Pro-Specialties, Inc. (Pro) appeals from a judgment finding Pro guilty of two counts of criminal contempt in violation of sec. 757.03(2), Stats. (1977),1 and fixing a fine of $4,000 on each count, and finding Pro’s defense frivolous under sec. 814.025 and allowing Share Corporation (Share) its costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees pursuant to secs. 814.025 and 814.04. We conclude that sec. 757.06 (1977) precludes the award of attorneys’ fees and costs in this instance. We accordingly modify the judgment and order to delete the award of attorneys’ fees and costs and affirm the judgment and order as modified.
FACTS
Pro and Share are countrywide competitors in the manufacture, sale and distribution of chemical cleaning products. On February 1, 1977, Share commenced action against Pro alleging that Pro had engaged in unfair trade practices by soliciting Share’s sales representatives to leave Share’s employ and work for Pro. Pro denied the claim. At a hearing before Milwaukee County Circuit Judge Robert C. Cannon, the dispute was settled and both parties were enjoined and restrained from soliciting each other’s employees or distributors for a two-year period commencing February 22, 1978. The stipulation was read into the record, both parties and their counsel agreed to the stipulation on the record, and the matter was dismissed on its merits. The injunction and order was reduced to writing and was signed and entered March 23,1978.2
*320On October 31, 1978, on petition by Share, Circuit Judge Jackson executed an order to show cause why Pro should not be held in contempt of the March 23 injunction and order. On December 15, 1978, Judge Jackson, on cross-petition by Pro, executed an order to show cause why Share should not be held in contempt of the same injunction and order. The parties stipulated that the matter would be tried in accordance with nonsum-mary procedure.3 The court appointed attorney Bruce C. O’Neill to act as special prosecutor. The matter was tried to the court on May 31 and June 1,1979.
On September 17, 1980, the trial court issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found that Pro did not meet its burden of establishing that Share willfully and intentionally disobeyed the order and injunction. The trial court found Pro in contempt, contrary to sec. 757.03(2), Stats. (1977), for soliciting two of Share’s employees to work as distributors in violation of the injunction and order. The trial court fixed the fine at $4,000 for each of the two violations. The trial court also determined that Pro’s defense was frivolous as defined by sec. 814.025, and awarded Share its *321costs, including certain travel expenses advanced to Pro4 and reasonable attorneys’ fees. The trial court then directed Share to submit a petition to determine the amount of attorneys’ fees.
The record reflects that counsel for Share submitted a petition requesting the costs and fees and that a hearing on the matter was held on October 27, 1980.5 On February 9, 1981, the trial court entered an order for judgment which awarded Share $300 in costs, $500 in travel expenses and $4,800 as reasonable attorneys’ fees. Judgment was entered on February 16, 1981. On February 25, 1981, the trial court entered an order denying Pro’s motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court, in a nonsummary criminal contempt proceeding may, after imposing a punishment for the contempt, assess civil costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees for a frivolous defense against the defendant pursuant to secs. 814.025 and 814.04, Stats.
Pro argues that a nonsummary criminal contempt proceeding is a criminal action and that secs. 814.025 *322and 814.04, Stats., do not apply to criminal actions in view of sec. 973.066 and City of Janesville v. Wiskia.7 Share contends that a criminal contempt proceeding is not a criminal prosecution, but a special proceeding under secs 814.025 and 757.04(2) and that costs and fees are properly taxable in special proceedings under those sections.
We conclude that a nonsummary criminal contempt proceeding is not a criminal action subject to the provisions of chapter 973.8 We nonetheless hold that sec. *323757.06, Stats., forecloses the assessment of civil costs and attorneys’ fees in such proceedings.
CRIMINAL CONTEMPT
There are two forms of contempt of court — civil and criminal.9 Civil contempt is remedial and coercive. It generally involves the enforcement of a private right through fines or imprisonment which can be purged by compliance with the order that led to the contempt. Criminal contempt, on the other hand, involves punishment for past actions that is determinate and not purge-able. Its purpose is to vindicate the authority and dignity of the court.10
All courts of record have the inherent power to punish for criminal contempt those who willfully and intentionally disobey their lawful orders.11 However, that power is subject to reasonable legislative regulation.12
Section 757.04, Stats., outlines the procedure to be followed in criminal contempts. Unless the conduct constituting the contempt is committed within the presence of the court, the nonsummary procedure provisions of sec. 757.04(2) are applicable.13 A nonsummary criminal contempt must be prosecuted on notice and verified petition by the district attorney, attorney general or a specially appointed attorney.14 The defendant is entitled *324to a reasonable time to prepare the defense, the right to bail, the substitution of a judge, and a presumption of innocence until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.15 The defendant is also entitled to a right against self-incrimination, the right to call witnesses, and the right to a jury trial if the sentence is for more than six months.16
Section 757.06, Stats., defines the available sanctions for criminal contempt. Under sec. 757.06(2) punishment for a nonsummary criminal contempt “in no case may exceed” a $5,000 fine and/or imprisonment for one year. Section 757.06(3) specifically provides that “[fjines collected . . . may not be applied for the benefit of any party in a civil proceeding.”
Costs are penal in nature.17 We conclude that the language of sec. 757.06, Stats., prohibits the imposition of any penalty, including the assessment of costs, over and above the fines and imprisonment for nonsummary criminal contempt. We believe that sec. 757.06 is a reasonable legislative act that is clear and unambiguous. Therefore, the statute is not subject to interpretation.18 We accordingly modify the judgment to delete the award of costs and attorneys’ fees and affirm the judgment and order as modified.19
By the Court. — Judgment modified and, as modified, affirmed.