MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter comes before the court on defendant Cody D. Glover’s motion to dismiss the indictment. The government indicted Glover on violations of subsections (1)(A) and (2) of 18 U.S.C. § 922(q), claiming the defendant possessed a firearm within a school zone.1 Glover maintains the indictment should be dismissed because § 922(q),2 which is known as the Gun-Free School Zones Act, is unconstitutional. He claims the statute “is an unconstitutional extension of federal control over public schools and is an unconstitutional exercise of the power of Congress to regulate activities affecting interstate commerce.” (Def.’s Memo, at 1-2.) The government contends the Commerce Clause permitted the congressional act in question.
Glover argues § 922(q) is an unconstitutional extension of federal control over public schools because the Constitution does not provide for the federal regulation or control of schools and education and because the Tenth Amendment states “powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are *1329reserved to the States.” See U.S. Const, amend. X. The defendant relies upon the long-recognized precept of constitutional law that there are restrictions upon Congress’ authority to enact legislation. See Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 325-26, 4 L.Ed. 97 (1816) (“The government ... of the United States, can claim no powers which are not granted to it by the constitution, and the powers actually granted, must be such as are expressly given, or given by necessary implication.”); see also United States v. Fox, 95 U.S. 670, 672, 24 L.Ed. 538 (1878) (“[A]n act committed within a State, ... cannot be made an offense against the United States, unless it have some relation to the execution of a power of Congress, or to some matter within the jurisdiction of the United States. An act not having any such relation is one in respect to which the State can alone legislate.”). Glover points out that regulation of education and control of schools traditionally has been left to the states, see Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104, 89 S.Ct. 266, 270, 21 L.Ed.2d 228 (1968); Petrey v. Flaugher, 505 F.Supp. 1087, 1090 (E.D.Ky.1981),3 and that Kansas is no exception. See Kan. Const, art. VI, § 1 (1859, amended 1966) (“The legislature shall provide for intellectual, educational, vocational and scientific improvement by establishing and maintaining public schools, educational institutions and related activities which may be organized and changed in such manner as may be provided by law.”); see also Kan. Const, art. VI, § 2 (1859, amended 1966) (state board of education “shall have general supervision of public schools, educational institutions and all the education interests of the state”); Kan. Const, art. VI, § 5 (1859, amended 1966) (“Local public schools under the general supervision of the state board of education shall be maintained, developed and operated by locally elected boards.”).
The defendant argues 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) impinges upon state and local law because state and local authorities have made provisions prohibiting scenarios similar to the allegations in this case. For example, Kansas law prohibits possession of a gun on school property or grounds, the violation of which is a class B misdemeanor. See K.S.A. 21-4204 (1992 Supp.). Additionally, the City of Wichita, Kansas has enacted an ordinance prohibiting the carrying of a concealed weapon. Violation of this ordinance is a misdemeanor, subjecting the violator to forfeiture of the weapon and a possible fine and jail term. See Wichita, Kan. Ordinances tit. 5, ch. 5.88, §§ 5.88.010(b), 5.88.090 (1987). Pursuant to the policy of the Wichita School Board, a student found in possession of a dangerous weapon on school property may be expelled. See Wichita, Kan., U.S.D. 259 Board Policy PL466 (Jan. 1993).4
Citing United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349, 92 S.Ct. 515, 523, 30 L.Ed.2d 488 (1971),5 *1330and United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 120-21, 61 S.Ct. 451, 460-61, 85 L.Ed. 609 (1941), Glover suggests a two-part analysis: (1) did Congress intend to supersede the states’ authority, and (2), if so, did Congress have the authority under the Constitution to enact the legislation? See United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1365 (5th Cir.1993) (“Congress’ power to use the Commerce Clause ... to impair a State’s sovereign status, and its intent to do so, are related inquiries.”). The defendant then argues the express language of § 922(q) evidences Congress’ intent to not supersede the states’ authority. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(3) (“Nothing in this subsection shall be construed as preempting or preventing a State or local government from enacting a statute establishing gun-free school zones as provided in this subsection.”). The defendant apparently is arguing this court need not reach the question of whether Congress had the power to enact the statute. Glover, however, also contends Congress lacked the authority to enact § 922(q). This contention will be addressed subsequently.
The government acknowledges the lack of an express constitutional provision authorizing Congress to regulate or control schools and education, but points out the lack of an express provision has not prevented federal legislation in a myriad of areas, such as the trafficking of drugs within a school zone. See 21 U.S.C. § 860; see, e.g., United States v. McDougherty, 920 F.2d 569, 572 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 911, 111 S.Ct. 1119, 113 L.Ed.2d 227 (1991) (“Congress has already determined, and the courts have accepted as rational, that drug trafficking affects interstate commerce. It would be highly illogical to believe that such trafficking somehow ceases to affect commerce when carried out within 1000 feet of a school.” (Citation omitted.)).6 The government also notes various federal constitutional and statutory provisions have been applied to the regulation and control of schools and education. See, e.g., Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., — U.S. -, -, 113 S.Ct. 2462, 2464, 125 L.Ed.2d 1, 7 (1993) (the Establishment Clause does not prevent a public school district from providing, pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Act, a sign language interpreter to a deaf student attending parochial school). Additionally, the government rebuts Glover’s Tenth Amendment concerns, arguing the Tenth Amendment, by definition, cannot prohibit constitutionally authorized congressional action. See New York v. United States, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992).
The New York decision discussed the “delicate balance” between state and federal authority, and although the case involved a challenge to three provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, the state-federal discussion is pertinent to the case at hand. Writing for the majority, Justice O’Connor stated:
In some cases the Court has inquired whether an Act of Congress is authorized by one of the powers delegated to Congress in Article I of the Constitution. See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 US 146,28 L Ed 2d 686, 91 S Ct 1357 (1971); McCulloch v. Maryland [17 U.S.], 4 Wheat 316, 4 L Ed 579 (1819). In other eases the Court has sought to determine whether an Act of Congress invades the province of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment. See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 US 528, 83 L Ed 2d 1016, 105 S Ct 1005 (1985); Lane County v. Oregon [74 U.S.], 7 Wall 71, 19 L Ed 101 (1869).... If a power is delegated to Congress in the Constitution, the Tenth Amendment expressly disclaims any reservation of that power to the States; ...
It is in this sense that the Tenth Amendment “states but a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered.” *1331United States v. Darby, 312 US 100, 124, 85 L Ed 609, 61 S Ct 451 [462], 132 ALR 1430 (1941)....
Congress exercises its conferred powers subject to the limitations contained in the Constitution____ The Tenth Amendment likewise restrains the power of Congress, but this limit is not derived from the text of the Tenth Amendment itself, which, as we have discussed, is essentially a tautology. Instead, the Tenth Amendment confirms that the power of the Federal Government is subject to limits that may, in a given instance, reserve power to the States. The Tenth Amendment thus directs us to determine ... whether an incident of state sovereignty is protected by a limitation on an Article I power.
This framework has been sufficiently flexible over the past two centuries to allow for enormous changes in the nature of government. The Federal Government undertakes activities today that would have been unimaginable to the Framers in two senses; first, because the Framers would not have conceived that any government would conduct such activities; and second, because the Framers would not have believed that the Federal Government, rather than the States, would assume such responsibilities. Yet the powers conferred upon the Federal Government by the Constitution were phrased in language broad enough to allow for the expansion of the Federal Government’s role.
... We have observed that the Supremacy Clause gives the Federal Government “a decided advantage in th[e] delicate balance” the Constitution strikes between State and Federal power. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 US [452], at -, [111 S.Ct. 2395, 2400, 115 L Ed 2d 410, 423 (1991) ].
The actual scope of the Federal Government’s authority with respect to the States has changed over the years, therefore, but the constitutional structure underlying and limiting that authority has not. In the end, just as a cup may be half empty or half full, it makes no difference whether one views the question at issue in this case as one of ascertaining the limits of the power delegated to the Federal Government under the affirmative provisions of the Constitution or one of discerning the core of sovereignty retained by the States under the Tenth Amendment.
— U.S. at---, 112 S.Ct. at 2417-19, 120 L.Ed.2d at 137-39 (citations omitted).
Glover’s two grounds for challenging the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) are but “mirror images of each other.” Id. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 2417, 120 L.Ed.2d at 137. Thus, the defendant’s dual challenge to § 922(q) may be addressed by focusing upon whether the Commerce Clause empowered Congress to enact the statute because, if so, there are no Tenth Amendment concerns.7
*1332Glover correctly assumes the government will argue the Commerce Clause8 permitted Congress tó enact the Gun-Free School Zones Act. Congress generally relies upon the Commerce Clause to enact federal criminal laws. See O’Rourke v. City of Norman, 875 F.2d 1465, 1469 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 918, 110 S.Ct. 280, 107 L.Ed.2d 260 (1989); 1 Ronald D..Rotunda & John E. Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law § 4.10(c) (1992). Under the Commerce Clause, Congress can regulate not only “the use of channels of interstate- or foreign commerce” and the “protection of the instrumentalities of interstate commerce ... or persons or things in commerce,” but also “activities affecting commerce.” Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150, 91 S.Ct. 1357, 1359, 28 L.Ed.2d 686 (1971). Here, the government argues guns in school zones affect commerce.
In support of his argument that Congress exceeded its authority to regulate interstate commerce in the passage of § 922(q), Glover primarily relies upon United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir.1993).9 In Lopez, the defendant successfully challenged the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(q). The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals opinion is a most comprehensive analysis of the Gun-Free School Zones Act and of federal firearm legislation in general. As the Lopez court noted, Congress did not address the basis for its authority to enact § 922(q)— there was no testimony before Congress nor any congressional findings that gun violence in schools affects interstate commerce. In fact, this was pointed out at a House subcommittee hearing on the proposed'legislation.10
The Fifth Circuit makes some import of Congress’ silence pertaining to findings under the Commerce Clause.11
We are unwilling to ourselves simply assume that the concededly intrastate conduct of mere possession by any person of any firearm substantially affects interstate commerce, or the regulation thereof, whenever it-occurs, or even most of the time *1333that it occurs, within 1000 feet of the grounds of any school, whether or not then in session. If Congress can thus bar firearms possession because of such a nexus to the grounds of any public or private school, and can do so without supportive findings or legislative history, on the theory that education affects commerce, then it could also similarly ban lead pencils, “sneakers,” Game Boys, or slide rules.
Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1366-67. Apparently, if Congress has done this, i.e., found some connection between the use of guns at the school place and interstate commerce, then the Fifth Circuit would have been unwilling to challenge the rational basis for such congressional findings.12 See Federal Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 754, 102 S.Ct. 2126, 2134, 72 L.Ed.2d 532 (1982) (“A court may invalidate legislation enacted under the Commerce Clause only if it is clear that there is no rational basis for a congressional finding that the regulated activity affects interstate commerce, or that there is no reasonable connection between the regulatory means selected and the asserted ends.”); see also id. (a congressional act is presumed constitutional); United States v. Agnew, 931 F.2d 1397, 1404 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 237, 116 L.Ed.2d 193 (1991) (same).
In the fall of 1993, perhaps in response to the Lopez decision, an amendment to the Gun-Free School Zones Act explicitly setting forth such findings was introduced in both the House of Representatives and the Senate.13 As Justice O’Connor noted in New *1334York, — U.S. at-, 112 S.Ct. at 2418-19, 120 L.Ed.2d at 138,
[t]he volume of interstate commerce and the range of commonly accepted objects of government regulation have ... expanded considerably in the last 200 years, and the regulatory authority of Congress has expanded along with them. As interstate commerce has become ubiquitous, activities once considered purely local have come to have effects on the national economy, and have accordingly come within the scope of Congress’ commerce power.14
Subsequent to the filing of the memoranda in this case, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals handed down its decision upholding the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) in United States v. Edwards, 13 F.3d 291 (9th Cir.1993).15 That circuit held with its view in United States v. Evans, 928 F.2d 858 (9th Cir.1991). The Edwards court stated that in Evans it had held “the violence created through the posséssion of firearms adversely affects the national economy, and consequently, it was reasonable for Congress to regulate the possession of firearms pursuant to the Commerce Clause.” Edwards, 13 F.3d at 292 (citing Evans, 928 F.2d at 862). Citing United States v. McDougherty, 920 F.2d 569, 572 (9th Cir.1990), the Edwards court concluded “[t]he addition of the condition ... that the firearms be possessed within 1000 feet of a school does not in any way diminish Congress’ power to regulate firearms under the Commerce Clause.” Edwards, 13 F.3d at 293.
Following Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 91 S.Ct. 1357, 28 L.Ed.2d 686 (1971), and Evans, 928 F.2d at 862, the Ninth Circuit in Edwards iterated its holding “that it is unnecessary for Congress to make express findings that a particular activity or class of activities affects interstate commerce in order to exercise its legislative authority pursuant to the Commerce Clause.” 13 F.3d at 293; see Perez, 402 U.S. at 154, 91 S.Ct. at 1361 (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 193, 88 S.Ct. 2017, 2022, 20 L.Ed.2d 1020 (1968)) (“Where the class of activities is regulated and that class is within the reach of federal power, the courts have no power ‘to excise, as trivial, individual instances’ of the class.”). Support also was drawn from the observation of Justice Powell in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 503, 100 S.Ct. 2758, 2787, 65 L.Ed.2d 902 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring), that “[ajfter Congress has legislated repeatedly in an area of national concern, its Members gain experience that may reduce the need for fresh hearings or prolonged debate when Congress again considers action in that area.” The Ninth Circuit simply inferred congressional authority to act federally in this area, finding no reason for Congress to further support its conclusions in the enactment of § 922(q).
The Fifth and Ninth Circuits sharply disagree on the interpretation of the following language found in the Perez decision: ‘We have mentioned in detail the economic, financial, and social setting of the problem as revealed to Congress. We do so not to infer that Congress need make particularized findings in order to legislate.” 402 U.S. at 156, 91 S.Ct. at 1362. In a footnote, the Fifth Circuit commented:
No citation of authority is given, nor is the meaning of the second sentence entirely clear. However, the opinion as a whole shows extensive consideration of and reli*1335anee on not only the evidence before Congress and the legislative history, but also the formal Congressional findings, which the Court had already observed were “quite adequate” to sustain the act.
Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1362 n. 41. The Ninth Circuit respectfully responded that “the Fifth Circuit ha[d] misinterpreted, or refused to follow the decisions of the United States Supreme Court that are binding on all courts inferior to our nation’s highest court.” Edwards, 13 F.3d at 293. According to the Ninth Circuit, the sentence the Fifth Circuit found unclear was crystalline if read in the context of the entire paragraph.16
Three district courts also have ruled on the constitutionality of the Gun-Free School Zone Act. Two courts found the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit persuasive. See United States v. Morrow, 834 F.Supp. 364 (N.D.Ala.1993);17 United States v. Trigg, 842 F.Supp. 450 (D.Kan.1994).18 Prior to the Ninth Cir*1336cuit’s decision in Edwards, one court upheld the constitutionality of § 922(q). See United States v. Holland, 1993 WL 415825 (E.D.Pa.1993).19
These decisions boil down to a philosophical difference. I suppose the distinctions of philosophy are best found in the reasoning of my colleague, Judge Wiseman, in United States v. Cortner, 834 F.Supp. 242 (M.D.Tenn.1993), a case in which the Anti Car Theft Act was held unconstitutional because the act lacked any rational nexus to interstate commerce. Judge Wiseman reasoned that notwithstanding congressional intent, courts should be unwilling to construe the Commerce Clause so broadly. He reminded us of the widely and historically held premise of government structure that law enforcement is primarily the business of state and local government, and that we, as a nation, deplore the idea of a national police force.
I find the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit persuasive, although I do not join in that circuit’s rebuke of the Fifth Circuit. The Perez decision is open to more than one interpretation. It appears, however, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals would agree with the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of Perez.20 The Tenth Circuit has stated:
the absence of formal findings concerning the effect on interstate commerce ... does not prevent Congress from regulating under the Commerce Clause. Only a rational basis need support a finding that a regulated activity affects interstate commerce and the means selected by Congress need only be reasonably adapted toward the permissible end.
Morgan v. Secretary of Housing and Urban Dev., 985 F.2d 1451, 1455 (10th Cir.1993) (citations omitted). In United States v. Lane, 883 F.2d 1484, 1492 (10th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1059,110 S.Ct. 872,107 L.Ed.2d 956 (1990), the Tenth Circuit rejected the defendants’ argument that Congress did not validly invoke its power under the Commerce Clause because ‘“there is absolutely no legislative history which reflects that Congress made any findings about racially motivated interference with employment and its effect on interstate commerce.’ ” The court reasoned “Congress is not required to make ‘particularized findings in order to legislate.’” Id. (quoting Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 156, 91 S.Ct. 1357,1362, 28 L.Ed.2d 686 (1971)); see Bolin v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 759 F.Supp. 692, 707 (D.Kan.1991) (Judge Theis cited the passage from Lane quoted above).
I believe a rational basis supports a finding that guns affect interstate commerce, and that prohibiting guns in school zones is a reasonable means of getting guns off the streets. In my view, given the situation as it exists in our present day society, the time has come for the full weight of the United States to be brought to bear in the area with which we are dealing. It should have taken *1337no hearing in 1990 for Congress to recognize the use of weapons, particularly in concert with drug activities and gang-related activities, seems to pervade our entire society. Every city has been impacted. The senseless violence resulting from the use of these weapons—random shootings, drive-by shootings—is commonplace. Regrettably, our young folks today have taken up these practices. It would appear that possession of a gun is a badge of honor. More importantly, is not the school ground a most important vestige, the one place where children are entitled to a safe and secure harbor free of fear and violence? Are not these children the nation’s future? Does Congress really need a hearing or further findings to recognize the importance of it all? I think not. In my view, enactment of § 922(q) is an important first step to bring to bear the prohibition of guns in the hands of anyone, particularly children at school. I have no problem with the Gun-Free School Zones Act. If the Tenth Circuit sees it otherwise, it may say so.
IT IS ACCORDINGLY ORDERED this 12th day of January, 1994, that defendant Glover’s motion to dismiss the indictment (Dkt. No. 19) is denied.