delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioners were adjudged guilty,of contempt under § 268 of the Judicial Code (36 Stat. 1163, 28 U. S. C. §385) for their efforts to obtain a dismissal of a suit brought by one Elmore in the federal District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina. Elmore, administrator of the estate of his son, brought that action, in forma pauperis, against one Council and Bernard, partners, trading as B. C. Remedy Co., and alleged that his son died as a result of the use of a medicine, known as B C and manufactured and sold by them. The court appointed William B. Guthrie to represent Elmore. Defendants filed an answer April 29, 1939. On April 19, 1939, Elmore notified the District Judge and his lawyer by letters that he desired to have the case dismissed. The substance of the episode involving the improper conduct of petitioners was found as follows:
Elmore is illiterate and feeble in mind and body. Petitioners,1 through the use of liquor and persuasion, induced Elmore to seek a termination of the action. Nye directed his own lawyer to prepare the letters to the District Judge and to Guthrie and to prepare a final administration account to be filed in the local probate court. Nye took Elmore to, the probate court, had him discharged as administrator, and paid the clerk a.fee of $1. *40He then took Elmore to the postoffee, registered the letters and paid the postage. Elmore, however, was not promised or paid anything. These events took place more than ' 100 ' miles from Durham, North Carolina, where the District Court was located.
On September 30, 1939, Guthrie filed a motion 2 asking for an order requiring Nye to show cause “why he should not be attached and held as for contempt of this Court.”3 The court issued a show cause order to Nye and Mayers who filed their answers. There was a hearing. Evidence was introduced and argument was heard on motions to dismiss. The court found that the writing of the letters and the filing of the final account were pro*41cured by Nye “for the express and definite purpose of preventing the prosecution of the civil action in the federal court and with intent to obstruct and to prevent the trial of the case on its merits”; and that the conduct of Nye and Mayers “did obstruct and impede the due administration of justice in this cause; that the conduct has caused a long delay, several hearings and enormous expense.” It accordingly held that their conduct was “misbehavior so near to the presence of the court as to obstruct the administration of justice” and adjudged each guilty of contempt. It ordered Nye to pay the costs of the contempt proceedings, including $500 to Guthrie, and a fine of $500; and it ordered Mayers to pay a fine of $250. The District Court filed its finding of facts and judgment on February 8, 1940. On March 15, 1940', petitioners filed a notice of appeal from the judgment.4 The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment.5 113 F. 2d 1006. We granted the petition for certiorari because the interpretation of the power of the federal courts under § 268 of the Judicial Code to punish con-tempts raised matters of grave importance.
We are met at the threshold with a question as to the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of Appeals over the appeal. The government concedes that if this was a case of civil contempt, the notice of appeal was effective under Rule 73 of the, Rules of Civil Procedure. It argues, however, that the contepipt was criminal — in which case the appeal was not timely if the Criminal Appeals Rules *42govern,6 and not made in the proper form if § 8(c) of the Act of February 13, 1925 (43 Stat. 936, 940, 45 Stat. 54,28 U. S. C. § 230) is applicable.7
We do not think this was a case of civil contempt. We recently stated in McCrone v. United States, 307 U. S. 61, 64, “While particular acts do not always readily lend themselves to classification as civil or criminal con-tempts, a contempt is considered civil when the punishment is wholly remedial, serves only the purposes of the complainant, and is not intended as a deterrent to offenses against the public." The facts of this case do not meet that standard. While the proceedings in the District Court were entitled in Elmore’s action and the United States was not a party until the appeal, those circumstances though relevant (Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. 418, 445-446) are not conclusive as.to the nature of the contempt. The fact that Nye was ordered to pay the costs of the proceeding, including $500 to Guthrie, is also not decisive. .As Mr. Justice Brandéis stated in Union Tool Co. v. Wilson, 259 U. S. 107, 110, “Where a fine is imposed partly as compensation to the complainant and partly as punishment, the criminal feature of the order is dominant and fixes *43its character for purposes of review.” The order imposes unconditional fines payable to the United States. It awards no relief to a private suitor. The prayer for relief8 and the acts charged9 carry the criminal hallmark. Cf. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., supra, p. 449. They clearly do not reveal any purpose to punish for contempt “in aid of the adjudication sought in the principal suit.” Lamb v. Cramer, 285 U. S. 217, 220. When there is added the “significant” fact (Bessette v. W. B. Conkey Co., 194 U. S. 324, 329) that Nye and Mayers were strangers, not parties, to Elmore’s action, there can be no reasonable doubt that the punitive character of the order was dominant.
We come then to the question of the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of Appeals. We disagree with the government in its contention that the appeal in this case was governed by the Criminal Appeals Rules. Those rules were promulgated pursuant to the provisions of the Act of March 8, 1934 (48 Stat. 399; 28 U. S. C. § 723a) which provided, inter alia, that this Court should have “the power to prescribe, from time to time, rules of practice and procedure with respect to any or all proceedings after verdict, or finding of guilt by the court if a jury has been waived, or plea of guilty, in criminal - cases.” The rules were adopted “as the Rules of Practice and Procedure in all .proceedings after plea of guilty, verdict of guilt by a jury or finding of guilt by the trial court where a jury is waived, in criminal cases.” 292 U. S. 661. In this case there was no plea of guilty, there was *44no verdict of guilt by a jury, • and there was no finding of guilt by the court where a jury was waived. To be sure, the rules and the Act are applicable “in criminal cases.” But we do not agree with the government that the qualifying language of the rules designates merely the stage of the proceedings “in criminal cases” when the rules become applicable. It is our view that the rules describe the kinds of cases to which they are to be applied. The Act of March 8, 1934 amended the Act of February 24, 1933 (47 Stat. 904) which gave this Court rule-making power “with respect to any of all proceedings after verdict in criminal cases.” The legislative history makes it abundantly clear that the amendment in 1934, so far as material here, was made because, “it would not seem to be desirable that there should be different times and manner of procedure in cases of appeal where there is a verdict of a jury as distinguished from cases in which there is a finding of guilt by the court on the Waiver of a jury.” H. Rep. No. 858, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 1; S. Rep. No. 257, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 1. In light of this history and the language of the order promulgating the rules we conclude that the categories of cases embraced in the rules cannot be expanded by interpretation to include this type of case.
That conclusion means that this appeal was governed by §-8 (c) of the Act of February 13, 1925. The Court is equally divided in opinion as to whether the Circuit Court of Appeals, in absence of an application for allowance of the appeal, had the power to decide the case on the merits. Hence the action of that court in taking jurisdiction over the appeal is affirmed.
We come then to the merits.
The question is whether the conduct of petitioners constituted “misbehavior ... so near” the presence of the court “as"to obstruct the administration of justice” within *45the meaning of § 268 of the Judicial Code.10 That section derives from the Act of March 2, 1831 (4 Stat. 487). The Act of 1789 (1 Stat. 73, 83) provided that courts of the United States “shall have power ... to punish by fine or imprisonment, at the discretion of said courts, all contempts of authority in any cause or hearing before the same.” Abuses arose,11 culminating in impeachment proceedings against James H. Peck, á federal district judge, who had imprisoned and disbarred one Lawless for publishing a criticism of one of his opinions in a case which was on appeal. Judge Peck was acquitted.12 But the history of that episode makes abundantly clear that it served as the occasion for a drastic delimitation by Congress of the broad undefined power of the inferior federal courts under the Act of 1789.
The day after Judge Peck’s acquittal Congress took steps to change the Act of 1789. The House directed its Committee on the Judiciary “to inquire into the expediency of defining by statute all offences which may be punished as contempts of the courts of the United States, and also to limit the punishment for the same.”13 Nine *46days later James Buchanan brought in a bill which became the Act of March 2, 1831. He had charge of the prosecution of Judge Peck and during the trial had told the Senate:14 “I will venture to predict, that whatever may be the decision of the Senate upon this impeachment, Judge Peck has been the last man in the United States to exercise this power, and Mr. Lawless has been its' last victim.” The Act of March 2, 1831, “declaratory of the law concerning contempts of court,” contained two sections, the first of which provided:
“That the power of the several courts of the United States to issue attachments and inflict summary punishments for contempts of court, shall not be construed to extend to any cases except the misbehaviour of any person or persons in the presence of the said courts, or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice, the misbehaviour of any of the officers of the said courts in their official transactions, and the disobedience or resistance by any officer of the said courts, party, juror, witness, or any other person or persons, to any lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command of the said courts.”
Sec. 2 of that Act, from which § 135 of the Criminal Code15 (35 Stat. 1118, 18 U. S. C. §241) derives, provided:
“That if any person or persons shall, corruptly, or by threats or fr/oe, endeavour to influence, intimidate, or impede any juror, witness, or officer, in any court of the *47United States, in the discharge of his duty, or shall, corruptly, or by threats or force, obstruct, or impede, or endeavour to obstruct or impede, the due administration of justice therein, every person or persons, so offending, shall be liable to prosecution therefor, by indictment, and shall, on conviction thereof, be punished, by fine not exceeding five hundred dollars, or by imprisonment, not exceeding three months, or both, according to the nature and aggravation of the offence.”
In 1918 this Court in Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U. S. 402, 418, 419, stated that “there can be no doubt” that the first section of the Act of March 2, 1831 “conferred no power not already granted and imposed no limitations not already existing”; and that it was “intended to prevent the danger , by reminiscence of what had gone before, of attempts to exercise a power not possessed which . . . had been sometimes done in the exercise of legislative power.” The inaccuracy of that historic, observation has been plainly demonstrated. Frankfurter & Landis, Power of Congress Over Procedure in Criminal Contempts in “Inferior” Federal Courts — A Study in Separation of Powers, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 1010. Congress was responding to grievances arising out of the exercise of judicial power as dramatized by the Peck impeachment proceedings. Congress was intent on curtailing that power. The two sections of the Act of March 2, 1831 when read together, as they must be, clearly indicate that the category of criminal cases which could be tried without a jury was narrowly confinpd. That the previously undefined power of the courts was *48substantially curtailed by that Act was early recognized by lower federal courts. United States v. Holmes, Fed. Cas. No. 15,383, at p. 363; Ex parte Poulson, Fed. Cas. No. 11,350; United States v. New Bedford Bridge, Fed. Cas. No, 15,867, at p. 104; United States v. Seeley, Fed. Cas. No. 16,248a; United States v. Emerson, 4 Cranch (C. C.) 188; Fed. Cas. No. 15,050; Kent’s Commentaries (3rd ,ed. 1836) pp. 300-301. And when .the Act came before this Court in Ex parte Robinson, 19 Wall. 505, 511, Mr. Justice Field, speaking for the Court, acknowledgéd that it had limited the power of those courts. And see. Ex parte Bradley, 7 Wall. 364, 374. So far as the decisions of this Court are concerned, that view persisted to the time when Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, supra, was decided. See Ex parte Wall, 107 U. S. 265; Savin, Petitioner, 131 U. S. 267, 276; Cuddy, Petitioner, 131 U. S. 280, 285; Eilenbecker v. District Court, 134 U. S. 31, 38.
Mindful of that history, we come to the construction of § 268 of the Judicial Code in light of the specific facts of this case. The question is whether the words “so near thereto” have a geographical or a causal connotation. Read in their context and in the light of their ordinary meaning, we conclude that they are to be construed as geographical terms. In Ex parte Robinson, supra, at p. 511, it was said that as a result of those provisions the power to punish for contempts “can only be exercised to insure order and decorum” in court. “Misbehavior of any person in their presence” plainly falls in that category. Ex parte Terry, 128 U. S. 289. And in Savin, Petitioner, supra, it was also held to include attempted bribes of a witness, one in the jury room and within a few feet of the court room and one in the hallway immediately adjoining the court room. See Cooke v. United States, 267 U. S. 517. The phrase “so near thereto as to obstruct the' administration of justice” likewise con*49notes that the misbehavior must be in the vicinity of the court. Nelles & King, Contempt by Publication in the United States, 28 Col. L. Rev. 525, 530. It is not sufficient that the misbehavior charged has some direct relation to the work of the court. “Near” in this context, juxtaposed to “presence,” suggests physical proximity not .relevancy. In fact, if the words “so near thereto” are not read in the geographical sense, they come close, as the government admits, to being surplusage. There may, of course, be many types of “misbehavior” which will “obstruct the administration of justice” but which may not be “in” or “near” to the “presence” of the court. Broad categories of such acts, however, were expressly recognized in § 2 of the Act of March 2, 1831 and subsequently in § 135 of the Criminal Code. It has been held that an act of misbehavior though covered by the latter provisions may also be a contempt if committed in the “presence” of the Court. Savin, Petitioner, supra. And see Sinclair v. United States, 279 U. S. 749. Yet in view of the history of those provisions, meticulous regard for those separate categories of offenses must be had, so that the instances where there is no right to jury trial will be narrowly restricted. If “so near thereto” be given a causal meaning, then § 268 by the process of judicial construction will have regained much of the generality which Congress in 1831 emphatically intended to remove. See Thomas, Problems oj Contempt oj Court (1934) c. VII. If that phrase be not restricted to acts in the vicinity of the court but be allowed to embrace acts which have a “reasonable tendency” to “obstruct the administration of justice” (Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, supra, p. 421) then the conditions which Congress sought to alleviate in 1831 have largely been restored. See Fox, The History oj Contempt oj Court (1927) c. IX. The result will be- that the offenses which Congress designated as true crimes under § 2 of the Act of March 2, *501831 will be absorbed as contempts wherever they may take place. We cannot by the process of interpretation obliterate the distinctions which Congress drew.
We are dealing here only with a problem of statutory construction, not with a. question as to the constitutionally permissible scope of the contempt power. But that is no reason why we should adhere to the construction adopted by Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, supra, and leave to Congress the task of delimiting the' statute as thus interpreted. Though the statute in ques*tion has been on the books for over a century, it has not received during its long life the broad interpretation which that decision gave it. Rather, that broad construction is relatively recent. So far as decisions of this Court are concerned, the statute did not receive any such expanded interpretation- until Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, supra, was decided in 1918. The decisions of this Court prior to 1918 plainly recognized, as we have noted, that Congress through the Act of March 2, 1831 had imposed a limitation on the power to punish for contempts^ — a view consistent with the holdings of the lower federal courts during the years immediately following the enactment of the statute. The early view was best expressed in Ex parte Poulson, supra, decided in 1835. In that case it was held that the Act of March 2, 1831 gave the court no power to punish a newspaper publisher for contempt for publishing an “offensive’’ article relative to a pending case. It was held that the first section of the Act “alludes to that kind of misbehavior which is calculated to disturb the order of the court, such as noise, tumultuous or disorderly behavior, either in or so near to it as to prevent its proceeding in the orderly dispatch of its business.” p. 1208. That was a. plain recognition that the words “so near thereto” connoted physical proximity. And prior to 1918 the decisions of this Court did not depart from that theory, *51however they may have expanded the earlier, notions of “misbehavior.” To be sure, the lower federal courts in the intervening years had expressed a contrariety of views on the meaning of the statute16 and some were giving it an expanded scope17 which was later approved in Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, supra. But it is significant that not until after the turn of this century did the first line of fracture appear suggesting that the stat* ute authorized summary punishment for publication.18 Thus the legislative history of this statute and its career demonstrate that this case presents the question of correcting a plain misreading of language and history so as to give full respect to- the meaning which Congress unmistakably intended the statute to have. Its legislative history, its interpretation prior to 1918, the character and nature of the contempt proceedings, admonish us not to give renewed vitality to the doctrine of Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, supra, but to recognize the substantial legislative limitations on the contempt power which were occasioned by the Judge Peck episode. And they necessitate an adherence to the original construction of the statute so that, unless its requirements are clearly satisfied, an offense will be dealt with as the law deals with the run of illegal acts. Cf. Mr. Justice Holmes *52dissenting in Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United Stales, supra, pp. 422 et seq.
The conduct of petitioners (if the facts found are taken to be true) was highly reprehensible. It is of a kind which corrupts the judicial process and impedes the administration of justice. But the fact that it is not reachable through the summary procedure of contempt does not mean that such conduct can. proceed with impunity. Section 135 of the Criminal Code, a descendant of § 2 of the Act of March 2, 1831, embraces a broad category of offenses.. And certainly it cannot be denied that the conduct here in question comes far closer to thev family of offenses there described than it does.to the more limited classes of contempts described in § 268 of the Judicial Code. The acts' complained of took place miles from the District Court. The evil influence which affected Elmore was in ho possible sense in the “presence” of the court or “near thereto.” So far as the crime of contempt is concerned, the fact that the judge received Elmore’s letter is inconsequential.
We may concede that there was an obstruction in the administration of justice, as evidenced by the long delay and large expense which the reprehensible conduct of petitioners entailed. And it would follow that under the “reasonable tendency” rule of Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, supra, the court below did not err in affirming the judgment of conviction. But for the reasons stated that decision must be overruled. The fact that in purpose and effect there was an obstruction in the administration of justice did not bring the condemned conduct within the vicinity of the court in any normal meaning of the term. It was not misbehavior in the vicinity of the court disrupting to quiet and order or actually interrupting the court in the conduct of its business. Cf Savin, Petitioner, supra, at p. 278. Hence, it was not embraced within § 268 of the Judicial Code. *53If petitioners can be punished for their misconduct, it must be under the Criminal Code where they will be afforded the normal safeguards surrounding criminal prosecutions. Accordingly, the judgment below is
Reversed.