ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN HABEAS CORPUS
The petitioner Cooper brings a proceeding in habeas corpus on the complaint that he is unlawfully restrained by the Jackson County jailer. The petitioner is held in custody under a commitment by the circuit judge in execution of sentence upon revocation of probation. The term of probation of the petitioner was extended under the authority of § 549.071 on June 18, 1979, and then revoked. The petitioner contends that § 549.071 was effectively repealed prior to the date of extension, and so was discharged from probation by operation of law on June 21, 1979, when the original term of probation expired without event. Cooper seeks to give effect to that discharge by the writ of habeas corpus.
The petitioner Cooper entered pleas of guilty on July 21, 1977, to two counts of the possession of a controlled substance and was sentenced to concurrent two-year terms. The execution of the sentences was suspended and the petitioner was placed on probation for two years on conditions. On June 18, 1979, the circuit judge extended the probation for an additional three years *217under § 549.071. The petitioner was then convicted of negligent manslaughter and, on July 20, 1981, the circuit judge revoked probation. The petitioner contended on that hearing, as he contends by habeas corpus, that § 549.071 was repealed on January 1, 1979, and so the circuit judge was without authority in June of 1979, to extend the term of probation by a procedure already null.
The original grant of probation, after confession of guilt by plea, was entered on July 21,1977, under the power conferred on a court by § 549.061. The extension of the term of probation for an additional three years was exercised on June 18, 1979, under the power conferred on a court by § 549.-071. That enactment reads, inter alia:
1. ... In the case of a felony offense no probation under this chapter shall be granted for a term of less than one year, and no probation shall be granted for a term of longer than five years . . . The court may extend the term of the probation, but no more than one extension of any probation may be ordered.
In year 1977 the General Assembly reconstituted [with some exception] the criminal statutes of the state into a single coherent code of law for prospective effect on January 1, 1979. The legislative instrument for that enactment was Senate Bill 60. The new criminal code enacted two hundred twenty-two new sections in lieu of statutes on the same subject massively repealed. One subject of the Senate Bill 60 repealer and enactment anew was Probation chapter 559. The provisions of that new chapter neither empower nor prohibit an extension of probation. The plaintiff Cooper contends that the legislative history of Senate Bill 60 shows that § 549.071 was repealed — and with that rescission, the power of a court to extend a term of probation lapsed on January 1, 1979.
The career of Senate Bill 60 as reported in the official journals of the General Assembly discloses that the repeal of § 549-071 was declared in the title of the bill but not as a subject enacted. Thus, Senate Bill 60, as truly agreed on and finally passed, did not formally enact a repeal of § 549.-071.1 Mo.Const. Art. Ill, §§ 22 and 23 (1945 as amended). The plaintiff contends that the neglect to include § 549.071 within the subject matter of the enactment clause of the repeals notwithstanding, the clear intent of the legislative history to nullify § 549.071 should be given effect — or, if not as a repeal by explicit enactment, then as a repeal by implication. To the contention of explicit repeal by legislative intent, we say only that intent is no substitute for enactment, especially where the criminal law is concerned. State v. Eye, 415 S.W.2d 729, 730[1] (Mo.1967); 1A C. Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 18.07 (4th ed. 1972). To the contention of repeal by impli*218cation,2 the criminal code by plenary declaration excludes from its terms encompassed offenses committed before January 1, 1979. The code states:
Section 556.031. Application to offenses committed before and after enactment.
⅜ * ‡ ⅜ ‡ ‡
3. The provisions of this code do not apply to or govern the construction of and punishment for any offense committed prior to January 1, 1979, or the construction and application of any defense to a prosecution for such an offense. Such an offense must be construed and punished according to the provisions of law existing at the time of the commission thereof in the same manner as if this code had not been enacted, the provisions of section 1.160, RSMo, notwithstanding. [emphasis added]
The direction of that section that an offense committed before the effective date of the code — January 1, 1979 — be construed and punished according to the then extant law affects the gamut of the criminal proceeding from prosecution [State v. Thompson, 588 S.W.2d 36, 38[5] (Mo.App.1979) ] to conviction and punishment [State ex rel. Peach v. Bloom, 576 S.W.2d 744, 746[3] (Mo. banc 1979)] to the incident of eligibility for parole [Parrish v. Wyrick, 589 S.W.2d 74, 79[6, 7] (Mo.App. banc 1979) ]. Nor [in the terms of argument] does § 556.031.3 preserve to a prosecution only the “substantive” components of a criminal statute repealed by the Code so as to cede the “procedural” incidents of that offense — a permissible term of probation,3 among them — to the Code *219reenactment of the offense. The prescription of § 556.031.3 is absolute. State ex rel. Peach v. Bloom, 576 S.W.2d 744 (Mo. banc 1979). That peremptory direction extends even to nullify any melioration of penalty § 1.160 would otherwise work by the Code repeal and reenactment of the criminal statutes. State v. Bey, 599 S.W.2d 243, 246[2] (Mo.App.1980).
Thus, were we to assume that the criminal code repeals § 549.071 — whether explicitly or implicitly — [a question we do not decide] nevertheless the decision of the court of conviction to extend probation after the effective date of the Code for an offense committed before that date would remain unaffected.by repeal of that section.
The writ of habeas corpus is quashed and the defendant is ordered remanded to the custody of the Director of the Jackson County Department of Corrections.
All concur.