Appellants appeal from the appointment of a trustee in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy. For the reasons stated below, we vacate the appointment of a trustee and remand for further proceedings.
I.
BACKGROUND
This is an appeal from the district court’s appointment of a trustee for Cajun Electric Power Cooperative, Inc. (“Cajun”). The district court appointed a trustee because it found that conflicts of interest existed among Cajun’s board members, and because it felt that the appointment of a trustee would be in the best interest of all parties.
Cajun’s financial problems can be traced back to its ill-fated investment in Gulf States Utilities’ River Bend Nuclear Power Facility (“River Bend”). Cajun borrowed at least $1.6 billion from the Rural Utilities Service (“RUS”), an agency of the federal government, to invest in River Bend. The investment went sour, and Cajun has since sued Gulf States Utilities on the grounds that it was fraudulently induced to invest in River Bend.
Cajun’s financial problems came to a head when the Louisiana Public Service Commission (“LPSC”) ordered Cajun to lower its rates. Because it could not meet its debt obligations under the lower rates, Cajun filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 the same day that the rate decrease went into effect.
The conflicts among Cajun’s board members became apparent when the board had to decide whether to appeal the LPSC’s order to lower Cajun’s rates. This decision was made difficult by the fact that Cajun’s board members were managers or board members of its twelve member companies, who bought all of their electricity from Cajun. If they voted to appeal the rate decrease, they would be attempting to raise the price of electricity charged to the'member-customers for which they worked. On the other hand, if the prices were lowered, it would be more difficult for Cajun to pay its debt obligations. Several board members resigned because of this conflict, but the board ultimately decided to appeal the rate decrease. The appeal, however, was not successful.
The RUS, along with some of Cajun’s other creditors, moved for the appointment of a trustee. The district court granted this motion, finding that a trustee should be appointed because of the conflict of interest created by the fact that Cajun’s board members owed duties of loyalty to Cajun, to Cajun’s creditors, and to Cajun’s member-customers. Cajun appeals from the appointment of a trustee.
II.
APPEALABILITY OF THE APPOINTMENT OF A TRUSTEE
We turn first to the issue of whether the appointment of a trustee is presently appealable. Because this is an appeal from a district court sitting in bankruptcy, our jurisdiction is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (“Section 1291”). Section 1291 provides that this Court has “jurisdiction of appeals from final decisions of the district courts.... ” Thus, whether the district court’s appointment of a trustee is appealable turns on whether it is viewed as a final order.
Normally, a final order is one that ends the litigation in the trial court. However, because of considerations unique to bankruptcy appeals — such as the protracted nature of bankruptcy proceedings and the large number of parties interested in them- — courts have applied liberalized rules of finality for *1217bankruptcy appeals. The appellees, citing Matter of Hawaii Corp., 1 argue that these liberalized rules apply only to appeals from a district court’s review of a bankruptcy court’s decision pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) (“Section 158(d)”), not to appeals from a district court sitting in bankruptcy pursuant to Section 1291. Other circuits, however, have refused to follow Matter of Hawaii Corp. They “see no reason ... for interpreting the word ‘final’ in [Section] 1291 differently from the way [they interpret] it in ... Section 158(d).”2 We too see no reason to apply different rules of finality for Section 1291 appeals, and will apply the same rules that we apply to Section 158(d) appeals.
Applying this liberalized concept of finality, we must now determine whether the appointment of a trustee in a Chapter 11 case is a final, appealable order. This is a question of first impression in this circuit. The only case in this circuit addressing the appealability of the appointment of a trustee, In re Delta Services Industries,3 is inapplicable to the case at bar. In re Delta Services Industries held that the appointment of an interim trustee in a Chapter 7 ease is not immediately appealable. However, that case involved an interim trustee, the appointment of which “constitutes only a preliminary step in [a debtor’s] liquidation.”4 The case at bar, on the other hand, involves the appointment of a permanent trustee who is to negotiate a plan of reorganization.
Four other circuits have allowed appeals from the appointment of a trustee.5 Of those four, the First Circuit gave the most convincing rationale for asserting appellate jurisdiction. First, it noted that the appointment of a trustee in a Chapter 11 case is “a decision of a significant and discrete dispute.”6 It then went on to state that:
It seems plain that the decision of an appeal from the court’s order [appointing a trustee] could not be meaningfully postponed until the end of the entire Chapter 11 proceeding. If an appeal were postponed until a plan of reorganization were confirmed, there would be no satisfactory way to vindicate the [debtor’s rights].7
This rationale is well-reasoned. Without an immediate appeal, a debtor would have no effective relief from an erroneous appointment. The only option would be an appeal after a plan of reorganization was confirmed. By that time, the debtor would already have been out of possession for months, if not years, and the only relief would be to vacate the plan of reorganization and start new negotiations with creditors. An immediate appeal is a better option. Consequently, we hold that the appointment of a trustee in a Chapter 11 ease is an immediately appealable final order.
III.
STANDING
The appellees challenge the appellants’ standing to bring this appeal. Only one appellee, Central Louisiana Electric Company, Inc. (“CLECO”), actually challenges Cajun’s standing.8 CLECO argues *1218that Cajun lacks standing because it is “hopelessly insolvent.” To have standing to appeal a bankruptcy .order, a party must show that it was “directly and adversely affected pecuniarily by” the order, or that the order diminished its property, increased its burdens or impaired its rights.9 CLECO argues that Cajun is so insolvent that it lacks any hope of return under any reorganization, and is thus not adversely affected by the appointment of a trustee. CLECO’s argument is without merit. When the trustee was appointed, Cajun lost all the rights it had as a debtor-in-possession, including the right to operate its business. Clearly, it was aggrieved by losing the right to run itself. Accordingly, we hold that Cajun has standing to prosecute this appeal.
Although the appellees questioned the standing of the other appellants, we will only address the issue of whether appellant Cajun has standing. Because we hold that Cajun has standing, we need not consider whether the other parties have standing. The other parties raise the same issue on appeal — the propriety of the appointment of the trustee— as Cajun. Thus, whether they have standing to prosecute this appeal is of no consequence; because Cajun has standing, we can decide whether the district court erred in appointing a trustee even if the other appellants do not.
TV.
THE APPOINTMENT OF A TRUSTEE
We now turn to the sole substantive issue in this appeal, whether the district court erred in appointing a trustee. The district court justified its appointment on two grounds: First, it held that there was cause to appoint a trustee under 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1); and second, it held that the appointment of a trustee was in the best interest of the parties under 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(2). The district court’s appointment of a trustee is reviewable only for abuse of discretion.10 Our review of the record convinces us that the district court abused its discretion in appointing a trustee.
We will first review whether the appointment of the trustee can be justified under 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (“Section 1104(a)(1)”). Section 1104(a)(1) provides that a court shall order the appointment of a trustee—
for cause, including fraud, dishonesty, incompetence or gross mismanagement of the affairs of the debtor by current management, either before or after the commencement of the case, or similar cause....
The appointment of a trustee pursuant to Section 1104(a)(1) is an extraordinary remedy, and there is a strong presumption that the debtor should be permitted to remain in possession absent a showing of need for the appointment of a trustee.11 The parties moving for the appointment of a trustee have the burden of proof, which they must meet by clear and convincing evidence.12
The district court gave several reasons for appointing a trustee,13 but they all stemmed from one conflict of interest: Cajun’s inherent conflict between the interests of its member-customers, who want low rates, and those of its creditors, who want to raise *1219rates.14 However, because this inherent conflict results from Cajun’s organizational structure — a structure that Congress encouraged it to adopt — the conflict is insufficient to justify the appointment of a trustee.
Congress intended that utilities which borrowed from the RUS be cooperatives. The Rural Electrification Act of 193615 is set up to favor cooperatives. Specifically, it provides that in making loans, the Administrator “shall give preference to ... cooperative, nonprofit and limited dividend associations ....” 16 In fact, according to the parties’ stipulation in this case, all electric generation and transmission companies receiving loans from the RUS are organized as cooperatives. The fact that Congress and the RUS encouraged — -if not required — Cajun to organize itself as a cooperative leads us to believe that any conflict inherently arising from Cajun’s organization as a cooperative is insufficient to justify the appointment of a trustee. Further, holding that these inherent conflicts constitute cause for appointing a trustee would create a per se rule permitting the appointment of a trustee in any case involving a cooperative. Nothing in the Bankruptcy Code or its legislative history indicates that Congress intended such a per se rule. In fact, when Congress wanted to create special rules for certain types of businesses, it did so.17 Congress did not create such a per se rule, and we refuse to create one by judicial fiat.
Because all of the conflicts found by the district court arose from Cajun’s organizational structure, we hold that the district court erred in finding that cause existed to appoint a trustee.
Appellees cite In re Colorado-Ute Electric Ass’n, Inc. 18 for the proposition that the conflicts inherent in any cooperative justify the appointment of a trustee. That ease, however, is distinguishable. In Colorado-Ute, the district court found that the debtor had committed a number of bad acts, including making transfers on the eve of bankruptcy in an effort to destroy the RUS’ security interest, and that the debtor had an incompetent board and management. Cajun, on the other hand, has committed no such bad acts, and the district court did not find its management or board incompetent. Thus, the factors justifying the appointment of a trustee in Colorado-Ute are not present in the instant case.19
The district court also justified its appointment of a trustee upon Section 1104(a)(2). That section provides that the district court shall appoint a trustee when such an appointment is in the best interests of all the parties. The district court found that the appointment of a trustee was in the best interests of the parties because of the conflicts *1220discussed above. However, just as such conflicts do not justify the appointment of a trustee for cause pursuant to Section 1104(a)(1), they also do not make the appointment of a trustee in the best interests of the parties under Section 1104(a)(2).20 Further, the fact that the debtor and several creditors are appealing the trustee’s appointment is evidence that the appointment was not in their best interest.21 Thus, we hold that the district court erred in finding that the appointment of a trustee was in the parties’ best interests.
In closing, we note that our vacation of the appointment of the trustee does not leave the parties’ best interests unprotected. The bankruptcy court, even with the debtor in possession, can still enter orders in the reorganization plan to be adopted and the lack of the trustee is not an impediment to this inherent power of the bankruptcy court.
Y.
CONCLUSION
Because the district court erred in appointing a trustee, we VACATE the appointment of the trustee and REMAND this case for further proceedings.