Artie Whitesides as plaintiff instituted this action for herself as widow and as next friend of Edward Richard Whitesides, her minor son by her husband, Major E. White-sides, deceased, against Ryan-Richards, Incorporated, to recover damages for the alleged negligent killing of her said husband, about 11:30 a. m. on December 21, 1933, at a point on highway 62 about one and one-half miles directly east of Altus, Okl.
By amended petition Percy Meacham became a party defendant.
The parties will be referred to herein in the order in which they appeared in the lower court, and when not so designated will be referred to as follows: The plaintiff as “widow” and the defendants, Ryan-Richards, Incorporated, as “contractor,” and Percy T. Meacham, as “truck driver.”
The said “contractor” answered, denying each and every allegation except where admitted, and interposed the plea of contributory negligence on the part of said decedent and averred that the injury, if it occurred as alleged, which was by defendants denied, that the party occasioning same was not an agent, servant or employee of said “contractor,” but an independent contractor operating his own truck, under no control or supervision of said “contractor,” who was in no wise responsible for said negligence and consequent damage.
Plaintiff (the widow) by reply denied all affirmative averments contained in said answer, specifically pleading as to the allegation that the said “truck driver” was an independent contractor, that the “contractor” was then and there operating under a *828contract with the Highway Commission of the State of Oklahoma, pursuant to section 204 of the National Industrial Recovery Act, 40 U.S.C.A. § 404, which provided:
“For the purpose of providing for emergency construction of public highways and related projects, 'the President is authorized to make grants to the highway departments of the several States in an amount not less than $400,000,000 to be expended by such departments in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Highway Act, approved November 9, 1921, as amended and supplemented [chapter 1 of Title 23], except as provided in this title [chapter] as follows: * * *
“(c) All contracts involving the expenditure of such grants shall contain provisions establishing minimum rates of wages, to be predetermined by the State highway department, which contractors shall pay to skilled and unskilled labor, and such minimum rates shall be stated in the invitation for bids and shall be included in proposals for bids for the work.”
And further averred that certain funds were allotted under the provisions of said act to the State Highway Commission, on account of which the State Highway Commission entered into a contract for certain road improvements on the highways of the State of Oklahoma, containing the following provision:
“No portion of the contract shall be sublet, assigned or otherwise disposed of except with the written consent of the contracting officer or his authorized representative. Requests for permission to sublet, assign or otherwise dispose of any portion of the contract shall be in writing and accompanied by showing that the organization which will perform the work is particularly experienced and equipped for such work. The contractor shall give assurance that the minimum wage for unskilled labor and the maximum amount to be deducted for board, if furnished, as stated in his proposal shall apply to labor performed on all work sublet, assigned or otherwise disposed of in any way. Written consent to sublet, assign or otherwise dispose of any portion of the contract shall not be construed to relieve the contractor of any responsibility for the fulfillment of the contract.”
A certified copy of said contract was attached as a part of said reply, with the further allegation that neither was application. made to the State Highway Commission nor its written consent obtained to sublet or assign or otherwise dispose of any portion of said contract, and that the said defendant, the “contractor,” was prohibited by its terms from employing the said “truck driver” as an independent contractor to perform any of the work thereunder, it being further alleged therein that: “Copies of all pay rolls for work performed under this contract (whether done by the contractor or under a sub-contract or otherwise), certified under oath by the contractor or his authorized representative, shall be filed with the engineer, showing the name of each employee, the State and the county of his bona fide residence, the agency from which his name was ’ obtained, whether or not a veteran with dependents, the class of work performed, the hours worked each day, the wage rate paid, the total amount earned and deductions for board, if any”; and that in accordance with said contract, and for the purpose of receiving payments thereon, the said “contractor” made its sworn reports to said Highway Commission, stating that the said “truck driver,” who is one and the same person as P. T. Meacham, was an employee of said “contractor,” a certified copy of one of said reports so made being attached to said reply and made a part thereof.
Judgment on verdict was for plaintiff, from which this appeal followed.
The deceased, whilst driving a truck on the highway east of Altus, Okl., traveling westward on said highway, and having picked up two hitchhikers, one of whom was blind, but both of whom were in his truck, stopped said truck on the north shoulder of said gravelled and graded highway, as far away from the traveled road as practicable. Having gotten out of said truck, he was standing on its south side making repairs on the motor when the said “truck driver” driving a gravel truck, also going west towards Altus, drove up directly behind the Whitesides truck until close to it, then swerved out, and around the said truck, the plainly defined tracks disclosing that the “truck driver’s” truck missed the White-sides truck about a foot and one-half, a line of blood and brains being along its tracks for some distance.
At the time of the accident the two hitchhikers were sitting on the bed of the truck just behind the cab, on the right side, facing north, one of whom, Wiley Giddens, being blind, could not tell how close the “truck driver’s” truck came to the deceased’s truck. The other. Reginald Rutledge, *829testified that the Whitesides truck stopped where the accident occurred, pulling out to the right side of the road, he (witness) being on the flat bed facing north, talking to blind Wiley Giddens, whilst Whitesides was working on the motor with the hood up, the motor idling, witness, not hearing “truck driver’s” truck but only a noise, looked around and saw Whitesides lying in the road about 35 feet in front of his truck, and the “truck driver’s” truck stopped about 500 yards further down the road. The said Reginald Rutledge examined the truck tracks from the “truck driver’s” track back and along past the Whitesides track, which were 18 or 20 inches from the Whitesides truck, Whitesides’ hat lying under same, and thus tracing same from “track driver’s” truck location back past the Whitesides truck, the tracks being 18 inches outside from the Whitesides truck.
Ross Rutherford, the county attorney of said county, testified that on December 21, 1933, he went to the scene of the accident, it being an ordinary clear day — neither wind blowing nor sand flying, on said highway (No. 62), the traveled part of the highway being about 60 feet wide, its entire right of way covering 100 feet, the bar pit being not over a foot deep with gradual slope. The Whitesides truck headed west, the body of the deceased still in the road, he examined and made investigation to find where the truck driven by the “truck driver” had passed with reference to the White-sides truck, and found that it had come from the east toward the west directly behind the Whitesides truck parked on the north side of the road as close to the bar pit as it could get without being driven into the bar pit, there being room on the left side of the road for two cars driving abreast to pass the Whitesides truck, the “truck driver’s” tracks coming directly behind the Whitesides truck, and disclosing that he had traveled behind the Whitesides truck till he got close to it, then swerved out, the plainly defined tracks showing he missed it possibly a foot and one-half or two feet south of the Whitesides truck, and along its track there being a line of brains and blood.
O. R. Jones, undersheriff, going from Altus to the scene of the accident, did not see the “track driver’s” truck when he arrived, no other truck being there except the Whitesides track. The place where he saw the sign of where the “truck driver’s” truck had stopped was about one-fourth mile from the accident, there being only one set of tracks behind the Whitesides truck. He later saw the “truck driver’s” truck at Altus. The auxiliary gasoline tank on it extended out further than the wheels, 3 to 6 inches past the bed of the truck, with a clot of brains hanging on it. The road was straight where the accident occurred and a parked truck could have been seen practically as far as the vision of the eye could extend.
Ernest Hathaway, a deputy sheriff for seven years and such on December 21, 1933, went to the scene of the accident and made an investigation of tracks and observed a heavy set of tracks coming from the east on the north side of the road, and as these tracks came up, approaching the Whitesides truck, they swerved to the left or south of the Whitesides truck, missing it by 2 or 3 feet, and was able to follow these tracks substantially up to where the body lay, there being brains scattered along the road parallel to the tracks, and signs on the road where the body had slid, which lay approximately 60 feet in front of the Whitesides track, not in the center of the road, the body being west of the truck which was facing west, the highway a wide one, and the Whitesides truck being parked very close to the bar pit. He was present when Meacham talked, who said he saw no one standing around the truck, but about the time he got ready to pass, a man kind of stepped out and he thought turned around and about the same time he heard the truck strike something, and mentioned it to the boy who was riding with him. He then stopped his truck and went back to the Whitesides truck when he saw what had happened.
Demurrer to plaintiff’s evidence on the part of each defendant was interposed, overruled, and exceptions saved.
Evidence on part of defendant1 and rebuttal by plaintiff was introduced.
*830At close" of all the evidence each defendant separately moVed the court t"o direct the jury to return a verdict in his or its favor, exceptions being saved.
(1) Whether plaintiff met the burden of proof with substantial evidence tending to show that the negligence alleged was the proximate cause of the injury and (2) that *831Meacham was an employee of Ryan-Richards, Incorporated, and not an independent contractor, it is uncontradicted that the deceased, Whitesides, had stopped his truck on the north shoulder of the highway as near the bar pit as reasonably possible and as distant from the section of the road over which the main part of the traffic passed as *832it could practically and safely be done, and had gotten out of the cab or driver’s .seat, going around on the south side of his truck, and raised the hood covering the engine on that side, endeavoring to make some repairs on its motor, and at the same time the defendant Percy Meacham, driving a gravel truck at a high rate of speed, at about 40 *833miles an hour, neither sounding his horn nor giving any signal or warning of his approach to the point on the highway where, for over 300 yards away from the White-sides truck, he admitted seeing.it, and failed to slow same down as he approached. By keeping a proper lookout he could have seen it as far as the vision of the eye could carry. His statement is that as he approached it he slowed- his truck down to 25 miles per hour, which is at variance with the weight of evidence in the record. He drove so close to the north shoulder of said highway in such a manner as to endanger vehicles and persons compelled to stop at such point on said highway, failing to keep his truck under reasonable control to avoid hitting the deceased, although in plain sight for several hundred yards before reaching that point.
Defendant Meacham admitted that he was overloaded, having 13,000 pounds on his truck, 2,750 pounds being the reasonably permitted load, the reserve gas tank on his truck projecting 3 to 6 inches beyond its right side, which struck deceased with sufficient force to crush his skull and scatter his brains along the roadway and hurl his body a long distance, 60 feet down the roadway, and not stopping his truck until he had gone about 400 yards beyond the point of the accident.
The court in submitting the issue as to negligence and proximate cause to the jury, committed no error.2
Whether Ryan-Richards, Incorporated, was an employer, and Meacham an employee, in Standard Oil Co. v. Parkinson, 8 Cir., 152 F. 681, 682, it is said:
“The test of one’s liability for the act or omission of bis alleged servant is his right and power to direct and control his imputed agent in the performance of the causal act or omission at the very instant of the act or neglect. There can be no recovery of a person for the act or omission of his alleged servant under the maxim, ‘respondeat superior,’ in the absence of the right and power in the former to command or direct the latter in the performance of the act or omis*834sion charged, because in such a case there is no superior to respond. * * *
“The fact that Perry’s compensation was-agreed to be paid and'was paid in solido for all that he did, including his hauling of the oil and gasoline and his sales, deliveries, collections, and remittances, indicates that all these acts were bound together and performed in the same relation, and the evidence that they were either by agreement or in fact' so separated that he was an independent contractor in the performance of the former and the agent of the’ company in' his relation to the latter is not so conclusive or convincing that all reasonable men in the exercise of an honest and unprejudiced judgment would agree that at the instant, and in the act of driving upon the railroad Perry was his own master or without the command and direction- of the company, while in the care, sale, delivery, and collection of the price of the oil and gasoline he was its agent. It is indisputable that there was substantial and persuasive evidence that in the performance of the latter acts Perry was the agent of the company subject to its command and direction. The driving of the team was an act -ordinarily within the scope and course of such an agency, and, in view of the fact that the hauling and driving were paid for together with the acts of care, sale, and delivery,vthe evidence in this case is not so conclusive that he was not the agent of the company and subject to its command in the hauling and in the driving upon the crossing that it was the duty of the court below to withdraw that issue from the jury and to so hold'as a matter of law. * * * ”
In Howard W. Luff Co. v. Capece, 6 Cir., 61 F.2d 635, it is said (page 636): “In making application of general principles to specific fácts, many and varied circumstances are relied upon in reported cases, such as the power of dischárge, the payment of wages as distinguished from other forms of compensation, the continuity of the employment, the .engagement by the alleged employee in a distinct business or occupation, the professional skill required in doing the employer’s work, and so on. Such circumstances, however, are not ultimate facts, but are only more or less useful in determining whose is the work and whose is the power of control. * * * ” See, also, Singer Mfg. Co. v. Rahn, 132 U.S. 518, 10 S.Ct. 175, 33 L.Ed. 440; New Orleans, M. & C. Railroad Co. v. Hanning, 15 Wall. 649, 21 L.Ed. 220; Pittsburgh Valve Foundry & Construction Co. v. Gallagher, 6 Cir., 32 F.2d 436; P. F. Collier & Son Co. v. Hartfeil, 8 Cir., 72 F.2d 625; Western Express Co. v. Smeltzer, 6 Cir., 88 F.2d 94, 112 A.L.R. 74; and Philadelphia & R. Coal & Iron Co. v. Barrie, 8 Cir., 179 F. 50 at page 54 (concurring opinion by Circuit Judge Sanborn).
James, the superintendent, employed the “truck driver,”- directing him where to get loads of sand and where to dump same, with no understanding as to how many yards or loads of sand or to what extent were to be hauled or how long the hauling would continue or as to whether as long as it was necessary for sand to be hauled and delivered or dumped for the completion of said construction. The “truck driver” was subject to be discharged at any time without regard as to whether the work was satisfactory, his compensation to be paid i'n solido for all that he did, including the use of the truck and the hauling and dumping of the sand, the contractor furnishing the gasoline to be deducted out of said compensation.
The “truck driver” was not engaged in a distinct business or occupation, as he neither owned the truck, nor furnished the sand, being temporarily employed. No information was furnished the “contractor” as to who owned the truck or how long he could use it. The employment was not distinctive. The contract not being in writing, its intent must be gathered .from the direct and circumstantial evidence. The “truck driver” did not buy or sell the sand —did not know where it was located except as he was directed by the agent of the “contractor,” and was to dump it along the highway where the construction work was being done as directed by the agent of the “contractor.”
MaWirter had no part in the procuring of the job. The sand did not belong to him. The check was made out to the “truck driver” and not to MaWirter. The “contractor’s” agent furnished the “truck driver” with the gas and oil for the truck, the bill for same being reserved when the payment for the work was made. The “truck driver” could not only cease work at any time but could also be dispensed with at any time.
A flagman located by the “contractor” along the construction line when the trucks loaded with sand would come along to dump signalled them to slow down or to dump.
The right of the employer to exercise a limited control over the work, without thereby destroying the independent charac*835ter of the contract, is recognized by the courts. Rules seem to be well established that, where the control reserved does not apply to the mode or manner of having the work done, not in any way taking the work out of the hands of the contractor, it will not destroy the independent nature of the contract, the relation of master and servant not to be inferred from the reservation by the employer of powers which do not deprive the contractor of his right to use his own methods in carrying out his contract.
The mere fact that a proprietor retains a general supervision over work to be constructed for him by another, to satisfy himself that the contractor carries out the stipulations of his contract, does not make the proprietor responsible for the wrongs done to third persons in the prosecution of the work. If the other provisions of the contract are such as render the person employed an independent contractor, he will not be converted into a servant by the insertion of stipulations reserving to the employer “the right to change, inspect, and supervise to the extent necessary to produce the result intended by the contract.” The mere fact of direction as to things to be done, without control over the methods or means of doing them, does not make a contractor a servant. The right of the defendant to supervise the work so far as to see whether it was done according to contract does not throw the responsibility if any, of the contractor, upon the employer.3
In the instant case the “contractor,” in a written report made to the Highway Commission, sworn to, stated that the “truck driver” yvas its employee. This is direct evidence to be considered in connection with all the circumstances. True, the “contractor” and its codefendant, the “truck driver,” seek1 to explain this admission in writing, but that, under the evidence in the record, is a question for the determination by the jury as to independent contractor vel non.
In Dishman v. Whitney, 121 Wash. 157, 209 P. 12, 29 A.L.R. 460, it is said (page 13) ; “'One of the tests to determine the question is whether the employer retained the right, or had the right under the contract, to control the mode or manner in which the work was to be done. Where the facts presented are as consistent'with the theory of agency as that of independent contractor, the burden is upon the one asserting the independency of the contractor to show the true relation of the parties. This may he a mixed question of law and fact, or of law alone.”
'In Norwegian Danish M. E. Church v. Home Tel. Co., 66 Wash. 511, 119 P. 834, it is said (page 835) : “These facts are quite as consistent with the theory of agency as that of independent contractor, and the burden shifts to appellant to show its true relation to the construction company, the best evidence of which would have been its contract, thus making a mixed question of law and fact, or one of law alone.”
1 The judgment of the lower court is affirmed.