MEMORANDUM OPINION
This cause, coming on to be heard, was submitted on the pleadings, the order on the pre-trial hearing, the stipulation of facts entered into by counsel, the further stipulation that the issue of liability should be submitted to the court without the intervention of a jury and that if the issue of liability should be resolved by the court in favor of the plaintiffs, the issue of damages remaining would thereafter be tried to a jury.
After a careful consideration of the above and the briefs of counsel submitted herein, the court proceeds to enter the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The court finds the facts to be as stipulated by the parties.1
*885CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The court has jurisdiction of this action and the parties thereto.
This action is brought under § 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act [29 U.S.C. § 187] 2 for damages sustained as a result of an alleged secondary-boycott. The sole issue before the court is whether the conduct complained of is proscribed by the provisions of § 8(b) (4) of the National Labor Relations Act [29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4)].3
The court is of the opinion that the conduct complained of is not so proscribed. While the truck lease and service agreement between the plaintiffs and Southern Steel Products, Inc., was in effect, the plaintiffs’ truck drivers were members of the defendant Union and were covered by the supplemental collective bargaining agreement between Southem Electric Steel Company, Inc., and the defendant Union. Paragraph 5(r) of that agreement provided that:
“The Company shall have the option, to ship LTL shipments by common carrier, or to load on customers trucks.”
Thus, during the existence of the-lease and the collective bargaining agreement, deliveries were made by the plaintiffs’ trucks, which were then driven by members of the defendant Union, except when the Company exercised its option under paragraph 5(r) set out above. It appears, therefore, that by the activity complained of the Union was attempting-to recapture jobs which had been held by its members prior to the termination, of the truck lease contract. Such an attempt on the part of the Union is a. typical primary activity and thus lawful under § 8(b) (4).4
*886Incidental secondary effects of such conduct do not render that conduct illegal.5 An illegal “object” is something more than a result, even an inevitable result, of a work stoppage for a legitimate reason.6
Therefore, this court is of the opinion that the attempt on the part of the defendant Union to regain jobs previously held by its members is a legitimate primary activity and that the conduct complained of is not proscribed by § 8(b) (4).