1 In this disciplinary proceeding against a lawyer, the issues to be decided are: (1) Does the record submitted for our examination provide sufficient evidence for a meaningful de novo consideration of the complaint and of its disposition? 1 and (2) Is a suspension from the practice of law for six months an appropriate disciplinary sanction for respondent's breach of professional ethics? We answer the first question in the affirmative and the second in the negative.
INTRODUCTION TO THE RECORD
T2 The Oklahoma Bar Association (Bar) commenced this disciplinary proceeding on 15 August 2008 against W. Kirk Clausing (respondent or Clausing), a licensed lawyer, by filing a formal complaint in accordance with the provisions of Rule 6.1 of the Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings (RGDP).2 The complaint alleges in one count violations of the RGDP and of the Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct (ORPC).3 A trial panel of the Professional Responsibility Tribunal (trial panel or panel) conducted hearings (the PRT hearings) on 6 January 2009 to consider the charges. It recognized for the record the parties' stipulations and agreed conclusions of law. Left unresolved by the parties' stipulations was the discipline to be suggested for imposition. Respondent concedes (by stipulation) that his conduct violates RGDP Rule 1.3 4 and ORPC Rules 1.1,5 1.7 6 and 1.8.7
13 Upon completion of the hearing and consideration of the stipulations and testimony on file, the trial panel issued its report (which incorporates the parties' stipulations, but rejects certain tendered statements as not supported by the law and record),8 finding that respondent violated certain provi*1272sions of the rules of professional conduct. The panel recommended that the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six months and that he pay the costs imposed in this proceeding.
II
THE RECORD BEFORE THE COURT PROVIDES SUFFICIENT EVI DENCE FOR A MEANINGFUL DE NOVO CONSIDERATION OF ALL FACTS RELEVANT TO THIS PROCEEDING
T4 In a bar disciplinary proceeding the court functions as an adjudicative licensing authority that exercises exclusive original cognizance.9 Its jurisdiction rests on the court's constitutionally vested, nondelegable power to regulate the practice of law, including the licensure, ethics, and discipline of this state's legal practitioners.10 In deciding whether discipline is warranted and what sanction, if any, is to be imposed for the misconduct charged, the court conducts a full-scale, nondeferential, de novo examination of all relevant facts,11 in which the conclusions and recommendations of the trial panel are neither binding nor persuasive.12 In this undertaking we are not restricted by the seope-of-review rules that govern corrective relief on appeal or on certiorari, proceedings in which another tribunal's findings of fact may have to be left undisturbed by adherence to law-imposed standards of deference.13
T5 The court's duty can be discharged only if the trial panel submits to us a complete record of the proceedings.14 Our *1273initial task is to ascertain whether the tendered record is sufficient to permit (1) this court's independent determination of the facts and (2) its task of fashioning an appropriate discipline. The latter is that which (a) is consistent with the discipline imposed upon other lawyers who have committed similar acts of professional misconduct and (b) avoids the vice of visiting disparate treatment on the offending lawyer.15
T6 Having carefully serutinized the record submitted to us in this proceeding, we conclude that it is adequate for de novo consideration of respondent's alleged professional misconduct.
III
THE CHARGES AGAINST RESPONDENT
Count I-The Kulp Complaint
17 The charges against respondent arise from his handling of a spendthrift trust (Kulp Trust) established by Virginia K. Kulp, now deceased, for the benefit of her son, Jon Kulp (the life income beneficiary), and the remainder beneficiaries. Respondent had represented Mrs. Kulp over the years, advising her on tax matters, and preparing for her a will and a revocable trust. He prepared the Kulp Trust at her request in 1995 and served as a co-trustee at the trust's inception. He later succeeded as the sole trustee when the other co-trustee resigned in February 2007.16 The Kulp Trust funds were held in a cash management account at Merrill Lynch. Respondent was the primary decisionmaker for the types of investment to be made. In his capacity as trustee, respondent made two unauthorized withdrawals of trust funds for his personal use from the cash management account and paid trustee fees to himself in advance of earning those fees.
18 The May 2007 withdrawal. Respondent made the first unauthorized withdrawal on 18 May 2007 for $18,000 and noted on the check that it was for a "loan." On 29 May 2007 he made a partial repayment to the Kulp Trust of $8,000. He took money from the trust fund to relieve a personal financial crisis caused by an IRS notice of a lien levy on his office account. The withdrawn trust funds were used to pay his personal federal employment tax liability.
19 The July 2007 withdrawal. On 24 July 2007 respondent wrote a second unauthorized check on the Kulp Trust account for $27,500. According to respondent, the money was used to make a personal investment in a business opportunity-a stock subscription to an initial public offering. Trust funds were needed because the money he had intended to use for payment to Merrill Lynch of the subscription price had not arrived in time to meet the payment deadline. Three days later respondent repaid the Kulp trust $27,500 plus $50 interest.
110 The advancement of trustee fees. Respondent admits he had advanced the payment to himself of trustee fees before rendering the services. According to the record, this had been the practice of the Kulp co-trustees in previous years. He explained that the trustee fee was based on three-fourths of one percent of the average value of the trust. The fee advancements were made quarterly in an amount based upon this formula.
{11 When the beneficiaries discovered that respondent had made unauthorized withdrawals of trust funds, they demanded by letter of 28 September 2007 that he resign as trustee, remit the balance of the unpaid withdrawal and of any unearned trustee fees and transfer all trust records to a lawyer who had been engaged to assist them. *1274Respondent submitted his resignation by letter of 3 October 2007 and turned over the requested records. On 9 October 2007 respondent repaid the Kulp Trust $10,000 for the balance owed on the first withdrawal plus interest of $300 and for the unearned trustee fees ($660.84). On 28 November 2007 the beneficiaries filed a Bar grievance against respondent. They described the May and July withdrawals as serious breaches of the trust as well as violations of the Oklahoma Trust Act (60 0.8.2001 § 9).17 They claimed the advance withdrawals of "prepaid trustee fees" were "repetitive self-serving personal loans to the trustee to the detriment of the Trust and its beneficiaries."
IV
A LAWYER WHO SERVES IN A DUAL CAPACITY AS A LAWYER AND TRUSTEE MUST ADHERE TO ETHICAL RULES WHICH GOVERN THE CONDUCT REQUIRED OF LAWYERS
112 Vis-a-vis the Kulp Trust respondent acted in a dual capacity. He performed legal services by advising the settlor and drafting the trust document in which he was named a co-trustee. He also served in a fiduciary capacity gua co-trustee of the Kulp Trust. A lawyer who commingles the role of a lawyer with that of a fiduciary is not immune to and cannot escape disciplinary action for a breach of fiduciary duty occurring dehors the practice of law.18 He or she will be held both to the ethical standards for lawyers as well as to those governing fiduciaries.19
Respondent's Fiduciary Duty in Handling the Kulp Trust
118 A trustee is a fiduciary of the highest order in whom the hope and confidence of the settlor are placed with the expectation that the trustee will exercise the obligations of the office for the exclusive benefit of the cestui que trust.20 To the cestur que trust a trustee always owes wber-*1275rima fides (utmost good faith).21
114 A trustee must act with undivided loyalty to the beneficiaries.22 A gross breach of loyalty occurs when a trustee engages in self-dealing by unauthorized withdrawals of trust funds for the trustee's personal use.23
115 When a legal practitioner who occupies the position of trustee breaches that fiduciary obligation through mismanagement of the trust, that practitioner brings the legal profession into disrepute and, as a result, subjects himself (or herself) to bar discipline for acts contrary to prescribed standards of conduct.24 RGDP 1.3 commands that lawyers engage in behavior that helps maintain the reputable status of the entire legal profession.25 Strong and unswerving commitment to the value and virtue of fidu-clary loyalty is a sine gua non of the personal characteristics lawyers must have.26 A lawyer's breach of fiduciary loyalty signifies that he (or she) is incompetent to stand in the fiduciary role.
1 16 Respondent gua trustee had a fiduciary duty to invest and manage funds in the Kulp Trust "solely in the interest of the beneficiaries" 27 and not to place his own interests above those of the beneficiaries. He was a "trustee held to something stricter than the morals of the market *1276place."28
T17 As an attorney respondent should have been mindful of the strict standards of conduct to which a fiduciary is expected to adhere. The evidence clearly shows that respondent did not act within the prescribed standards of conduct mandated for a trustee. He took advantage of his position by "dipping" into trust funds for his own personal use in violation of his strict duty of loyalty to the trust beneficiaries.
118 Respondent failed to demonstrate competence in his handling of the Kulp Trust with respect to the trust funds that he withdrew for his personal use. He endangered the trust by taking money from the Kulp Trust without a written agreement or collateral.29 Respondent's failure to act with reasonable competence constituted a marked departure from the standards of competence required of trustees and imposed by ORPC Rule 1.1.
$19 Respondent admits that when he procured loans from the Kulp Trust while a co-trustee he did not comply with the procedure prescribed by RGPC Rule 1.8(a) and (b).30 He did not consult with anyone before making the two withdrawals (which he de-seribed as personal loans). The trust benefi-claries had neither affirmatively consented to his withdrawal of trust funds for his personal use nor had they been advised to seek independent legal counsel to protect their interests. Respondent states that while he did not conceal or misrepresent the personal nature of these withdrawals, he did not affirmatively disclose the withdrawals to the Kulp Trust beneficiaries. By his conduct respondent impermissibly used information obtained from his representation of the Kulp Trust, entered into a business transaction for purely personal gain and precipitated a conflict of interest between his fiduciary duties and purely personal interests.
120 Respondent specifically admits to a violation of ORPC Rules 1.1, 1.7, 1.8 and RGDP Rule 1.3. We accept respondent's admission and find from clear and convincing evidence that his conduct, which violated those rules, constitutes grounds for the imposition of professional discipline.
y
FACTORS CALLING FOR THE ENHANCEMENT OF DISCIPLINE
1 21 Respondent received in 1995 a private reprimand from this court for (1) failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness as the lawyer in two probate cases and (2) for failure to respond to the Bar in the course of its investigation.31 Today's proceeding is respondent's second appearance before a disciplinary tribunal.
VI
CONCESSION AS TO AVAILABLE MITIGATION
T22 Mitigating circumstances may be considered in assessing the appropriate quantum of discipline.32 The trial panel report contains numerous factors to be considered in mitigation. (1) There is evidence that respondent repaid with interest the money he took from the trust corpus. (2) Respondent promptly and voluntarily turned over all information associated with the Bar's investigation and cooperated fully, completely and candidly at all times in the Bar's investigation of the grievance. (8) Respondent has acknowledged and accepted responsibility for his professional misconduct. (4) After respondent was notified about the *1277Bar's investigation of the Kulp grievance, he instituted a program of monitoring on a monthly basis all other trust instruments through his defense counsel to insure that he was administering each instrument and performing its obligations as required by law. The record shows that respondent's misconduct did not cause grave economic harm.
{23 We have taken these matters into account in fashioning the appropriate measure of discipline.
VII
DISCIPLINE TO BE IMPOSED
124 A government's license to practice law is conferred not for the benefit of the individual licensee, but rather for that of the public.33 The disciplinary process, including the imposition of a sanction, is designed not to punish the delinquent lawyer, but to safeguard the interests of the public, those of the judiciary and of the legal profession.34 Disciplinary sanctions serve not only to deter the offending lawyer from committing similar acts in the future, but also operate to put other practitioners on notice that departures from ethical norms will not be tolerated.35 The measure of discipline imposed upon an offending lawyer should be consistent with the discipline visited upon other practitioners for similar acts of professional misconduct.36
1 25 The trial panel has recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six months. Respondent urges the court to fashion a disciplinary sanction that does not require a suspension of his license.37 In support of a less severe sanction Respondent notes (1) the Bar made no recommendation for discipline either in its trial brief or at the PRT hearing, (2) there was no economic harm to the Kulp Trust or to its beneficiaries and (8) he promptly and voluntarily repaid with interest the improper withdrawals of trust funds. The Bar urges that respondent's misconduct gua trustee warrants the full measure of a six-month suspension.
126 This court has imposed varying degrees of discipline upon lawyers for violating some or all of the rules we found to have been violated by the respondent. Respondent's admitted (1) violations of fiduciary duty, involving failure to adhere to the fidu-clary standards of conduct that are obligatory on a trustee, (2) the use of trust funds for his own personal purpose without anyone's consent or affirmative disclosure,38and (8) placing the trust fund in jeopardy by transactions that were neither put in writing nor collateralized. These are indeed very serious offenses.39
127 We conclude that a suspension for a period of one year, coupled with imposition of liability for costs incurred in this proceeding, is an appropriate measure of discipline to be imposed for the respondent's serious breach of professional discipline.
VIII
SUMMARY
T28 In sum, the record bears clear and convincing proof that respondent's participation in unprofessional conduct violates the rules that govern professional responsibility. After a thorough review of the record and *1278upon due recognition of all the factors tendered to us in mitigation,
1 29 RESPONDENT IS ORDERED DISCIPLINED (1) BY SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW FOR A PERIOD OF ONE YEAR AND (2) BY IMPOSITION OF COSTS OF THIS PROCEEDING, WHOSE PAYMENT SHALL BE DUE NOT LATER THAN NINETY DAYS AFTER THIS OPINION BECOMES FINAL.
30 EDMONDSON, C.J., and OPALA, KAUGER, WATT, WINCHESTER, COLBERT, REIF, JJ., concur.
1 31 TAYLOR, V.C.J., dissents.
1 32 HARGRAVE, J., not participating.