The plaintiff claims that the contract entered into ;he park commisioners for the paving of Fillmore avenue is ind, because the assessment therefor had not been previously irmed by the common council. This claim is based upon a ion of the charter of the city of Buffalo which prohibits that from entering into a contract for any work "or improvement, i certain immaterial exceptions, at a price exceeding $500, itil the assessment therefor has been confirmed.” Laws 1870, 3. 519, p. 1205, § 19, as amended by Laws 1885, chap. 181, p. § 20. The main question arising upon this appeal is whether section applies to the board of park commissioners and prefcs them from contracting without a previous confirmation of assessment.
he park commission was organized by chap. 165 of the Laws 869, entitled “ An act to authorize the selection and location ertain grounds for public parks in the city of Buffalo, and to ride for the maintenance and embellishment thereof.” This formed no part of the city charter and was in no way depend-thereupon. It created an independent department of the city srnment and clothed it with powqr to locate parks, to lay out roaches thereto, to appropriate and condemn. lands for these Doses, to make rules for the regulation, government and proron of the parks, and provided an elaborate system of procedto enable the commission to create, embellish and maintain :s with appropriate approaches for the benefit of the city,
he powers thus confided to the commission were to be exer1 independently, without the consent or approval of any other Y or officer. The year after the passage of this statute the charter was completely revised, but no part of the act of 1869 incorporated therein and the park commissioners were not in-ed among the officers of the city. Laws 1870, chap, 519. charter and the park commission act continued to be separ*334ate, although one or the other was amended almost every year,, until 1885, when the provisions of the latter were, in substance, added to one of the titles of the former. Laws 1885, chap. 181,¡ pp. 326, 330. The provisions added, however, were no more interdependent with the remaining provisions of the charter, than] the separate acts had been prior to the consolidation. The apparent object of such addition was to have all laws relating to the city government in its various departments embraced in a single statute for the sake of convenience. The park commissioners were not made city officers, but were still given “sole and exclusive power by contract or otherwise, to open, grade, construct, repair and maintain the roadways" and approaches tc the different parks, without leave or license from common counci or other agency of the city and even without the assent of the adjacent owners. They were required whenever any part of the work was assessable locally, to publish in the official paper notice of their intention to make the proposed improvement, for a spcci tied time, and after that to hear all interested persons upon the question of whether the work should be done or not. It is no probable that the legislature intended to provide for two hear ings upon the same question, one before the park commissioner and the other before the common council, or, by implication only to confer upon the latter body the power to determine that an in: provement ordered by the former should not be made. Thi would be inconsistent with “the sole and exclusive power” cor ferred upon the park commissioners with reference to the subjec of parks and their approaches. The object of § 19 title 9 of th charter was to provide for a hearing after confirmation of a assessment, so that the common council could then determim when all persons interested had been heard, whether to go on wit the work, or abandon the enterprise.
That section, as we think, applies exclusively' to the reguh municipal government and to the contracts made by it, throug its common council, because it would enable that body to decic intelligently, and before it was too late to recede, the question su' mitted to its exclusive jurisdiction whether a public improverner devised by it and for which it only was responsible, should 1 contracted for or not. We do not think that it applies to tl park commissioners or to the contracts made by them, becau the common council has no power to decide whether such co tracts are to be made or not, as the entire subject is express committed to an independent department of the city governmei The only duty of the common council in the matter is to raise 1 local assessment one-half the cost of such improvement as t park commissioners may determine upon, not exceeding, ho ever, the limitation of the statute as to amount. While § 19 sa that “ the city shall not enter into a contract" until the asse ment has been confirmed, the history and nature of the two a referred to show that the reference is to the city as governed the mayor and common council, and not to the park depa ment
The interpretation of a statute should accord with its meanii *335and a liberal rather than a literal construction should prevail when it leads to a discovery of the real intention of the legislature. Dwar. on Stat., 690; Plowd., 205.
The contract, as embraced in the written proposal and the resolution of acceptance, was between the defendant Barber and the park commissioners, not between the city and Barber. While the written agreement was in form between “ the city of Buffalo by the park commissioners,” it was notwithstanding the contract of the commissioners, as an independent department of the city, as appears from the reference therein to the proceedings of the board upon which it depended for validity. As the city was to pay for the work, and to have the sole benefit thereof, the contract was its contract in that sense, but not within the meaning of said § 19, which refers to contracts made by the regular officers of the municipal government, and not to those made by a separate department possessing independent corporate powers. The subject has been so fully considered by the learned general term as to require no further discussion on our part.
The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.
All concur, except Bradley and Haight, JJ., not sitting.