response to the motion. At Scarberry’s request, the Court treats the supplemental response as a cross motion for summary judgment.1 The Court GRANTS Peoples’ motion and DENIES Scarberry’s motion.
I. FACTUAL DEVELOPMENT
In April 1992, Scarberry and her husband Charles met with a Peoples’ agent, Earnest Sanders, to discuss life insurance. Following a further meeting among these parties and a second Peoples’ representative, the Scarberrys applied for life insurance on themselves and their two children on May 29,1992. The application provided that Charles, the “Proposed insured #1,” would be the policy “owner unless” specified otherwise. Ex. A to Def.’s mot. for summ. jgt. at 1.
Scarberry paid the initial premium with her personal cheek at the time of the application. She also executed a pre-authorized check agreement permitting Peoples to draw subsequent premiums “on or after the 25th day of each month” directly from her cheeking account. Ex. B to Def.’s mot. for summ. jgt. at 1. The Withdrawal Agreement provided as follows;
I hereby authorize [Peoples] to make withdrawals each month against the account at the institution listed at the left, for the purpose of paying premiums on the policy or policies listed on the reverse side.
Please make the withdrawal on or after the 25th day of each month. (If day is left blank, it will be based on the issue day.) I agree that this request is subject to the terms and conditions on the reverse side.
Id. The reverse side of the Withdrawal Agreement states
I agree that the presentation of such withdrawals to the institution named on the reverse side shall constitute due notice of premiums being due upon the policy or policies.
I agree that if any withdrawal for the payment of premium is dishonored, or if the amount has been refunded to the bank on its request, the premium shall be considered to be in default and if payment of the premium in default is not made within 31 days of the date on which such premium was due, the policy shall terminate except as may otherwise be provided in the policy.
Id. at 2.
Peoples issued a term life insurance policy to the Scarberrys with a “Policy Date” of August 25, 1992. Ex. C to Def.’s mot. for summ. jgt. The Policy insured the lives of each of the Scarberrys for $50,000.00 and the lives of their children for $10,000.00.
*358The Policy provides Peoples “will pay the Death Benefit to the Beneficiary if the Insured dies while this policy is in full force.” Policy at 1. “In full force” is defined as the Policy’s status when each premium has been paid by its “Due Date” or “within the grace period.” Id. at 5. The Policy also states that “[a]ll premiums are to be paid in advance[,]” and that “[premiums are to be paid on the Due Date for each Premium Interval.” Id. at 6. It continues that “[t]he Due Date of a premium is the same day of the month as the Policy Date.” Id.
The Policy contains both a grace period and default provision. The grace period provision states
You have 31 days from a Due Date to pay a premium. This is called “the grace period.” The policy will continue in full force. No interest will be charged. But, if the Insured dies during the grace period, we will subtract the unpaid premium for those 31 days. There is no grace period for the first premium.
Id. The default section provides “If a premium is not paid by the end of the grace period, your policy will be in default. It will cease to be in full force. The date of default is the Due Date of the unpaid premium.” Id.
The Scarberrys separated in early 1993. Scarberry talked with Charles nearly every day though and checked her mail at their home even more frequently. Scarberry also had near-daily contact with Defendant’s agent, Sanders, who frequented her place of employment.
Up to May 1993, Peoples successfully drew from Scarberry’s cheeking account pursuant to the Withdrawal Agreement. The May 25, 1993 premium withdrawal, however, “bounced” and was returned on June 1 for insufficient funds.2 Peoples attempted to draw again on June 7, 1993 but that withdrawal too was returned on June 8 for the same reason.
Scarberry testified insufficient funds were in her account because she “just messed up.” Dep. of Penny R. Scarberry at 50. Overdraft notices were apparently sent to her on June 1 and June 8,1993. She admits receiving at least one of these notices. She knew it related to the premium due Peoples.3
Scarberry claims after receiving the overdraft notice she immediately deposited funds to cover the premium. Bank records are sketchy on this point, but an affidavit from an official at Scarberry’s bank states that at no time between May 28 and July 9 did the account ever have sufficient funds to cover the cost of the premium withdrawal. Indeed, between May 21 and July 1,1993 the account registered six other overdrafts, including two to another insurance company with a similar withdrawal arrangement.
Scarberry testified that on or about June 10,1993 she attempted to contact Sanders to (1) inform him she was discontinuing use of *359her checking account; and (2) ascertain how to mail her premiums directly to Peoples.4
On June 27, 1993 Charles Scarberry was killed in an auto accident. Plaintiff advised Sanders of the tragedy the next day. Sanders later informed her Peoples had denied coverage. The denial of coverage apparently was based on the Policy not being in full force on the date of death due to non-payment of premiums.
Peoples, however, mailed Scarberry a premium notice postmarked June 28,1993. The premium notice lists the due date in two places as May 25, 1993. The amount due is listed as $325.85. Language at the bottom of the notice provides as follows though: “Your policy will be in force only to the extent of any nonforfeiture option or cash value it may contain, unless total payment due is made prior to expiration of the grace period.”
Peoples also mailed a “LAPSE NOTICE” postmarked July 8, 1993 to Scarberry. It informed her as follows:
The grace period on your insurance policy has expired and your coverage has lapsed. We at [Peoples] value our relationship with you, and we want to continue to serve your insurance needs.
You may apply for reinstatement by completing the information below and mailing it and your remittance in the enclosed envelope, or contact your Peoples ... agent.
Ex.B, PL’s resp. br. (footnote added). Later in the notice appears the phrase “PLEASE DISREGARD IF TIMELY PAYMENT HAS ALREADY BEEN MADE[.]” Id. (emphasis added).
Scarberry complained to the West Virginia Insurance Commissioner about the denial of coverage. The Commissioner closed the investigation without taking any action against Peoples. During the investigation Brad McCoy, an account manager for Peoples, disclosed he had contacted Charles in June 1993 and told him of the overdue payment:
Mr. Scarberry informed me that he was separated from his wife and that he did not know if they intended to keep the insurance. I informed Mr. Scarberry that his policy was in danger of lapsing and if they intended to keep the policy in force, they should forward their premium as soon as possible.
Ex. I, PL’s supp. resp.
Scarberry filed the instant complaint on June 26, 1995. She alleges claims for (1) breach of contract; and (2) violations of the West Virginia Unfair Trade Practices Act, West Virginia Code § 33-11-1 et seq.5
II. DISCUSSION
A. The Summary Judgment Standard:
Our Court of Appeals has often stated the settled standard governing the disposition of a motion for summary judgment:
A moving party is entitled to summary judgment ‘if the pleading[s], depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to *360material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 56(c). See Charbonnages de France v. Smith, 597 F.2d 406 (4th Cir.1979).
A genuine issue exists ‘if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’ Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 4111 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court is required to view the facts and draw reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. at 2514. The plaintiff is entitled to have the credibility of all his evidence presumed. Miller v. Leathers, 913 F.2d 1085, 1087 (4th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1109, 111 S.Ct. 1018, 112 L.Ed.2d 1100 (1991). The party seeking summary judgment has the initial burden to show absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2554, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The opposing party must demonstrate that a triable issue of fact exists; he may not rest upon mere allegations or denials. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. A mere scintilla of evidence supporting the case is insufficient. Id.
Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 115 S.Ct. 67, 130 L.Ed.2d 24, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 68, 130 L.Ed.2d 24 (1994); see also Spradling v. Blackburn, 919 F.Supp. 969, 974 (S.D.W.Va.1996). Accordingly, it is through this analytical prism the Court evaluates the parties’ motions.
B. Breach of Contract Claim:
There are two controlling questions in determining whether Peoples breached any duty owed to Scarberry. First, the Court must ascertain whether the Policy was “in full force” at the time of Mr. Scarbenys death. Second, it must determine whether there was an explicit or implicit duty imposed on Peoples by the Policy or West Virginia law to provide Scarberry with notice of lapse or impending lapse.
As for the first issue, the Policy’s death benefit is payable only if Charles died while the Policy was “in full force.” The Policy is “in full force” only if premiums have been paid either on their “[ (1) ] Due Date or [ (2) ] within the grace period.” The Policy unambiguously dictates the “Due Date” applicable here was May 25,1996, the same day of the month as the Policy date. Scarberry did not pay the premium by May 25. She thus fails to satisfy the first alternative prong of the full force definition.
The determination of whether Charles died within the grace period is slightly more complex. According to the Withdrawal Agreement signed by Scarberry though, the parties
agree[d] that if any withdrawal for the payment of premium is dishonored ... the premium shall be considered to be in default and if payment of premium in default is not made within 31 days of the date on which such premium was due, the policy shall terminate____
Id. (emphasis added). The Policy’s grace period provision similarly provides “[y]ou have 31 days from a Due Date to pay a premium.” The default provision states that if the premium is not paid by the end of the grace period, it will be in default and not in full force. It further provides the date of default reverts back to the due date of the unpaid premium.
Under the most generous reading of the Policy then, given the due date of May 25, a death benefit would be payable only if Charles died on or before June 25, 31 days after the due date. Charles died on June 27. Accordingly, no death benefit was payable under the Policy.6
*361The Court next addresses whether Peoples had an explicit or implicit duty pursuant to the Policy or West Virginia law to provide Searberry with notice of lapse or impending lapse. Searberry does not suggest an explicit duty. She must therefore rely on the existence of an implicit duty, if one is available, in West Virginia decisional law.
The Court has reviewed the Policy in detail and every conceivably applicable West Virginia ease. No implicit duty exists. All of the cases cited by Searberry, or those located independently by the Court, that find or suggest such a duty are based either on (1) an explicit statutory or contractual provision; or (2) facts wholly distinguishable from the instant case. See, e.g., Conn v. Motorist Mut. Ins. Co., 190 W.Va. 553, 555, 439 S.E.2d 418, 420 (1993) (involving sufficiency of notice required explicitly by statute and contract);7 Firstbank Shinnston v. West Virginia Ins. Co., 185 W.Va. 754, 760, 408 S.E.2d 777, 783 (1991) (contractual duty); Smith v. Municipal Mut. Ins. Co., 169 W.Va. 296, 298, 289 S.E.2d 669, 670 (1982) (involving sufficiency of notice required explicitly by statute and contract); Staley v. Municipal Mut. Ins. Co., 168 W.Va. 84, 86, 282 S.E.2d 56, 58 (1981) (involving sufficiency of notice required explicitly by statute); Laxton v. National Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 150 W.Va. 598, 600, 148 S.E.2d 725, 727 (1966) (explicit contractual duty), overruled on other grounds by Smith, 169 W.Va. at 301, 289 S.E.2d at 671.8
*362The Court thus concludes Peoples breached no duty owed Scarberry. Accordingly, Peoples is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Scarberry’s breach of contract claim.
C. Unfair Trade Practices Claim:
The Court has determined Peoples faithfully discharged its contractual and statutory duties to Scarberry. This conclusion is consistent with the apparent lack of merit the West Virginia Insurance Commissioner accorded Scarberry’s complaints. For these reasons and others, the Court concludes Peoples is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Scarberry’s unfair trade practices claim.
III. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes there is no genuine issue of material fact and Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED and Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment is DENIED. This case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE and stricken from the docket of the Court.