delivered the opinion of the Court.
In United States v. Scophony Corp., 333 U. S. 795, we recently considered the meaning and effect of § 12 of the Clayton Act,1 providing for venue and service of process in civil antitrust proceedings against private corporations. This case brings before us another phase of the section’s effect in like proceedings. The principal ques*575tion, and the only one we find it necessary to consider, is whether the choice of forums given to the plaintiff by § 12 is subject to qualification by judicial application of the doctrine of jorum non conveniens.
The suit was brought by the United States against nine corporations2 for alleged violation of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. 26 Stat. 209, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1, 2. The basic charge is that the appellees conspired to acquire control of local transportation companies in numerous cities located in widely different parts of the United States,3 and to restrain and monopolize interstate commerce in motorbusses, petroleum supplies, tires and tubes sold to those companies, contrary to the Act’s prohi*576bitions.4 Injunctive and other relief of an equitable nature was sought.5
The appellees filed various motions, including the one involved in this appeal. It sought dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the District Court for the Southern District of California was not a convenient forum for the trial. This motion was supported by a showing not only of inconvenience to the defendants of trial in the California district, but also that the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division (Chicago), would be the most convenient forum for them. The showing was by affidavits, executed by officers, attorneys and employees of the corporate defendants.6 *577Counteraffidavits were filed in opposition on behalf of the Government.7
After oral argument, the District Court filed findings of fact and conclusions of law together with a written opinion, substantially accepting appellees’ showing and sustaining the motion. 7 F. R. D. 456. Accordingly it entered judgment dismissing the complaint, but without prejudice to the institution of a similar suit against the named defendants “in a more appropriate and convenient forum.” This decision is brought to us for review on direct appeal pursuant to the statutes applicable in such cases.8
It is not disputed that the District Court has jurisdiction in the basic sense of power to hear and determine the cause or that it has venue within the provisions of § 12.9 Nor can it be questioned that any of the defendants can be brought personally within that court’s jurisdiction by service of process made in accordance with *578the provisions of either § 12, or those of § 5 of the Sherman Act.10 The only question presented concerning the court’s power is whether, having jurisdiction and venue of the cause and personal jurisdiction of the defendants, the court also was authorized to decline to exercise its jurisdiction upon finding, without abuse of discretion, that the forum was not a convenient one within the scope of the non-statutory doctrine commonly, though not too accurately, labeled jorum non conveniens.
It would serve no useful purpose to review in detail the reasoning or the authorities upon which the District Court ruled the doctrine applicable in such cases as this, or therefore the further groundings upon which it proceeded in holding the forum inconvenient. For the view has prevailed without qualification during the life of § 12, thirty-four years, that the choice of venues expressly given to the plaintiff is not to be qualified by any power of a court having venue under any of the section’s alternatives to decline to exercise the jurisdiction conferred. None of the decisions on which the District Court relied suggested, much less decided, that such a power exists. This therefore is a case of first impression, seeking departure from long-established practice. Moreover, the analogies drawn from other types of cases in which the doctrine has been applied11 cannot survive in the face of the section’s explicit terms and the patent intent of Congress in enacting it.
*579In the Scophony case we gave attention to the history of § 12, which as there related is as pertinent to the question now presented as it was to the issues then under consideration.12 Reference to the Scophony opinion, Part I, 333 U. S. at 802-810, will avoid the necessity for repeating the history here in extenso. But its present applicability will be accentuated by recalling that we reaffirmed the ruling in Eastman Co. v. Southern Photo Co., 273 U. S. 359, namely, that § 12 of the Clayton Act had enlarged the venue provision of § 7 of the Sherman Act, with the intent and effect to give the plaintiff the right to bring antitrust proceedings not only in the districts where the corporate defendant “resides or is found,” as § 7 had authorized, but also “in any district wherein it . . . transacts business.”13
In the Eastman case, as the Scophony opinion emphasized, the Court had rejected the argument that the addition of “or transacts business” was no more than a redundant reformulation of “is found”; instead it gave the added words broader and less technical meaning than “is found” had acquired under prior decisions.14 This was done, as the Eastman opinion stated, because accepting the contrary view would have rendered the addition meaningless and defeated the plain remedial purpose of § 12. 273 U. S. at 373. That section, the Court held, supplemented “the remedial provision of the Anti-Trust Act for the redress of injuries resulting from illegal restraints upon interstate trade, by relieving the injured person from the necessity of resorting for the redress of wrongs com*580mitted by a non-resident corporation, to a district, however distant, in which it resides or may be 'found’ — often an insuperable obstacle — and enabling him to institute the suit in a district, frequently that of his own residence, in which the corporation in fact transacts business, and bring it before the court by the service of process in a district in which it resides or may be ‘found.’ ” (Emphasis added.) 273 U. S. at 373-374.
The Scophony opinion reaffirmed this view: “Thus, by substituting practical, business conceptions for the previous hair-splitting legal technicalities encrusted upon the ‘found’-'present’-'carrying-on-business’ sequence, the Court yielded to and made effective Congress’ remedial purpose. Thereby it relieved persons injured through corporate violations of the antitrust laws from the ‘often insuperable obstacle’ of resorting to distant forums for redress of wrongs done in the places of their business or residence. A foreign corporation no longer could come to a district, perpetrate there the injuries outlawed, and then by retreating or even without retreating to its headquarters defeat or delay the retribution due.” 333 U. S. at 808.
These conclusions concerning the section’s intent and effect are altogether inconsistent with any idea that the defendant corporation can defeat the plaintiff’s choice of venue as given, by asking for and securing dismissal of the suit, either on the ground that the venue selected within the statutory limits is inconvenient for the defendant or that another authorized venue is more convenient for it.
No such discretionary power had been exercised by any court during the twenty years of the Sherman Act’s application prior to the enactment of § 12, under the narrower range of choice afforded by § 7. None had been suggested, and uniform practice had established that the plaintiff’s choice was conclusive, as was true later under § 12 until the deviation in this case.
*581When therefore Congress came to face the problem of making the nation’s antitrust policy more effective through the Clayton Act’s provisions, that body was not confronted with any problem of abuse by plaintiffs in selecting venue for antitrust suits; nor was it concerned with any question of providing means by which the defendants in such suits might defeat the plaintiff’s choice to serve their own convenience. Congress’ concern was quite the opposite. It was to provide broader and more effective relief, both substantively and procedurally, for persons injured by violations of its antitrust policy.15 Insofar as convenience in bringing suit and conducting trial was involved, the purpose was to make these less inconvenient for plaintiffs or, as was said in the Eastman opinion, to remove the “often insuperable obstacle” thrown in their way by the existing venue restrictions.
To have broadened the choice of venue for the reasons which brought about that action, only to have it narrowed again by application of the vague and discretionary power16 comprehended by jorum non conveniens, would have been incongruous, to say the least. In making *582the change Congress did not authorize plaintiffs to institute civil antitrust suits in the newly specified districts, merely in order to have them transferred back for trial to one of the districts comprehended by § 7. It intended trial to take place in the district specified by the statute and selected by the plaintiff.17
This conclusion is supported as strongly by the history of the legislative proceedings relating to the enactment of § 12 as by the foregoing judicial constructions. Section 7 of the Sherman Act had limited venue, as we have noted, to districts in which the defendant “resides or is found.” As originally introduced in the House, two sections of the Clayton Act, §§ 4 (then § 5) and 12 (then § 10),18 perpetuated those provisions.19 During discussion on the floor, however, various Representatives demanded broader choice of venue for plaintiffs. The demand related to both sections, and the discussion went *583forward now with reference to one, now the other, now both.
The basic aim of the advocates of change was to give the plaintiff the right to bring suit and have it tried in the district where the defendant had committed violations of the Act and inflicted the forbidden injuries.20 At first they were not much concerned with the exact formulation of the language to accomplish this, several formulas being proposed from time to time.21 But they were convinced that restricting the choice of venue to districts in which the defendant “resides or is found” was not adequate to assure that the suit could be brought where the cause of action arose, and therefore insisted on change in order to assure that result.22
*584The committee sponsoring the bill had no objection to this purpose; indeed its members expressly approved it.23 But at first they opposed any amendment, because they thought the object fully achieved by the words “is found.” 24 Over this difference the discussion went for*585ward, as well as over various formulations of the proposed addition. Some were broader than was necessary to achieve the primary aim.25 Indeed some were so broad that committee members thought their inclusion would jeopardize passage of the entire bill.26
To avoid this result and to satisfy those who insisted on amendment, the committee yielded and proposed a substitute amendment for one of those offered from the floor relating to § 4. The committee substitute added the words “or has an agent” after “is found” in the original committee version. 51 Cong. Rec. 9466. This amendment passed the House and later the Senate unchanged. Id. 9467. Section 4 thus became law in its present form, for the limited class of cases covered by its terms. Cf. note 18.
Since however the amendment affected only § 4, the problem concerning § 12 remained unresolved. Suggestions therefore were made at once for amending § 12 to bring it into conformity with § 4. Id. 9467, 9607. Although other proposals were again put forward, id. 9607, the conforming amendment was adopted by the House. Ibid.
After the bill passed the House, it was referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. That committee reported it out with § 12 altered by the substitution of “or transacts business” in place of “or has an agent,” *586but leaving the latter clause in § 4 untouched.27 The Senate committee reports and the debates in that body throw little light upon the reasons underlying the committee’s alteration of § 12 and its failure to alter § 4 so as to make them uniform, except for the general statement that § 12 as reported “concerns the venue or the place where suits to enforce the antitrust laws against corporations may be brought and liberalizes the Sherman law to some extent upon this subject.” 28 The bill finally passed the Senate with § 12 substantially as it was reported by the Committee on the Judiciary,29 and went to conference in that form. In conference the Senate version of § 12 prevailed over that of the House, and the bill was so enacted.30
The short outcome was that Congress expanded the venue provisions of the Sherman Act, § 7, in two ways, viz: (1) by adding to “resides or is found,” in § 4 of the Clayton Act, the words “or has an agent”; (2) in § 12 by adding “or transacts business.” Thus strict uniformity in the two sections’ venue provisions was not achieved. But whatever their differences may be, each addition was designed to aid plaintiffs by giving them a wider choice of venues, and thereby to secure a more effective, because more convenient, enforcement of antitrust prohibitions.
Moreover the discussions in Congress, particularly in the House, disclose no other thought than that the choice *587of forums was given as a matter of right, not as one limited by judicial discretion. There was, in fact, common agreement upon this among both the advocates and the opponents of amendment.31 No one suggested that the courts would have discretionary power to decline to exercise the jurisdiction conferred. But since it was universally agreed that the choice of venue, to whatever extent it might be conferred, was to be given as a matter of right, several of the broader amendments were opposed and defeated as going too far.32
Congress therefore was not indifferent to possibilities of abuse involved in the various proposals for change. Exactly the opposite was true. For the broader proposals were not rejected because they gave the plaintiff *588the choice. They were rejected because the choice given was too wide, giving plaintiffs the power to bring suit and force trial in districts far removed from the places where the company was incorporated, had its headquarters, or carried on its business. In adopting § 12 Congress was not willing to give plaintiffs free rein to haul defendants hither and yon at their caprice. 51. Cong. Rec. 9466, 9467. But neither was it willing to allow defendants to hamper or defeat effective enforcement by claiming immunity to suit in the districts where by a course of conduct they had violated the Act with the resulting outlawed consequences. In framing § 12 to include those districts at the plaintiffs’ election, Congress thus had in mind not only their convenience but also the defendant company’s inconvenience, and fixed the limits within which each could claim advantage in venue and beyond which neither could seek it. Moreover, in § 12, though not in § 4, the right of choice conferred was given designedly to the Government as well as to private suitors.33
In the face of this history we cannot say that room was left for judicial discretion to apply the doctrine of forum non conveniens so as to deprive the plaintiff of the choice given by the section. That result, as other courts have concluded, would be utterly inconsistent with the purpose of Congress in conferring the broader range of choice. Tivoli Realty v. Interstate Circuit, 167 F. 2d 155; Ferguson v. Ford Motor Co., 77 F. Supp. 425.
In this view of Congress’ action, numerous considerations of policy urged by the appellees as supporting the discretionary power’s existence and applicability become irrelevant. Congress’ mandate regarding venue and the *589exercise of jurisdiction is binding upon the federal courts. Const. Art. Ill, § 2. Our general power to supervise the administration of justice in the federal courts, cf. McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332, does not extend to disregarding a validly enacted and applicable statute or permitting departure from it, even in such matters as venue.
It is true that the appellees made a strong showing of inconvenience, albeit by interested persons, when that matter is considered on their presentation alone. On the other hand, the Government advanced strong reasons, apart from the question of power, for not applying the doctrine.34 But in the view we take of § 12, we need not consider whether the appellees’ showing on the facts sufficiently outweighed that of the Government to justify dismissal.35
Two important policy considerations were advanced by the Government, however, which not only bear strongly upon that question but affect the question of power, if Congress had not concluded it. The first is that permitting the application of jorum non conveniens to antitrust cases inevitably would lengthen litigation already overextended in the time required for its final disposition, and thus would violate Congress’ declared policy of expediting this type of litigation.36
*590The argument has merit to support the conclusion we have reached upon the statute. Antitrust suits, even with all the expedition afforded them, are notoriously though often perhaps unavoidably long drawn out. The more complex and important cases seldom require less than three to five years to conclude,37 except possibly where consent decrees are entered. Often the time necessary or taken is much longer. To inject into this over lengthened procedure what would amount to an additional preliminary trial and review upon the convenience of the forum could not but add approximately another year or longer to the time essential for disposing of the cases, indeed for reaching the merits.38 Although some instances of inconvenience to defendants will arise from the absence of discretionary power, that will be unavoidably true in almost any event. And it may well be doubted *591that the sum total of inconvenience and injustice resulting will be as great as would follow, for both private plaintiffs and the public, from allowing the inescapable delay-incident to the exercise of such a discretionary power. For once the power were found to exist, it is more than likely that injection of the issue would become a common incident of antitrust suits, and create the disadvantage of delay for all concerned.
This consideration is reinforced by another, namely, the difficulty of applying the doctrine in cases such as this, in which the violations charged are nationwide or nearly so in scope and effect, and the defendants are numerous companies widely scattered in the location of their places of incorporation, principal offices, and places of carrying on business and participating in the scheme. In such a case dismissal in one authorized district cannot reinstate or transfer the cause to another. Nor can the court, within the limits of the doctrine, specify the district in which the case shall be reinstituted and tried. It can only terminate the pending proceeding, as was done here, without prejudice to commencement of a like suit “in a more appropriate or convenient forum,” with whatever consequences may follow from having to begin all over again.
Further, when that is done, the result well may be in some instances to have the action commenced again, only to precipitate the same issue and consequent delay in the second forum. Conceivably this could occur from forum to forum in succession, depending upon the number of corporations named as defendants and the variety, proximity, and degree of concentration of the locations of their principal offices, places of business, and the relative advantages of other available forums for the variously situated defendants. Accordingly, in an unknown number of such cases the practical result well might be to establish a merry-go-round of litigation upon the *592issue, which could be used to defer indefinitely consideration of the merits. The very possibility of such a tactic would greatly hamper the institution as well as the conclusion of antitrust proceedings. Indeed, for cases of this complex type, the uncertainty concerning the outcome of an effort to apply the doctrine might go far toward defeating the Act's effective application to the most serious and widespread offenses and offenders.39
Further, even if it is taken that the appellees’ activities constituting the core of the violations charged were as fully concentrated in or near the Illinois district as ap-pellees claim, such a concentration might or might not exist in other like proceedings. And in the latter event the problem of selecting the appropriate forum well might become a highly uncertain and difficult one.40
*593The appellees also strongly urge two other considerations which deserve mention. One is that a criminal prosecution against the appellees (together with seven individuals, officers of some of them), pending in the California district simultaneously with this cause and growing out of substantially the same transactions, had been transferred to the Illinois district shortly before the District Court entered its judgment of dismissal.41 The transfer was ordered pursuant to Rule 21 (b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.42 That action was taken after *594the District Court had made findings of fact and conclusions of law founded upon and substantially adopting the appellees’ showing, which was practically identical with their showing in this case. Consequently, as the cases now stand, the criminal cause is to be tried in the Illinois district while this civil suit founded upon practically the same transactions and affecting the same corporate defendants is to be tried in the California district.
Great emphasis is placed upon this as an impelling reason for holding jorum non conveniens applicable here, and then sustaining the order of dismissal under that doctrine and the District Court’s findings. But, for the reasons above stated, we think the matter has been concluded by the terms and intent of § 12. Moreover, it is at least doubtful whether the Government had a right to appeal from the order of transfer in the criminal case.43 In any event, the validity of that order is not before us. . We therefore express no opinion upon either of those questions. But the fact that we cannot do so goes far to nullify the effect of appellee’s argument of hardship arising from the transfer. For that argument comes down, in the peculiar circumstances, to one that because the District Court on appellees’ application has *595transferred the criminal cause by a dubiously reviewable order, perforce of that action it should also dismiss this civil cause and we should sustain the dismissal.
In practical effect the outcome of accepting such an argument as ground for sustaining both the power and the dismissal would be to make Rule 21 (b) controlling in civil as well as criminal cases involving the same transactions and parties, thus overriding § 12, and at the same time depriving the plaintiff in the civil cause of anything more than perfunctory review of the District Court’s order of dismissal.44
Hardly can it be taken that Rule 21 (b) was intended so to override the provisions of § 12, to confer power on the District Courts to do so, or to nullify the plaintiff’s right of appeal from an order depriving it of the statutory privilege of choosing the venue. Yet these would be the practical results, if the consideration that the court has ordered transfer of the criminal case is to be controlling or highly influential, as it undoubtedly would be in most cases, in applying the doctrine of jorum non conveniens in the civil cause. If matters of policy were material, these possible consequences would add force to the view that the doctrine is not applicable.
Moreover, if the transfer should result in hardship to the appellees,45 insofar as the hardship arises from that *596cause it is one which was avoidable by them and will be incurred as a result of their own action in applying for it. That they have voluntarily incurred it is no good reason for depriving the plaintiff of its statutory right of choice under the terms and policy of § 12 in the entirely distinct civil suit.
Finally, both appellees and the District Court have placed much emphasis upon this Court’s recent decisions applying the doctrine of jorum non conveniens and in some instances extending the scope of its application.46 Whatever may be the scope of its previous application or of its appropriate extension, the doctrine is not a principle of universal applicability, as those decisions uniformly recognize. At least one invariable, limiting principle may be stated. It is that whenever Congress has vested courts with jurisdiction to hear and determine causes and has *597invested complaining litigants with a right of choice among them which is inconsistent with the exercise by those courts of discretionary power to defeat the choice so made, the doctrine can have no effect. Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Kepner, 314 U. S. 44; Miles v. Illinois Central R. Co., 315 U. S. 698. The question whether such a right has been given is usually the crux of the problem. It is one not to be answered by such indecisive inquiries as whether the venue or jurisdictional statute is labeled a “special” or a “general” one. Nor is it to be determined merely by the court’s view that applicability of the doctrine would serve the ends of justice in the particular case. It is rather to be decided, upon consideration of all the relevant materials, by whether the legislative purpose and the effect of the language used to achieve it were to vest the power of choice in the plaintiff or to confer power upon the courts to qualify his selection.
This is a case in which the pertinent factors make clear that the courts were given no such power. Accordingly the judgment is
Reversed.