In the exercise of our supervisory jurisdiction, we granted the State’s application for writs in order that we might review the district court’s judgment sustaining defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized upon the search of defendant’s apartment. Art. VII, Sec. 10, La.Const. of 1921.
On December 8, 1971, D. A. Invest. J. M. Mergen and Dy. W. Ryals swore out an affidavit which recites in part:
“That probable cause does exist for the issuance of a search warrant authorizing the search of Apartment # 62, Mark III Apartments, 2720 Alaska St., Baton Rouge, La.
“A quantity of Narcotic drugs,
“Marijuana, and L.S.D. and equipment used in their administration and use is (are) believed to be secreted or concealed, and such probable cause is based upon the following: Affiants inform the court that on Nov. 30, 1971, a confidential and reliable informant who has proven reliable in the past by giving the affiants information which has led to the arrest of several persons in the Baton Rouge area for various narcotic violations, did while working under the supervision of the affiants purchase a ‘lid’ of marijuana from a subject in the above apartment. Affiants further inform the court that the time the informant made the above buy he was under the direct observation of the affiants.
“Affiants further inform the Court that on November 23, 1971, the same informant purchased a quantity of hashish from the occupant of apartment # 61, 2720 Alaska St. and further that the occupants of both of these apartments are close associates and visit each others apartments regularly.”
Pursuant to the above affidavit, a warrant issued and was executed on December 8, 1971. The return to the search warrant *365recites that the following property was found and seized:
“One (1) matchbox, containing suspected Marijuana seeds.
“A brown vegetable-like substance, in a frying pan, suspected to be Marijuana.
“Three (3) Plastic bags, containing a small amount of green vegetable-like material, suspected to be Marijuana.”
On April 7, 1972, a bill of information was filed against Gary Hightower and Jeff Young, charging that on December 8, 1971, they “unlawfully did attempt to violate L. R.S. 40:971 (c) in that they knowingly and intentionally did attempt to possess a controlled dangerous substance, to-wit: Marijuana.”
A motion to suppress was filed, and after hearing on July 6, 1972, the trial judge sustained the motion, stating:
“But under the articulated facts of this situation and articulated facts of this application or affidavit of this search warrant, I think the error that the Judge fell into, when he considered a reference to a prior sale from another premise, which should not have been a factor in considering whether or not probable cause existed to issue this warrant on December 8th for a sale that had been made in another premise on November 30th. So, really, you got a week there — November 23rd they made a buy, allegedly made a buy in Apartment 61; and on November 30th they allegedly made a buy in Apartment 62, but we don’t know from whom; but I see no connection between the 61 and 62 in determining whether or not on the 8th there was probable cause to search apartment 62.”
The State contends that the trial court erred in ruling that a lapse of nine days from the receipt of the information to the execution of a search warrant is of itself sufficient to render the search invalid.
Article 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides:
“A search warrant may issue only upon probable cause established to the satisfaction of the judge, by the affidavit of a credible person, reciting facts establishing the cause for issuance of the warrant.
“A search warrant shall include a reasonable description of the things to be seized. When a warrant authorizes the search of a place, it shall designate the place to be searched. * * * ”
Article 163 of the Code of Criminal Procedure recites that a search warrant cannot be lawfully executed after the expiration of the tenth day after its issuance. The Official Revision Comment states that the nine-day period formerly provided for the expiration of the warrant has been increased to ten days.
The nine days which elapsed between November 30, 1971, the date of the alleged purchase of a “lid” of marijuana from a subject in defendant’s apartment and the date of the application for the instant search warrant and the date of search, December 8, 1971, do not constitute remoteness of time under the facts and circumstances of this case. Had the search warrant issued on November 30, 1971, ten days were permitted by Article 163 supra for its execution; December 8, 1971 was therefore within the contemplated legal limitation. Police investigative work concerning dangerous substances is technical, studied, and secret. It is time-consuming because of the peculiarity of the matter involved.
The important issue herein involved is whether the affidavit supra expressed probable cause for the issuance of the instant search warrant.
In the trial court, defendant argued that the affidavit supra was deficient for establishing probable cause for the issuance of the warrant, and that the marijuana transaction recited in the affidavit was stale and inadequate.
*366In United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965), the United States Supreme Court stated:
“While a warrant may issue only upon a finding of ‘probable cause,’ this Court has long held that ‘the term “probable cause” means less than evidence which would justify condemnation,’ Locke v. United States, 7 Cranch 339, 348, 3 L.Ed. 364, and that a finding of ‘probable cause’ may rest upon evidence which is not legally competent in a criminal trial. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 311, 79 S.Ct. 329, 332, 3 L.Ed.2d 327. As the Court stated in Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 173, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1309, 93 L.Ed. 1879, 'There is a large difference between the two things to be proved [guilt and probable cause], as well as between the tribunals which determine them, and therefore a like difference in the quanta and modes of proof required to establish them.’ Thus hearsay may be the basis for issuance of the warrant ‘so long as there * * * [is] a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay.’ Jones v. United States, supra, 362 U.S. [257], at 272, 80 S.Ct. [725], at 736 [, 4 L.Ed.2d 697]. And, in Aguilar we recognized that ‘an affidavit may be based on hearsay information and need not reflect the direct personal observations of the affiant,’ so long as the magistrate is ‘informed of some of- the underlying circumstances’ supporting the affiant’s conclusions and his belief that any informant involved ‘whose identity need not be disclosed * * * was “credible” or his information “reliable.” ’ Aguilar v. State of Texas, supra, 378 U.S. [108], at 114, 84 S.Ct. [1509], at 1514 [12 L.Ed.2d 723].”
In speaking of the decisions above quoted and cited, the Court In Ventresca stated : “These decisions reflect the recognition that the Fourth Amendment’s commands, like all constitutional requirements, are practical and not abstract. If the teachings of the Court’s cases are to be followed and the constitutional policy served, affidavits for search warrants, such as the one involved here, must be tested and interpreted by magistrates and courts in a commonsense and realistic fashion. They are normally drafted by nonlawyers in the midst and haste of a criminal investigation. Technical requirements of elaborate specificity once exacted under common law pleadings have no proper place in this area. A grudging or negative attitude by reviewing courts toward warrants will tend to discourage police officers from submitting their evidence to a judicial officer before acting.” (Emphasis ours.) See, 47 Am.Jur., Searches and Seizures, Secs. 21-26, pp. 516-519; United States v. Permisohn, D.C., 339 F.Supp. 52 (1971).
In Berger v. State of New York, 388 U. S. 41, 87 S.Ct. 1873, 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1967), the United States Supreme Court held that probable cause under the Fourth Amendment exists where the facts and circumstances within the affiant’s knowledge, and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient unto themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been or is being committed.
The decisions of the United States Supreme Court concerning Fourth Amendment probable cause requirements before a warrant for either arrest or search can issue require that the judicial officer issuing such a warrant be supplied with sufficient information to support an independent judgment that probable cause exists for the warrant. Whiteley v. Warden, Wyoming State Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560, 91 S.Ct. 1031, 28 L.Ed.2d 306 (1971).1
*367 Any reasonable and prudent man, if he had had in his possession the information which D. A. Invest. J. M. Mergen and Dy. W. Ryals had at the time they applied for the search warrant to search defendant’s apartment, would have believed that there was probable cause for the search of the said apartment for dangerous substances. It thus follows that the judge who issued the present warrant was supplied by the officers with sufficient information to make an independent judgment that probable cause existed and that he was justified in issuing a search warrant. As stated in Ventresca, supra, “probable cause” means less than evidence which would justify condemnation. Cf. United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 91 S.Ct. 2075, 29 L.Ed.2d 723 (1971).
Guilt or innocence found by a jury at the end of a trial is not to be confused with the finding that should be made at the hearing of a motion to suppress. The hearing of such a motion does not demand the strict and rigid formalities of trial; hearsay, if credible, may be the basis for the issuance of a search warrant; the objects seized should not be suppressed from evidence merely because of strained technicalities. Cf. United States v. Thomas, D.C.App., 294 A.2d 164; 409 U.S. 992, 93 S.Ct. 341, 34 L.Ed.2d 258 (1972); 409 U.S. 1006, 93 S.Ct. 448, 34 L.Ed.2d 296.2
It .is true as stated by the trial judge at the hearing of the motion to suppress that some searches could be embarrassing and result in the charging of an innocent host and hostess. However, this is just an unfortunate coincidence of the conduct of guests reflecting on his host and hostess. Certainly, innocent parties would be entitled to exonerate themselves and prove that they did not cooperate in the possession of dangerous substances.
The addition to the affidavit of an allegation respecting the friendship which existed between the defendant and his neighbor concerns a matter which will probably be adduced in evidence. If adduced, it will be considered by the jury in its deliberations. We find that probable cause was expressed in the affidavit, supra, without the additional paragraph con*368cerning the relationship of the apartment residents.
We conclude that probable cause was expressed in the instant affidavit, and that it was sufficient and adequate (not stale) for the issuance of a search warrant directing the search of defendant’s apartment. The trial judge therefore should have denied the motion to suppress the evidence herein seized. Cf. State v. O’Brien, 255 La. 704, 232 So.2d 484 (1970).
For the reasons assigned, the Writ of Certiorari herein issued is made peremptory; the judgment of the trial court which sustained the motion to suppress is reversed and set aside; the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
BARHAM, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
TATE, J., joins in BARHAM, J.’s dissent.
DIXON, J., dissents.