This petitioner having been brought before a justice of this court on habeas corpus, the questions presented have been adjourned into the full court for decision, conformably to the provisions of the statute. It appears by the return, that the petitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the governor, as a fugitive from the justice of the state of Maine, charged with the crime of larceny, to be delivered to the agent of Maine appointed by the governor of that state to receive her. Several questions are presented respecting the validity of the proceedings.
*224The papers returned with the warrant are, first, a copy of the requisition of the governor of Maine. It states that she is “ charged with the crime of larceny, as will more fully appear by the papers hereunto annexed, which I certify to be authentic; ” and that she is a fugitive from justice; and he therefore requests that she be delivered up.*
The papers referred to, which accompanied the requisition, were, a complaint made on oath to Atkinson Hobart, a trial justice for the county of Penobscot in Maine, charging Mrs. Kings-bury with larceny, in the usual form, sworn to October 27,1870 ; a warrant of the magistrate, in the usual form, on the same day, for her arrest; a return of non est inventus, made thereon by a deputy sheriff on the 31st of October; and affidavits of several witnesses stating circumstances tending to prove the larceny.
To these papers are added a certificate of the attorney general of this Commonwealth, that he had examined the requisition and other documents accompanying it, and is of opinion that a warrant may properly issue for her arrest, and that she may properly be given up to the agent appointed in the requisition to receive her.
*225The U. S. St. of 1793, c. 7, § 1,* requires three things: 1. That the fugitive must be demanded by the executive of the state from which he has fled 2. A copy of an indictment found, or an affidavit made before a magistrate, charging the fugitive with having committed the crime. 3. Such copy of the indictment or affidavit must be certified as authentic by the executive. Clark’s case, 9 Wend. 212, 219. State v. Schlemn, 4 Harrington, 579, Romaine’s case, 23 Cal. 585.
Our statute (Gen. Sts. c. 177, § 1) requires that the demand of the executive shall be accompanied by sworn evidence that the party charged is a fugitive from justice; and by a duly attested copy of an indictment, or a duly attested copy of a complaint made before a court or magistrate authorized to receive the same, such complaint to be accompanied by affidavits to the facts constituting the offence charged, by persons having actual knowledge thereof, and such further evidence in support thereof as the governor may require. Section 2 authorizes the governor to require the attorney general to investigate the matter and report to him. Section 3 provides that, if the governor is satisfied that the demand is conformable to law and ought to be complied with, he shall issue his warrant. This provision makes his decision conclusive, unless there is some defect apparent on the record.†
*226It is contended that there is no certificate of allegation that the justice before whom the complaint and affidavits purport to be sworn to is a magistrate, in due form. But we think that, within the statute of the United States, and our own statute, the certificate of the governor sufficiently authenticates these papers as being sworn to before a magistrate.
It is further contended that they are not annexed to the requisition. But the statute only requires that they shall “ accompany ” it, and the governor of this state has found them to be sufficient.
*227The affidavits show that the prisoner’s home was in Boston, and that she went to Maine and did the acts complained of, which are alleged to constitute a larceny, and soon afterwards returned to Boston before the alleged larceny was known. It is contended that one who goes into a state and commits a crime and returns home cannot properly be called a fugitive. We are referred to the opinion of the attorney general of Pennsylvania, stated in Hurd on Habeas Corpus, 606, as an authority for this position. But we do not think it is sustained by a reasonable construction of either of the statutes above referred to. The material facts are, that the prisoner is charged with a crime in the manner prescribed, and has gone beyond the jurisdiction of the state, so that there has been no reasonable opportunity to prosecute him after the facts were known. The fact in this case, that she returned to her permanent home, cannot be material.
It is further contended that the warrant of our governor is insufficient, inasmuch as it does not recite more fully the facts on which it is founded. It contains a general recitation of the requisition, and that he is satisfied that the demand is conformable to law and ought to be complied with.* This meets all the require*228ments of the statutes. It is not necessary that the guilt of the alleged fugitive should be inquired into. It is sufficient that the crime of larceny has been properly charged, and that the prisoner is a fugitive, and a requisition has been properly made.
Prisoner remanded to the custody of the officer.